Discovery of 157W and 161Os

The nuclides 157W and 161Os have been discovered in reactions of 58Ni ion beams with a 106Cd target. The 161Os α -decay energy and half-life were 6890±12 keV and 640±60 μs. The daughter 157W nuclei β -decayed with a half-life of 275±40 ms, populating both low-lying α-decaying states in 157Ta, which is consistent with a 7/2− ground state in 157W. Fine structure observed in the α decay of 161Os places the lowest excited state in 157W with Iπ=9/2− at 318±30 keV. The branching ratio of View the MathML source indicates that 161Os also has a 7/2− ground state. Shell-model calculations analysing the effects of monopole shifts and a tensor force on the relative energies of 2f7/2 and 1h9/2 neutron states in N=83 isotones are presented.

Decays of new nuclides and isomers beyond the proton drip line — the influence of neutron configurations

The energy of the vh9/2 orbital in nuclei above N = 82 drops rapidly in energy relative to the vf7/2 orbital as the occupancy of the πh11/2 orbital increases. These two neutron orbitals become nearly degenerate as the proton drip line is approached. In this work, we have discovered the new nuclides 161Os and 157W, and studied the decays of the proton emitter 160Re in detail. The 161Os and 160Re nuclei were produced in reactions of 290, 300 and 310 MeV 58Ni ions with an isotopically enriched 106Cd target, separated in‐flight using the RITU separator and implanted into the GREAT spectrometer. The 161Os α a decays populated the new nuclide 157W, which decayed by β‐particle emission. The β decay fed the known α‐decaying 1/2+ and 11/2− states in 157Ta, which is consistent with a vf7/2 ground state in 157W. The measured α‐decay energy and half‐life for 161Os correspond to a reduced α‐decay width that is compatible with s‐wave α‐particle emission, implying that its ground state is also a vf7/2 state. Over 7000 160Re nuclei were produced and the γ decays of a new isomeric state feeding the πd3/2 level in 160Re were discovered, but no evidence for the proton or a decay of the expected πh11/2 state could be found. The isomer decays offer a natural explanation for this non‐observation and provides a striking example of the influence of the near degeneracy of the vh9/2 and vf7/2 orbitals on the properties of nuclei in this region.

Separating real incentives and accountability

In experimental investigations of the effect of real incentives, accountability—the implicit or explicit expectation of a decision maker that she may have to justify her decisions in front of somebody else—is often confounded with the incentives themselves. This confounding of accountability with incentives makes causal attributions of any effects found problematic. We separate accountability and incentives, and find different effects. Accountability is found to reduce preference reversals between frames, for which incentives have no effect. Incentives on the other hand are found to reduce risk seeking for losses, where accountability has no effect. In a choice task between simple and compound events, accountability increases the preference for the simple event, while incentives have a weaker effect going in the opposite direction. It is thus shown that the confounding of accountability and incentives is relevant for studies on the effect of the latter, and that existing conclusions on the effect of incentives need to be reconsidered in light of this issue.

Responsibility effects in decision making under risk

We systematically explore decision situations in which a decision maker bears responsibility for somebody else's outcomes as well as for her own in situations of payoff equality. In the gain domain we confirm the intuition that being responsible for somebody else's payoffs increases risk aversion. This is however not attributable to a 'cautious shift' as often thought. Indeed, looking at risk attitudes in the loss domain, we find an increase in risk seeking under responsibility. This raises issues about the nature of various decision biases under risk, and to what extent changed behavior under responsibility may depend on a social norm of caution in situations of responsibility versus naive corrections from perceived biases. To further explore this issue, we designed a second experiment to explore risk-taking behavior for gain prospects offering very small or very large probabilities of winning. For large probabilities, we find increased risk aversion, thus confirming our earlier finding. For small probabilities however, we find an increase of risk seeking under conditions of responsibility. The latter finding thus discredits hypotheses of a social rule dictating caution under responsibility, and can be explained through flexible self-correction models predicting an accentuation of the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes predicted by prospect theory. An additional accountability mechanism does not change risk behavior, except for mixed prospects, in which it reduces loss aversion. This indicates that loss aversion is of a fundamentally different nature than probability weighting or utility curvature. Implications for debiasing are discussed.

Risk taking for oneself and others: a structural model approach

Economic theory makes no predictions about social factors affecting decisions under risk. We examine situations in which a decision maker decides for herself and another person under conditions of payoff equality, and compare them to individual decisions. By estimating a structural model, we find that responsibility leaves utility curvature unaffected, but accentuates the subjective distortion of very small and very large probabilities for both gains and losses. We also find that responsibility reduces loss aversion, but that these results only obtain under some specific definitions of the latter. These results serve to generalize and reconcile some of the still largely contradictory findings in the literature. They also have implications for financial agency, which we discuss.

