Strategic Incentives in Unconventional Electoral Systems: Introduction to the Special Issue

The study of strategic behaviour and the impact of institutions on elections has mainly focused on simple and conventional electoral systems: list-proportional electoral systems (PR) and the plurality vote. Less conventional systems are not on the agenda of comparative studies, even though no less than 30% of countries use unconventional electoral systems for their national parliamentary elections, such as the Single Transferable Vote, PR with majority bonuses, or mixed electoral systems. Often, they provide for unusual combinations of different institutional incentives, and hence to particular actor strategies.

Institutions and coalitions in policy processes: a cross-sectoral comparison

Actors with joint beliefs in a decision-making process form coalitions in order to translate their goals into policy. Yet, coalitions are not formed in an institutional void, but rather institutions confer opportunities and constraints to actors. This paper studies the institutional conditions under which either coalition structures with a dominant coalition or with competing coalitions emerge. It takes into account three conditions, i.e. the degree of federalism of a project, its degree of Europeanisation and the openness of the pre-parliamentary phase of the decision-making process. The cross-sectoral comparison includes the 11 most important decision-making processes in Switzerland between 2001 and 2006 with a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Results suggest that Europeanisation or an open pre-parliamentary phase lead to a dominant coalition, whereas only a specific combination of all three conditions is able to explain a structure with competing coalitions.

Europeanization in parliament and in the press

Europeanization challenges national democratic systems. As part and parcel of the broader internationalization of politics, Europeanization is associated with a shift from policymaking within majoritarian, elected representative bodies towards technocratic decisions among non-majoritarian and non-elected bodies (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2008, Lavenex 2013). It is thus said to weaken the influence of citizens and parliaments on the making of policies and to undermine democratic collective identity (Lavenex 2013, Schimmelfennig 2010). The weakening of national parliaments has been referred to as “de-parliamentarisation” (Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2008) and has nurtured a broader debate regarding the democratic deficit in the EU. While not being a member of the EU, Switzerland has not remained unaffected by these changes. As discussed in the contribution by Fischer and Sciarini, state executive actors take the lead in Switzerland's European policy. They are responsible for the conduct of international negotiations, they own the treaty making power, and it is up to them to decide whether they wish to launch a negotiation with the EU. In addition, the strong take-it or leave-it character of Europeanized acts limits the room for manoeuver of the parliamentary body also in the ratification phase. Among the public, the rejection of the treaty on the European constitution has definitely closed the era of “permissive consensus” (Hooghe and Marks 2009). However, the process of European unification remains far remote from the European public. In Switzerland, the strongly administrative character of international legislation hinders public discussion (Vögeli 2007). In such a context, the media may serve as cue for the public: By delivering information about the extent and nature of Europeanized policymaking, the media enable citizens to form their own opinions and to hold their representatives accountable. In this sense media coverage may not only be considered an indicator of the information delivered to the public, but it may also enhance the democratic legitimacy of Europeanized policymaking (for a similar argument, see Tresch and Jochum 2005). While the previous contributions to this debate have examined the Europeanization of Swiss (primary and secondary) legislation, we take a closer look at two additional domestic arenas that are both supposed to be under pressure due to Europeanization: The parliament and the media. To that end, we rely on data gathered in a research project that two of us carried out in the context of the NCCR Democracy.1 While this project was primarily interested in the mediatization of decision-making processes in Switzerland, it also investigated the conditional role played by internationalization/Europeanization. For our present purposes, we shall exploit the two data-sets that were developed as part of a study of the political agenda-setting power of the media (Sciarini and Tresch 2012, 2013, Tresch et al. 2013): A data-set on issue attention in parliamentary interventions (initiatives, motions, postulates,2 interpellations and questions) and a data-set on issue attention in articles from the Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ). The data covers the years 1995 to 2003 and the coding of issues followed the classification system developed in the “Policy Agendas Project” (Baumgartner and Jones 1993).

