Bald mehr und sicherere Arzneimittel für Kinder? Die Revision des Heilmittelgesetzes bringt im Bereich der Kinderarzneimittel eine Anpassung an europäische Standards

Die Ende Oktober 2009 vom Bundesrat eröffnete ordentliche Revision des Heilmittelgesetzes sieht im Bereich der Kinderarzneimittel erhebliche Neuerungen vor. Zur Verbesserung der Versorgung mit sicheren Kinderarzneimitteln soll in der Schweiz ein in Europa und den USA bereits etabliertes Anreizsystem für die Pharmaindustrie eingeführt werden. Das Ziel der Neuerungen ist die Anpassung des schweizerischen Heilmittelrechts an europäische Standards, wodurch die Versorgung mit pädiatrischen Arzneimitteln verbessert und die Sicherheit der Medikation in der Pädiatrie erhöht werden soll.

International standards for programmes of training in intensive care medicine in Europe.

PURPOSE To develop internationally harmonised standards for programmes of training in intensive care medicine (ICM). METHODS Standards were developed by using consensus techniques. A nine-member nominal group of European intensive care experts developed a preliminary set of standards. These were revised and refined through a modified Delphi process involving 28 European national coordinators representing national training organisations using a combination of moderated discussion meetings, email, and a Web-based tool for determining the level of agreement with each proposed standard, and whether the standard could be achieved in the respondent's country. RESULTS The nominal group developed an initial set of 52 possible standards which underwent four iterations to achieve maximal consensus. All national coordinators approved a final set of 29 standards in four domains: training centres, training programmes, selection of trainees, and trainers' profiles. Only three standards were considered immediately achievable by all countries, demonstrating a willingness to aspire to quality rather than merely setting a minimum level. Nine proposed standards which did not achieve full consensus were identified as potential candidates for future review. CONCLUSIONS This preliminary set of clearly defined and agreed standards provides a transparent framework for assuring the quality of training programmes, and a foundation for international harmonisation and quality improvement of training in ICM.

Approaches to Ensure Quality Standards for Standardized/ Simulated Patient Performance in High Stakes Objective Structured Clinical Exams (OSCEs)

Introduction To meet the quality standards for high-stakes OSCEs, it is necessary to ensure high quality standardized performance of the SPs involved.[1] One of the ways this can be assured is through the assessment of the quality of SPs` performance in training and during the assessment. There is some literature concerning validated instruments that have been used to assess SP performance in formative contexts but very little related to high stakes contexts.[2], [3], [4]. Content and structure During this workshop different approaches to quality control for SPs` performance, developed in medicine, pharmacy and nursing OSCEs, will be introduced. Participants will have the opportunity to use these approaches in simulated interactions. Advantages and disadvantages of these approaches will be discussed. Anticipated outcomes By the end of this session, participants will be able to discuss the rationale for quality control of SPs` performance in high stakes OSCEs, outline key factors in creating strategies for quality control, identify various strategies for assuring quality control, and reflect on applications to their own practice. Who should attend The workshop is designed for those interested in quality assurance of SP performance in high stakes OSCEs. Level All levels are welcome. References Adamo G. 2003. Simulated and standardized patients in OSCEs: achievements and challenges:1992-2003. Med Teach. 25(3), 262- 270. Wind LA, Van Dalen J, Muijtjens AM, Rethans JJ. Assessing simulated patients in an educational setting: the MaSP (Maastricht Assessment of Simulated Patients). Med Educ 2004, 38(1):39-44. Bouter S, van Weel-Baumgarten E, Bolhuis S. Construction and validation of the Nijmegen Evaluation of the Simulated Patient (NESP): Assessing Simulated Patients' ability to role-play and provide feedback to students. Acad Med: Journal of the Association of American Medical Colleges 2012. May W, Fisher D, Souder D: Development of an instrument to measure the quality of standardized/simulated patient verbal feedback. Med Educ 2012, 2(1).

Reporting standards for studies of diagnostic test accuracy in dementia: The STARDdem Initiative.