The effect of accountability on loss aversion.

This paper investigates the effect of accountability-the expectation on the side of the decision maker of having to justify his/her decisions to somebody else-on loss aversion. Loss aversion is commonly thought to be the strongest component of risk aversion. Accountability is found to reduce the bias of loss aversion. This effect is explained by the higher cognitive effort induced by accountability, which triggers a rational check on emotional reactions at the base of loss aversion, leading to a reduction of the latter. Connections to dual-processing models are discussed.

The Stephen Dwoskin dossier: introduction

This dossier aims to consider the contribution Stephen Dwoskin and his work made to the development of film and its infrastructure in the UK from 1964 when he arrived in the London until his death in 2012. Dwoskin not only straddled different contexts and ideologies about film but advocated for the support of work in a wide variety of forms. Because of this he was not easily categorizeable. Much of the work analyzing his camera work and his contribution to film is written in French and there is little, particularly in recent years, in English. As such this dossier constituted an important contribution to the reassessment of a singular avant-garde artist and film maker. (can I use avant garde here?) In the light of his recent death this is a timely moment for a consideration of Dwoskin’s achievements and legacy. As well as having a groundbreaking vision of what film could do, he was an influential figure and constituting force in terms of the milieu and structures that supported the independent film world in the UK for several decades. Much of the literature surrounding this world in the UK has been formed by key figures making sense of their part in history. This dossier aims towards some first steps in historicising his legacy. Two of the proposed texts will be making use of new material to conduct original research made available through the recently acquired Dwoskin Archive at University of Reading. Due to Dowksin’s heterogenous involvement in film, there are many ways in which Dwoskin can be considered and the proposed essays will take a range of perspectives to assess and analyse his contribution.

Light and scanning electron microscopy of Henneguya arapaima n. sp (Myxozoa: Myxobolidae) and histology of infected sites in pirarucu (Arapaima gigas: Pisces: Arapaimidae) from the Araguaia River, Brazil

In this report, we describe Henneguya arapaima n. sp., a parasite of the gill arch and gall bladder of Arapaima gigas (pirarucu) collected in the Araguaia River, in the municipality of Nova Crixas, Goias State, central Brazil. The plasmodia were white, round or ellipsoidal and measured 200-600 mu m. Parasite development was asynchronous and the mature spores were fusifonn and had smooth wall. The spores measurements were (range, with means +/- S.D. in parentheses): total length-48.4-53.1 mu m (51.6 +/- 3.4 mu m), body length-13.5-15.2 mu m (14.2 +/- 0.8 mu m), body width-5.1-6.1 mu m (5.7 +/- 0.5 mu m), body thickness-4.7-5.3 mu m (4.9 +/- 0.2 mu m) and caudal process length-38.0-41.2 mu m (38.3 +/- 2.9 mu m). The polar capsules were elongated and of unequal size, with lengths of 6.3-6.8 mu m (6.5 +/- 0.2) and 6.2-6.6 mu m (6.3 +/- 0.1) for the longest and shortest axes, respectively. Capsule width was 1.4-1.6 mu m (1.5 +/- 0.1). Histological analysis showed that the plasmodia occurred in the tunica adventitia of the gall bladder and were delimited by a thin capsule of connective tissue. In the gill arch, the plasmodia were also surrounded by connective tissue similar to the endomesium, of striated skeletal muscle cells. Sixty-five juvenile specimens of A. gigas weighing 1.0-25.0 kg were examined, 17 (26.1%) of which were infected. Of these, 14 (82.3%) had cysts in the gall bladder, two (11.7%) had cysts in the gill arch and only one (5.9%) had cysts in both organs. When the fish were grouped by weight, the prevalence of infection in fish weighing up to 10.0 kg (20.7%) was significantly lower than in fish weighing 10.1-25.0 kg (50%) (G = 3.93; d.f. = 1; p < 0.05). (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Third-order nonlinearity of Er(3+)-doped lead phosphate glass

The third-order optical susceptibility and dispersion of the linear refractive index of Er(3+)-doped lead phosphate glass were measured in the wavelength range between 400 and 1940 nm by using the spectrally resolved femtosecond Maker fringes technique. The nonlinear refractive index obtained from the third-order susceptibility was found to be five times higher than that of silica, indicating that Er(3+)-doped lead phosphate glass is a potential candidate to be used as the base component for the fabrication of photonic devices. For comparison purposes, the Z-scan technique was also employed to obtain the values of the nonlinear refractive index of Er(3+)-doped lead phosphate glass at several wavelengths, and the values obtained using the two techniques agree to within 15%.