The structure of the debate on EU integration issues. A comparative analysis of party communication in the EP 2014 elections

The results of Eurosceptic parties in the recent European parliament election provide further evidence that the “permissive consensus” on European integration blurred. This paper focuses on the structure of the debate on EU integration issues. Which EU integration issues and positions do parties put forward? Can the debate on EU integration issues be subsumed in one or several dimensions? Do they reflect national political conflicts such as the left-right and the ‘new politics’/cultural divide? Or do they form one unique or several EU-specific dimensions, e.g. national sovereignty versus integration? In order to address these questions, this paper departs from the assumption that debate on European integration is multidimensional in its nature and therefore entails a multitude of issue areas. In other words, it does not look at how socio-economic and cultural issues are related to European integration but focuses on its components, i.e. particular EU-specific policies such as EU-wide employment, environment, immigration and monetary policy. The paper departs from the cleavage theory on political di-visions and different approaches transferring them to EU politics. Two points should be noted; first, this paper does not compare the debate on European integration issues between the national level and the EU level, but whether domestic divisions are reflected at the EU level. Second, it is not concerned with the general ideo-logical profile of political parties on EU integration issues, but on EU issues that parties communicated through press releases. By doing this, the paper is concerned with the salient EU issues that parties touch upon.

Tracing the Evidence: The Use of Evaluation Results in Direct-Democratic Campaigns

Although research on direct-democratic campaigns in Switzerland has intensified in the last decade, detailed information on the use of evidence in campaigns is still lacking. Our research aims to contribute both to research on direct democracy and to research on evidence-based policy making, by analyzing how evaluation results are used in directdemocratic campaigns. In this conceptual paper, the formulation of our hypothesis is based on a model of evaluation influence that traces the different uses of evaluation results in the process of a direct-democratic campaign. We assume that the policy analytical capacity of individual members in parliament, government and administration in the (pre)-parliamentary process fosters the use of evidence in campaigns. In the course of the campaign, symbolic use of evaluation in the form of justification, persuasion or mobilization prevails. We assume that the media is an important player in making transparent how political actors use evidence to support their positions. Evidence itself often remains ambiguous and uncertain, and evaluations are influenced by the values of the evaluator. To be able to make the right decisions, therefore, citizens should learn about possible interpretations in argumentative processes. For us, the context of direct democracy in Switzerland provides the setting for such a discourse that, besides evidence, brings up different opinions, values and beliefs.

Institutionelle Regeln oder politische Kultur? Faktoren der parlamentarischen Mitgliederfluktuation in der Schweiz

Die Frage, ob es institutionelle Regeln oder Merkmale der politischen Kultur sind, die den personellen Wechsel in Parlamenten erklären, wird auf subnationaler Ebene für alle 26 kantonalen Legislativen der Schweiz für den Zeitraum zwischen 1960 und 2012 untersucht. Die Befunde zeigen, dass sowohl institutionelle Rahmenbedingungen als auch kulturelle Merkmale bedeutende Beiträge zur Erklärung der kantonalen Unterschiede der Parlamentsfluktuation bieten. Während Massnahmen wie die Senkung der Anzahl Parlamentsmandate und die Amtszeitbeschränkung einen direkten und starken Einfluss auf die Fluktuationsrate haben, erweisen sich die Höhe der finanziellen Vergütungen und institutionelle Regeln zur Stärkung des Parlaments gegenüber der Exekutive ohne nachhaltigen Einfluss. Langfristige politisch-kulturelle Merkmale wie die Zugehörigkeit zu einem Sprachraum sind mindestens ebenso wichtig wie einzelne institutionelle Arrangements. Als relativ unbedeutend zur Erklärung der kantonalen Niveauunterschiede parlamentarischer Mitgliederfluktuation erweisen sich sozioökonomische und demographische Faktoren – mit Ausnahme des Urbanisierungsgrads.

The Marginal Impact of ENGOs in Different Types of Democratic Systems

Conventional wisdom suggests that environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) play a major role in pushing states towards more ambitious environmental policies. However, demonstrating that this presumption is in fact true is rather difficult, because the same system structures of democracies that may create more opportunities for ENGO activities are also, on their own, conducive to better environmental policies. This leaves open the possibility that the additional (marginal) impact of ENGOs on policy making is smaller than presumed. In trying to disentangle these effects, this paper examines the influence of ENGOs contingent on key structural characteristics of democratic systems. We develop the argument that presidential systems with a plurality electoral rule per se tend to provide more environmental public goods, which induces a smaller marginal impact of ENGOs. Conversely, parliamentary systems with a proportional representation electoral rule are likely to provide fewer environmental public goods, which allows for a larger marginal impact of ENGOs. We find robust empirical support for these hypotheses in analyses that focus on the ratification behavior of 75 democracies vis-à-vis 250 international environmental agreements in 1973–2002.

