Coalition formation in a contest game with three heterogeneous players

We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul (1989). Afterwards, coalitions play the contest game of Esteban and Ray (1999) within the resulting coalition structure of the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition formation game is equal to the distribution of the relative efficiency of effort. Finally, we use the case of equal bargaining power for all individuals to show that other types of coalition structures may be observed as well.

When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent seeking contests and policy conflicts

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in a general model of contest inspired by Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a symmetric coalition structure. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests.

Sequential formation of coalitions through bilateral agreements

We study a sequential protocol of endogenous coalition formation based on a process of bilateral agreements among the players. We apply the game to a Cournot environment with linear demand and constant average costs. We show that the final outcome of any Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game is the grand coalition, provided the initial number of firms is high enough and they are sufficiently patient.

Unemployment and wage formation in a growth model with public capital

We study the relation between public capital, employment and growth under different assumptions concerning wage formation. We show that public capital increases economic growth, and that, if there is wage inertia, employment positively depends on both economic growth and public capital.

Consumption externalities, habit formation, and equilibrium efficiency

We analyze the welfare properties of the competitive equilibrium in a capital accumulation model where individual preferences are subjected to both habit formation and consumption spillovers. We also discuss how consumption externalities and habits interact to generate an inefficient dynamic equilibrium. Finally, we characterize optimal tax policies aimed to restore efficient decentralized paths.

Growth, habit formation, and catching-up\ with the Joneses

When habits are introduced multiplicatively in a capital accumulation model, the consumers' objective function might fail to be concave. In this paper we provide conditions aimed at guaranteeing the existence of interior solutions to the consumers' problem. We also characterize the equilibrium path of two growth models with multiplicative habits: the internal habit formation model, where individual habits coincide with own past consumption, and the external habit formation (or catching-up with the Joneses) model, where habits arise from the average past consumption in the economy. We show that the introduction of external habits makes the equilibrium path inefficient during the transition towards the balanced growth path. We characterize in this context the optimal tax policy.

Income taxation with habit formation and consumption externalities

We analyze the dynamic behavior and the welfare properties of the equilibrium path of a growth model where both habits and consumption externalities affect the utility of consumers. We discuss the effects of flat rate income taxes and characterize the optimal income taxation policy. We show that, when consumption externalities and habit adjusted consumption are not perfect substitutes, a counter-cyclical income tax rate allows the competitive equilibrium to replicate the efficient path. Our analysis highlights the crucial role played by complementarities between externalities and habits in order to generate an inefficient dynamic equilibrium.

On the regional impact of public capital formation in Spain

The objective of this paper is to investigate, in a methodologically consistent manner, the regional effects of public capital formation and the possible existence of regional spillover effects in Spain. The empirical results are based on VAR estimates at both the aggregate and regional levels using output, employment, and private capital, as well as different measures of public capital. Empirical results suggest that public capital affects output positively at the aggregate level as well as in all but one region. For most regions, the effects of public capital installed in the region itself are important but the spillover effects induced from public capital installed elsewhere are also very important. In fact, the spillover effects account for over half of the total effects of public capital formation in Spain. Furthermore, these spillover effects have a clear geographical pattern in that they tend to be more important in the peripheral regions of the country. We also find that relative to their share of the Spanish output, the biggest beneficiaries of public capital formation are the largest regions in the country. This suggests that public capital formation has contributed to concentration of output in these regions. Finally, in terms of the effects of public capital formation on the private inputs we find that both private capital and employment are affected positively at the aggregate level as well as for most of the regions. Nevertheless, the effects on private capital seem to be larger. Also, the spillover effects are very important for private capital but not for employment. This reflects a great degree of dynamism and mobility in the capital markets as opposed to the labor markets.

New business formation and employment growth: some evidence for the Spanish manufacturing industry

This paper explores the effects of new business formation on employment growth in Spanish manufacturing industries. New firms are believed to make an important contribution to economic growth but the extent of this contribution is unclear. We consider time lags of new firm formation as explanatory variables of employment change and identify how long the effect of new firm entries on employment lasts. Our main results show that the effects of new business formation are positive in the short term, negative in the medium term and positive in the long term, thus confirming the existence of indirect supply-side effects found in similar studies for other countries. Key words: regional growth, firm entry, time lags and Spanish economy. JEL classifications: L00, L60, R11, R12

Secondary effects of catalytic diesel particulate filters: copper-induced formation of PCDD/Fs.

Potential risks of a secondary formation of polychlorinated dibenzodioxins/furans (PCDD/Fs) were assessed for two cordierite-based, wall-through diesel particulate filters (DPFs) for which soot combustion was either catalyzed with an iron- or a copper-based fuel additive. A heavy duty diesel engine was used as test platform, applying the eight-stage ISO 8178/4 C1 cycle. DPF applications neither affected the engine performance, nor did they increase NO, NO2, CO, and CO2 emissions. The latter is a metric for fuel consumption. THC emissions decreased by about 40% when deploying DPFs. PCDD/F emissions, with a focus on tetra- to octachlorinated congeners, were compared under standard and worst case conditions (enhanced chlorine uptake). The iron-catalyzed DPF neither increased PCDD/F emissions, nor did it change the congener pattern, even when traces of chlorine became available. In case of copper, PCDD/F emissions increased by up to 3 orders of magnitude from 22 to 200 to 12 700 pg I-TEQ/L with fuels of < 2, 14, and 110 microg/g chlorine, respectively. Mainly lower chlorinated DD/Fs were formed. Based on these substantial effects on PCDD/F emissions, the copper-catalyzed DPF system was not approved for workplace applications, whereas the iron system fulfilled all the specifications of the Swiss procedures for DPF approval (VERT).

Ectodysplasin A1 promotes placodal cell fate during early morphogenesis of ectodermal appendages.

Organs developing as appendages of the ectoderm are initiated from epithelial thickenings called placodes. Their formation is regulated by interactions between the ectoderm and underlying mesenchyme, and several signalling molecules have been implicated as activators or inhibitors of placode formation. Ectodysplasin (Eda) is a unique signalling molecule in the tumour necrosis factor family that, together with its receptor Edar, is necessary for normal development of ectodermal organs both in humans and mice. We have shown previously that overexpression of the Eda-A1 isoform in transgenic mice stimulates the formation of several ectodermal organs. In the present study, we have analysed the formation and morphology of placodes using in vivo and in vitro models in which both the timing and amount of Eda-A1 applied could be varied. The hair and tooth placodes of K14-Eda-A1 transgenic embryos were enlarged, and extra placodes developed from the dental lamina and mammary line. Exposure of embryonic skin to Eda-A1 recombinant protein in vitro stimulated the growth and fusion of placodes. However, it did not accelerate the initiation of the first wave of hair follicles giving rise to the guard hairs. Hence, the function of Eda-A1 appears to be downstream of the primary inductive signal required for placode initiation during skin patterning. Analysis of BrdU incorporation indicated that the formation of the epithelial thickening in early placodes does not involve increased cell proliferation and also that the positive effect of Eda-A1 on placode expansion is not a result of increased cell proliferation. Taken together, our results suggest that Eda-A1 signalling promotes placodal cell fate during early development of ectodermal organs.