Strategic Incentives in Unconventional Electoral Systems: Introduction to the Special Issue
Data(s) |
01/04/2014
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Resumo |
The study of strategic behaviour and the impact of institutions on elections has mainly focused on simple and conventional electoral systems: list-proportional electoral systems (PR) and the plurality vote. Less conventional systems are not on the agenda of comparative studies, even though no less than 30% of countries use unconventional electoral systems for their national parliamentary elections, such as the Single Transferable Vote, PR with majority bonuses, or mixed electoral systems. Often, they provide for unusual combinations of different institutional incentives, and hence to particular actor strategies. |
Formato |
application/pdf |
Identificador |
http://boris.unibe.ch/65421/1/00344893.2014.pdf Bochsler, Daniel; Bernauer, Julian (2014). Strategic Incentives in Unconventional Electoral Systems: Introduction to the Special Issue. Representation - the journal of representative democracy, 50(1), pp. 1-12. Routledge 10.1080/00344893.2014.902214 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2014.902214> doi:10.7892/boris.65421 info:doi:10.1080/00344893.2014.902214 urn:issn:0034-4893 |
Idioma(s) |
eng |
Publicador |
Routledge |
Relação |
http://boris.unibe.ch/65421/ |
Direitos |
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess |
Fonte |
Bochsler, Daniel; Bernauer, Julian (2014). Strategic Incentives in Unconventional Electoral Systems: Introduction to the Special Issue. Representation - the journal of representative democracy, 50(1), pp. 1-12. Routledge 10.1080/00344893.2014.902214 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2014.902214> |
Palavras-Chave | #320 Political science |
Tipo |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion PeerReviewed |