"An attentive Ear, a watchful Eye, and a Calm judicious Pen": William Samuel Johnson, the Colonial Agents, and the Transformation of the British Atlantic World

By looking at Great Britain and the American colonies in conjunction with the larger British Atlantic Empire, historians can better understand the political, social, and cultural transformations that occurred when transatlantic actors met. William Samuel Johnson is an example of an "ordinary" agent who nonetheless had extensive contacts with numerous British and American thinkers. While acting on Connecticut's behalf in London between 1767 and 1771, he sent reports back to Connecticut governors Jonathan Trumbull and William Pitkin on parliamentary proceedings while corresponding with the people who traveled around the Atlantic world during this critical period-merchants, seafarers, emigrants, soldiers, missionaries, radicals and conservatives, reformers, and politicians. He is also representative of the late eighteenth-century empire writ large. Agents, who had once been a source of stability in the far-flung colonies, became a destabilizing force as confusion and conflict grew over conceptual ideas of what constituted "the empire" and who was included in it. Johnson was a sane observer in the midst of the ideological and administrative upheaval of the 1760's and 1770's. His subsequent loyalism and political obscurity during the war years was in many ways a result of his attempts to reconcile various factional interests during his tenure as an agent. Although he did his best to resolve these divisions and provide an accurate account of the powerful nationalistic forces gathering on both sides of the Atlantic on the eve of the American Revolution, the agents' collective failures as transatlantic mediators helped bring about the collapse of an imperial community. This disintegration had dramatic effects on the whole of the Atlantic world.

Abortion and Clinical Practice. Abortion Review Papers from the bpas conference: London, 25 - 26 June 2008

The groundbreaking bpas conference The Future of Abortion: Controversies and Care brought together clinicians, academics, policymakers and advocates from the UK, Europe and the USA for a discussion about all aspects of abortion provision. Taking place during a critical Parliamentary debate about the UK abortion law, the conference generated great excitement and presented a number of important research findings and policy suggestions.In order to maximise the strides made by The Future of Abortion conference in taking forward an international, interdisciplinary discussion, Abortion Review is producing a series of special editions in which we have published edited transcripts of the presentations. In this third edition, Abortion and Clinical Practice, the presentations examine developments in abortion research and practice, and what these might indicate for the kind of abortion service that should be provided.

La inacabada construcción de la democracia interna : el voto directo en la UCR y el Partido Demócrata de Córdoba (1941-1942)

En Argentina, los primeros ensayos de voto directo en las elecciones internas de los partidos políticos tuvieron lugar en las décadas del treinta y el cuarenta del siglo XX. Con anterioridad, los candidatos eran elegidos por notables que imponían sus decisiones en las convenciones partidarias. En este artículo, se plantea analizar su implementación en Córdoba por la UCR y el Partido Demócrata, a partir de una coyuntura cuya relevancia trascendía los límites provinciales: las últimas elecciones parlamentarias nacionales antes del golpe militar de junio de 1943. La reconstrucción historiográfica muestra sus alcances así como las resistencias a la democratización en ambos partidos.

Un aspecto de la oposición radical yrigoyenista al gobernador Crotto, las interpelaciones parlamentarias

José Camilo Crotto llegó al gobierno de la provincia de Buenos Aires por la incuestionable presión que ejerció el presidente Yrigoyen para que así sucediera. Sin embargo, rápidamente el apoyo presidencial habría de convertirse en oposición; este cambio se debió a que Crotto designó, sin consultar al presidente, a allegados suyos, no sólo como ministros sino que también, luego de desplazar a varios yrigoyenistas, nombrados en su momento por el interventor federal Cantilo, a amigos de su confianza. Desde entonces, la ruptura del radicalismo yrigoyenista fue inevitable; los nuevos opositores a Crotto lo atacaron de todas maneras a fin de lograr, cosa que consiguieron en 1921, su renuncia como gobernador. Una de las formas de oposición, fue a través de las interpelaciones, siendo las más importantes aquí estudiadas.

Un aspecto de la oposición radical yrigoyenista al gobernador Crotto, las interpelaciones parlamentarias

José Camilo Crotto llegó al gobierno de la provincia de Buenos Aires por la incuestionable presión que ejerció el presidente Yrigoyen para que así sucediera. Sin embargo, rápidamente el apoyo presidencial habría de convertirse en oposición; este cambio se debió a que Crotto designó, sin consultar al presidente, a allegados suyos, no sólo como ministros sino que también, luego de desplazar a varios yrigoyenistas, nombrados en su momento por el interventor federal Cantilo, a amigos de su confianza. Desde entonces, la ruptura del radicalismo yrigoyenista fue inevitable; los nuevos opositores a Crotto lo atacaron de todas maneras a fin de lograr, cosa que consiguieron en 1921, su renuncia como gobernador. Una de las formas de oposición, fue a través de las interpelaciones, siendo las más importantes aquí estudiadas.