The polictical economy informed lobbies

We analize a discrete type version of a common agency model with informed principals of Martimort and Moreira (2005) in the context of lobby games. We begin discussing issues related to the common values nature of the model, i.e.the agent cares directly about the principal’s utility function. With this feature the equilibrium of Martimort and Moreira (2005) is not valid. We argue in favor of one solution, although we are not able to fully characterize the equilibrium in this context. We then turn to an application: a modification of the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model of lobbying for tariff protection to incoporate assimetric information (but disconsidering the problem of common values) in the lobbies objective function. We show that the main results of the original model do not hold and that lobbies may behave less agressively towards the police maker when there is private information in the lobbies valuation for the tariffs.

Conversas com economistas brasileiros

O objetivo deste trabalho é apontar importantes diferenças nos argumentos e diagnósticos de importantes economistas brasileiros. A evidência muito forte é a de que eles não oferecem respostas unânimes, claras e inequívocas para questões econômicas muito bem definidas. O economista brasileiro é quase sempre um generalista. Seja ocupando um lugar na esfera pública ou privada, seja concentrando-se no ambiente acadêmico, são impelidos a opinar sobre vários assuntos. Neste relatório apresentamos as idéias de Affonso Celso Pastore, André Lara Resende, Antonio Delfim Netto, Celso Monteiro Furtado, Eduardo Giannetti da Fonseca, Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, Maria da Conceição Tavares, Mário Henrique Simonsen, Roberto de Oliveira Campos. Procuramos identificar a formação destes economistas e suas visões de desenvolvimento econômico e inflação. Subjacente à leitura das entrevistas exploramos as divergências e os problemas de comunicação nas discussões econômicas. A ênfase foi na variedade e eloquência dos argumentos e o julgamento pessoal.

On common agency with informed principals

This thesis consists of three chapters that have as unifying subject the frame-work of common agency with informed principals. The first two chapters analyze the economic effects of privately informed lobbying applied to tariff protection (Chapter 1) and to customs unions agreements (Chapter 2). The third chapter investigates the choice of retailing strutures when principals (the producers) are privately informed about their production costs. Chapter 1 analyzes how lobbying affects economic policy when the interest groups have private information. I assume that the competitiveness of producers are lobbies private information in a Grossman and Helpman (1994) lobby game. This allows us to analyze the e¤ects of information transmission within their model. I show that the information transmission generates two informational asymmetry problems in the political game. One refers to the cost of signaling the lobby's competitiveness to the policy maker and the other to the cost of screening the rival lobby's competitiveness from the policy maker. As an important consequence information transmission may improve welfare through the reduction of harmful lobbying activity. Chapter 2 uses the framework of chapter 1 to study a customs union agreement when governments are subject to the pressure of special interest groups that have better information about the competitiveness of the industries they represent. I focus on the agreement's effect on the structure of political influence. When join a customs union, the structure of political pressure changes and with privately informed lobbies, a new effect emerges: the governments can use the information they learn from the lobby of one country to extract rents from the lobbies of the other country. I call this the "information transmission effect". This effect enhances the governments'bargaining power in a customs union and makes lobbies demand less protection. Thus, I find that information transmission increases the welfare of the agreement and decreases tari¤s towards non-members. I also investigate the incentives for the creation of a customs union and find that information transmission makes such agreement more likely to be politically sustainable. Chapter 3 investigates the choice of retailing structure when the manufacturers are privately informed about their production costs. Two retailing structures are analyzed, one where each manufacturer chooses her own retailer (exclusive dealing) and another where the manufacturers choose the same retailer (common agency). It is shown that common agency mitigates downstream competition but gives the retailer bargaining power to extract informational rents from the manufacturers, while in exclusive dealing there is no downstream coordination but also there are no incentives problem in the contract between manufacture and retailer. A pre- liminary characterization of the choice of the retailing structure for the case of substitute goods shows that when the uncertainty about the cost increases relatively to the size of the market, exclusive dealing tends to be the chosen retailing structure. On the other hand, when the market is big relatively to the costs, common agency emerges as the retailing structure. This thesis has greatly benefited from the contribution of Professors Humberto Moreira and Thierry Verdier. It also benefited from the stimulating environment of the Toulouse School of Economics, where part of this work was developed during the year of 2007.

