Strategic Incentives in Unconventional Electoral Systems: Introduction to the Special Issue


Autoria(s): Bochsler, Daniel; Bernauer, Julian
Data(s)

01/04/2014

Resumo

The study of strategic behaviour and the impact of institutions on elections has mainly focused on simple and conventional electoral systems: list-proportional electoral systems (PR) and the plurality vote. Less conventional systems are not on the agenda of comparative studies, even though no less than 30% of countries use unconventional electoral systems for their national parliamentary elections, such as the Single Transferable Vote, PR with majority bonuses, or mixed electoral systems. Often, they provide for unusual combinations of different institutional incentives, and hence to particular actor strategies.

Formato

application/pdf

Identificador

http://boris.unibe.ch/65421/1/00344893.2014.pdf

Bochsler, Daniel; Bernauer, Julian (2014). Strategic Incentives in Unconventional Electoral Systems: Introduction to the Special Issue. Representation - the journal of representative democracy, 50(1), pp. 1-12. Routledge 10.1080/00344893.2014.902214 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2014.902214>

doi:10.7892/boris.65421

info:doi:10.1080/00344893.2014.902214

urn:issn:0034-4893

Idioma(s)

eng

Publicador

Routledge

Relação

http://boris.unibe.ch/65421/

Direitos

info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess

Fonte

Bochsler, Daniel; Bernauer, Julian (2014). Strategic Incentives in Unconventional Electoral Systems: Introduction to the Special Issue. Representation - the journal of representative democracy, 50(1), pp. 1-12. Routledge 10.1080/00344893.2014.902214 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2014.902214>

Palavras-Chave #320 Political science
Tipo

info:eu-repo/semantics/article

info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

PeerReviewed