Un aspecto de la oposición radical yrigoyenista al gobernador Crotto, las interpelaciones parlamentarias

José Camilo Crotto llegó al gobierno de la provincia de Buenos Aires por la incuestionable presión que ejerció el presidente Yrigoyen para que así sucediera. Sin embargo, rápidamente el apoyo presidencial habría de convertirse en oposición; este cambio se debió a que Crotto designó, sin consultar al presidente, a allegados suyos, no sólo como ministros sino que también, luego de desplazar a varios yrigoyenistas, nombrados en su momento por el interventor federal Cantilo, a amigos de su confianza. Desde entonces, la ruptura del radicalismo yrigoyenista fue inevitable; los nuevos opositores a Crotto lo atacaron de todas maneras a fin de lograr, cosa que consiguieron en 1921, su renuncia como gobernador. Una de las formas de oposición, fue a través de las interpelaciones, siendo las más importantes aquí estudiadas.

Politics of the 1945 Constitution:Democratization and Its Impact on Political Institutions in Indonesia

Introduction : Before 1998, no one could think about the amendment of the 1945 Constitution. The 1945 Constitution was a product of nationalist who had hard fought for independence from the Dutch colonization. This historical background made it the symbol of independence of the Indonesian nation. Thus, it has been considered as forbidden to touch contents of the 1945 Constitution whereas political leaders have legitimized their authoritarian rulership by utilizing a symbolic character of the Constitution. With the largest political turmoil since its independence, that is, a breakdown of authoritarian regime and democratic transformation in 1998-1999, however, a myth of the "sacred and inviolable" constitution has disappeared. A new theme has then aroused: how can the 1945 Constitution be adapted for a new democratic regime in Indonesia? 　　　The Indonesian modern state has applied the 1945 Constitution as the basic law since its independence in 1945, except for around 10 years in the 1950s. In the period of independence struggle, contrary to the constitutional provision that a kind of presidential system is employed, a cabinet responsible for the Central National Committee was installed. Politics under this institution was in practice a parliamentary system of government. After the Dutch transferred sovereignty to Indonesia in 1949, West European constitutionalism and party politics under a parliamentary system was fully adopted with the introduction of two new constitutions: the 1949 Constitution of Federal Republic of Indonesia and the 1950 Provisional Constitution of Republic of Indonesia. Since a return from the 1950 Constitution to the 1945 Constitution was decided with the Presidential Decree in 1959, the 1945 Constitution had supported two authoritarian regimes of Soekarno's "Guided Democracy" and Soeharto's "New Order" as a legal base. When the 32-year Soeharto's government fell down and democratization started in 1998, the 1945 Constitution was not replaced with a new one, as seen in many other democratizing countries, but successively reformed to adapt itself to a new democratic regime. In the result of four constitutional amendments in 1999-2002, political institutions in Indonesia are experiencing a transformation from an authoritative structure, in which the executive branch monopolized power along with incompetent legislative and judicial branches, to a modern democratic structure, in which the legislative branch can maintain predominance over the executive. However, as observed that President Abdurrahman Wahid, the first president ever elected democratically in Indonesian history, was impeached after one and a half years in office, democratic politics under a new political institution has never been stable. 　　　Under the 1945 Constitution, how did authoritarian regimes maintain stability? Why can a democratic regime not achieve its stability? What did the two constitutional amendments in the process of democratization change? In the first place, how did the political institutions stipulated by the 1945 Constitution come out? Through answering the above questions, this chapter intends to survey the historical continuity and change of political institutions in Indonesia along with the 1945 Constitutions and to analyze impact of regime transformation on political institutions. First, we examine political institutions stipulated by the original 1945 Constitution as well as historical and philosophical origins of the constitution. Second, we search constitutional foundations in the 1945 Constitution that made it possible for Soekarno and Soeharto to establish and maintain authoritarian regimes. Third, we examine contents of constitutional amendments in the process of democratization since 1998. Fourth, we analyze new political dynamics caused by constitutional changes, looking at the impeachment process of President Abdurrahman Wahid. Finally, we consider tasks faced by Indonesia that seeks to establish a stable democracy.