Towards a Protocol for the Attachment of Semantic Descriptions to Grid Services

Service discovery in large scale, open distributed systems is difficult because of the need to filter out services suitable to the task at hand from a potentially huge pool of possibilities. Semantic descriptions have been advocated as the key to expressive service discovery, but the most commonly used service descriptions and registry protocols do not support such descriptions in a general manner. In this paper, we present a protocol, its implementation and an API for registering semantic service descriptions and other task/user-specific metadata, and for discovering services according to these. Our approach is based on a mechanism for attaching structured and unstructured metadata, which we show to be applicable to multiple registry technologies. The result is an extremely flexible service registry that can be the basis of a sophisticated semantically-enhanced service discovery engine, an essential component of a Semantic Grid.

Towards a Protocol for the Attachment of Metadata to Service Descriptions and its Use in Semantic Discovery

Service discovery in large scale, open distributed systems is difficult because of the need to filter out services suitable to the task at hand from a potentially huge pool of possibilities. Semantic descriptions have been advocated as the key to expressive service discovery, but the most commonly used service descriptions and registry protocols do not support such descriptions in a general manner. In this paper, we present a protocol, its implementation and an API for registering semantic service descriptions and other task/user-specific metadata, and for discovering services according to these. Our approach is based on a mechanism for attaching structured and unstructured metadata, which we show to be applicable to multiple registry technologies. The result is an extremely flexible service registry that can be the basis of a sophisticated semantically-enhanced service discovery engine, an essential component of a Semantic Grid.

A security architecture for a semantic Grid registry

Existing registry technologies such as UDDI can be enhanced to support capabilities for semantic reasoning and inquiry, which subsequently increases its usability range. The Grimoires registry was developed to provide such support through the use of metadata attachments to registry entities. The use of such attachments provides a way for allowing service operators to specify security assertions pertaining to registry entities owned by them. These assertions may however have to be reconciled with existing registry policies. A security architecture based on the XACML standard and deployed in the OMII framework is outlined to demonstrate how this goal is achieved in the registry.

Compositional Model Repositories via Dynamic Constraint Satisfaction with Order-of-Magnitude Preferences

The predominant knowledge-based approach to automated model construction, compositional modelling, employs a set of models of particular functional components. Its inference mechanism takes a scenario describing the constituent interacting components of a system and translates it into a useful mathematical model. This paper presents a novel compositional modelling approach aimed at building model repositories. It furthers the field in two respects. Firstly, it expands the application domain of compositional modelling to systems that can not be easily described in terms of interacting functional components, such as ecological systems. Secondly, it enables the incorporation of user preferences into the model selection process. These features are achieved by casting the compositional modelling problem as an activity-based dynamic preference constraint satisfaction problem, where the dynamic constraints describe the restrictions imposed over the composition of partial models and the preferences correspond to those of the user of the automated modeller. In addition, the preference levels are represented through the use of symbolic values that differ in orders of magnitude.

Education, preferences for leisure, and the optimal income tax schedule

Recent advances in dynamic Mirrlees economies have incorporated the treatment of human capital investments as an important dimension of government policy. This paper adds to this literature by considering a two period economy where agents are di erentiated by their preferences for leisure and their productivity, both private information. The fact that productivity is only learnt later in an agent's life introduces uncertainty to agent's savings and human capital choices and makes optimal the use of multi-period tie-ins in the mechanism that characterizes the government policy. We show that optimal policies are often interim ine cient and that the introduction of these ine ciencies may take the form of marginal tax rates on labor income of varying sign and educational policies that include the discouragement of human capital acquisition. With regards to implementation, state-dependent linear taxes implement optimal savings, while human capital policies may require labor income taxes that depend directly on agents' schooling.

Income inequality in a job-search model with heterogeneous time preferences

This paper explores the use of an intertemporal job-search model in the investigation of within-cohort and between-cohort income inequality, the latter being generated by the heterogeneity of time preferences among cohorts of homogenous workers and the former by the cross-sectional turnover in the job market. It also offers an alternative explanation for the empirically-documented negative correlation between time preference and labor income. Under some speciÖc distributions regarding wage offers and time preferences, we show how the within-cohort and between-cohort Gini coe¢ cients of income distribution can be calculated, and how they vary as a function of the parameters of the model.

Local concavifiability of preferences and determinacy of equilibrium

In this paper we consider strictly convex monotone continuous complete preorderings on R+n that are locally representable by a concave utility function. By Alexandroff 's (1939) theorem, this function is twice dífferentiable almost everywhere. We show that if the bordered hessian determinant of a concave utility representation vanishes on a null set. Then demand is countably rectifiable, that is, except for a null set of bundles, it is a countable union of c1 manifolds. This property of consumer demand is enough to guarantee that the equilibrium prices of apure exchange economy will be locally unique, for almost every endowment. We give an example of an economy satisfying these conditions but not the Katzner (1968) - Debreu (1970, 1972) smoothness conditions.

Preferences, common knowledge and speculative trade

We study the proposition that if it is common knowledge that en allocation of assets is ex-ante pareto efficient, there is no further trade generated by new information. The key to this result is that the information partitions and other characteristics of the agents must be common knowledge and that contracts, or asset markets, must be complete. It does not depend on learning, on 'lemons' problems, nor on agreement regarding beliefs and the interpretation of information. The only requirement on preferences is state-additivity; in particular, traders need not be risk-averse. We also prove the converse result that "no-trade results" imply that traders' preferences can be represented by state-additive utility functions. We analyze why examples of other widely studied preferences (e.g., Schmeidler (1989)) allow "speculative" trade.

Beyond indifferent players: on the existence of prisoners dilemmas in games with amicable and adversarial preferences

Why don’t agents cooperate when they both stand to gain? This question ranks among the most fundamental in the social sciences. Explanations abound. Among the most compelling are various configurations of the prisoner’s dilemma (PD), or public goods problem. Payoffs in PD’s are specified in one of two ways: as primitive cardinal payoffs or as ordinal final utility. However, as final utility is objectively unobservable, only the primitive payoff games are ever observed. This paper explores mappings from primitive payoff to utility payoff games and demonstrates that though an observable game is a PD there are broad classes of utility functions for which there exists no associated utility PD. In particular we show that even small amounts of either altruism or enmity may disrupt the mapping from primitive payoff to utility PD. We then examine some implications of these results.