OBJECTIVE To provide guidance on standards for reporting studies of diagnostic test accuracy for dementia disorders. METHODS An international consensus process on reporting standards in dementia and cognitive impairment (STARDdem) was established, focusing on studies presenting data from which sensitivity and specificity were reported or could be derived. A working group led the initiative through 4 rounds of consensus work, using a modified Delphi process and culminating in a face-to-face consensus meeting in October 2012. The aim of this process was to agree on how best to supplement the generic standards of the STARD statement to enhance their utility and encourage their use in dementia research. RESULTS More than 200 comments were received during the wider consultation rounds. The areas at most risk of inadequate reporting were identified and a set of dementia-specific recommendations to supplement the STARD guidance were developed, including better reporting of patient selection, the reference standard used, avoidance of circularity, and reporting of test-retest reliability. CONCLUSION STARDdem is an implementation of the STARD statement in which the original checklist is elaborated and supplemented with guidance pertinent to studies of cognitive disorders. Its adoption is expected to increase transparency, enable more effective evaluation of diagnostic tests in Alzheimer disease and dementia, contribute to greater adherence to methodologic standards, and advance the development of Alzheimer biomarkers.

Menschenrechtliche Standards der Haftbedingungen in der Untersuchungshaft und ihre Umsetzung in der Schweiz

Die Berechtigung der Untersuchungshaft liegt einzig in der Sicherstellung eines ordnungsgemäss verlaufenden Strafverfahrens, d.h. in der Verhinderung einer Flucht oder von Verdunkelungsaktivitäten. Umso bedeutsamer erscheint vor diesem Hintergrund das Verhältnismässigkeitsprinzip. Dieses verlangt, dass über den Freiheitsentzug an sich hinausgehende Restriktionen im Bereich der Haftmodalitäten nur rechtmässig sind, wenn sie sich im Einzelfall als notwendig erweisen, um den genannten öffentlichen Interessen Rechnung zu tragen. Basierend auf diesem Massstab prüft der Beitrag die Ausgestaltung der Untersuchungshaft in der Schweiz.

The role of anti-VEGF agents in myopic choroidal neovascularization: Current standards and future outlook

Introduction The global prevalence of pathologic myopia is 0.9-3.1%, and visual impairment is found in 0.1-0.5% of European and 0.2-1.4% of Asian studies. Myopic choroidal neovascularization (mCNV) affects 5.2-11.3% of pathologic myopia patients and is a leading cause of vision impairment in the working-age population. Characteristic morphological changes and visual-acuity decrease are diagnostic features. Vascular-Endothelial-Growth-Factor (VEGF) has been identified as a trigger for pathologic neovascularization in these highly myopic patients. Areas Covered We cover the epidemiology, pathology and diagnostic aspects of mCNV. The history of therapeutic interventions is described, followed by an overview of current standard-of-care (SOC)-blocking VEGF using bevacizumab (off-label), ranibizumab or aflibercept and improving vision up to 13.5-14.4 letters. Despite good efficacy, an unmet medical need remains. We summarize ongoing and future developments of new drugs to treat or potentially cure mCNV. Expert Opinion mCNV is a major global health concern. Early detection and treatment is key for a satisfying outcome. The current SOC, VEGF inhibitors, affords good therapeutic efficacy and reasonable disease stabilization with few intravitreal treatments per year. However, the long-term prognosis is still unsatisfactory, and side-effects like chorioretinal atrophy development are of concern. Therefore, efforts should be intensified to develop more effective therapies.

An die verehrlichen Herren Wahlmänner des Breslauer Landkreises: Meine Herren Wahlmänner! Wenn ich es wage, mich Ihnen als Abgeordneten für die zweite Kammer vorzuschlagen ...

Welsch (Projektbearbeiter): Programm des Abgeordneten-Kandidaten Koester aus Sillmenau bei Breslau: Bekenntnis zur oktroyierten Verfassung, Ablösung der grundherrlichen Lasten und Abgaben, Wahl der Pfarrer und Lehrer durch die Gemeinden, keine Trennung von Schule und Kirche, Erschwerung des Zuzugs und der Gründung von Familien für Landfremde, Regulierung der Oder, solide Haushaltspolitik

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.