Duas teorias econômicas: "consumo" e "retórica": subsídios para o estudo do campo científico da economia no Brasil

Então o panorama no primeiro ano era muito ruim. Tinha o Goffredo (da Silva Teles) que não era esse Goffredo de hoje. Era o Goffredo, vamos dizer, muito influenciado pelo romantismo jurídico, muito conservador. É um bom professor. Eu fui ficando numa "sinuca de bico" porque eu não podia largar a Faculdade. O que ia dizer para o meu pai? Um negócio complicadíssimo. Eu fui levando a faculdade, até que chegou o 20. semestre, eu e o (Luiz) Belluzzo - que fez a Faculdade comigo também - encontramos um amigo nosso que fazia filosofia, que é o Luiz Antônio de Oliveira Lima (professor da FGV-SP). E aí eu conversei: "- Lima, eu não aguento mais essa porcaria dessa faculdade. Quero fazer outra coisa. Aí, ele me disse: " Mas, por que você não vai fazer ciências sociais?" Nem sabia da existência desse curso. "Me explica esse negócio de ciências sociais." E fomos conversando ...então eu e o Belluzzo resolvemos prestar o vestibular para Ciências Sociais Esse sim era um curso estupendo, onde eu aprendi a raciocinar

Ensaios sobre inflação e política monetária

Esta tese tem por objetivo principal o estudo da relação entre atividade econômica, inflação e política monetária no tocante a três aspectos importantes. O primeiro, a perspectiva histórica da evolução da relação entre atividade e inflação no pensamento econômico. O segundo, a análise da dinâmica inflacionária utilizando um modelo com fundamentação microeconômica, no caso a curva de Phillips Novo-Keynesiana, com uma aplicação ao caso brasileiro. O terceiro, a avaliação da eficiência dos mecanismos de sinalização de política monetária utilizados pelo Banco Central no Brasil com base nos movimentos na estrutura a termo da taxa de juros com a mudança da meta da Selic. O elemento central que une estes ensaios é a necessidade do formulador de política econômica compreender o impacto significativo das ações de política monetária na definição do curso de curto prazo da economia real para atingir seus objetivos de aliar crescimento econômico com estabilidade de preços. Os resultados destes ensaios indicam que o modelo Novo-Keynesiano, resultado de um longo desenvolvimento na análise econômica, constitui-se numa ferramenta valiosa para estudar a relação entre atividade e inflação. Uma variante deste modelo foi empregada para estudar com relativo sucesso a dinâmica inflacionária no Brasil, obtendo valores para rigidez da economia próximos ao comportamento observado em pesquisas de campo. Finalmente, foi aliviada a previsibilidade das ações do Banco Central para avaliar o estágio atual de desenvolvimento do sistema de metas no Brasil, através da reação da estrutura a termo de juros às mudanças na meta da taxa básica (Selic). Os resultados indicam que comparando o período de 2003 a 2008 com 2000 a 2003, verificamos que os resultados apontam para o aumento da previsibilidade das decisões do Banco Central. Este fato pode ser explicado por alguns fatores: o aprendizado do público sobre o comportamento do Banco Central; a menor volatilidade econômica no cenário econômico e o aperfeiçoamento dos mecanismos de sinalização e da própria operação do sistema de metas. Comparando-se o efeito surpresa no Brasil com aqueles obtidos por países que promoveram mudanças significativas para aumentar a transparência da política monetária no período de 1990 a 1997, observa-se que o efeito surpresa no Brasil nas taxas de curto prazo reduziu-se significativamente. No período de 2000 a 2003, o efeito surpresa era superior aos de EUA, Alemanha e Reino Unido e era da mesma ordem de grandeza da Itália. No período de 2003 a 2008, o efeito surpresa no Brasil está próximo dos valores dos EUA e Alemanha e inferiores aos da Itália e Reino Unido.

Decision rules and information provision: monitoring versus manipulation

The paper focuses on the organization of institutions designed to resolve disputes between two parties, when some information is not veriable and decision makers may have vested preferences. It shows that the choice of how much discretional power to grant to the decision maker and who provides the information are intrinsically related. Direct involvement of the interested parties in the supply of information enhances monitoring over the decision maker, although at the cost of higher manipulation. Thus, it is desirable when the decision maker is granted high discretion. On the contrary, when the decision maker has limited discretional power, information provision is better assigned to an agent with no direct stake. The analysis helps to rationalize some organizational arrangements that are commonly observed in the context of judicial and antitrust decision-making.