Effects of team Knowledge and ecological constraints on decisional processes in customized football game scenarios

Several theories assume that successful team coordination is partly based on knowledge that helps anticipating individual contributions necessary in a situational task. It has been argued that a more ecological perspective needs to be considered in contexts evolving dynamically and unpredictably. In football, defensive plays are usually coordinated according to strategic concepts spanning all members and large areas of the playfield. On the other hand, fewer people are involved in offensive plays as these are less projectable and strongly constrained by ecological characteristics. The aim of this study is to test the effects of ecological constraints and player knowledge on decision making in offensive game scenarios. It is hypothesized that both knowledge about team members and situational constraints will influence decisional processes. Effects of situational constraints are expected to be of higher magnitude. Two teams playing in the fourth league of the Swiss Football Federation participate in the study. Forty customized game scenarios were developed based on the coaches’ information about player positions and game strategies. Each player was shown in ball possession four times. Participants were asked to take the perspective of the player on the ball and to choose a passing destination and a recipient. Participants then rated domain specific strengths (e.g., technical skills, game intelligence) of each of their teammates. Multilevel models for categorical dependent variables (team members) will be specified. Player knowledge (rated skills) and ecological constraints (operationalized as each players’ proximity and availability for ball reception) are included as predictor variables. Data are currently being collected. Results will yield effects of parameters that are stable across situations as well as of variable parameters that are bound to situational context. These will enable insight into the degree to which ecological constraints and more enduring team knowledge are involved in decisional processes aimed at coordinating interpersonal action.

Development of a 3D Game Engine

This paper presents the development history and specification of a 3D game engine titled "Spark Engine". The term "engine" is used to describe a complex graphics software suite that streamlines application development and provides efficient rendering functionality. A game engine specifically provides tools to simplify game development. Spark Engine is fully shader driven and is built on top of Microsoft's XNA Framework. It is a reusable and flexible platform that can be used to build any type of graphics application ranging from gaming to simulation. The engine was released as open source software under the New BSD License with an interest in furthering its development.

Game Theoretic Bidding Strategies for Auctions in Green Electricity Markets

Electricity markets in the United States presently employ an auction mechanism to determine the dispatch of power generation units. In this market design, generators submit bid prices to a regulation agency for review, and the regulator conducts an auction selection in such a way that satisfies electricity demand. Most regulators currently use an auction selection method that minimizes total offer costs ["bid cost minimization" (BCM)] to determine electric dispatch. However, recent literature has shown that this method may not minimize consumer payments, and it has been shown that an alternative selection method that directly minimizes total consumer payments ["payment cost minimization" (PCM)] may benefit social welfare in the long term. The objective of this project is to further investigate the long term benefit of PCM implementation and determine whether it can provide lower costs to consumers. The two auction selection methods are expressed as linear constraint programs and are implemented in an optimization software package. Methodology for game theoretic bidding simulation is developed using EMCAS, a real-time market simulator. Results of a 30-day simulation showed that PCM reduced energy costs for consumers by 12%. However, this result will be cross-checked in the future with two other methods of bid simulation as proposed in this paper.

Ahead of the Game: Middle and Upper Palaeolithic Hunting Behaviors in the Southern Caucasus

Over the past several decades a variety of models have been proposed to explain perceived behavioral and cognitive differences between Neanderthals and modern humans. A key element in many of these models and one often used as a proxy for behavioral “modernity” is the frequency and nature of hunting among Palaeolithic populations. Here new archaeological data from Ortvale Klde, a late Middle–early Upper Palaeolithic rockshelter in the Georgian Republic, are considered, and zooarchaeological methods are applied to the study of faunal acquisition patterns to test whether they changed significantly from the Middle to the Upper Palaeolithic. The analyses demonstrate that Neanderthals and modern humans practiced largely identical hunting tactics and that the two populations were equally and independently capable of acquiring and exploiting critical biogeographical information pertaining to resource availability and animal behavior. Like lithic techno-typological traditions, hunting behaviors are poor proxies for major behavioral differences between Neanderthals and modern humans, a conclusion that has important implications for debates surrounding the Middle–Upper Palaeolithic transition and what features constitute “modern” behavior. The proposition is advanced that developments in the social realm of Upper Palaeolithic societies allowed the replacement of Neanderthals in the Caucasus with little temporal or spatial overlap and that this process was widespread beyond traditional topographic and biogeographical barriers to Neanderthal mobility.

Teaching Time Preference and Human Impatience: The Billionaire Game

The Billionaire Game involves students in discussing time preference, or what Fisher (1930) calls human impatience. The game can facilitate the introduction of the material on present value and discounting or discussions on such issues as investment in human capital and the intertemporal consumption-saving decision. Thus, the game can facilitate discussions in a number of economics courses.

The Old Ball Game: Organization of Nineteenth Century Professional Base Ball Clubs

The first professional base ball clubs came in two varieties: stock clubs, which paid their players fixed wages, and player cooperatives, in which players shared the proceeds after expenses. We argue that stock clubs were formed with players of known ability, while co-ops were formed with players of unknown ability. Although residual claimancy served to screen out players of inferior ability in co-ops, the process was imperfect due to the team production problem. Based on this argument, we suggest that co-ops functioned as an early minor league system where untried players could seek to prove themselves and eventually move up to wage teams. Empirical analysis of data on player performance and experience in early professional base ball provides support for the theory.

Can a Newly Proposed Mechanism for Allocating Contracts in U.S. Electricity Wholesale Markets Lead to Lower Prices? A Game Theoretic Analysis

This study of the wholesale electricity market compares the cost-minimizing performance of the auction mechanism currently in place in U.S. markets with the performance of a proposed replacement. The current mechanism chooses an allocation of contracts that minimizes a fictional cost calculated using pay-as-offer pricing. Then suppliers are paid the market clearing price. The proposed mechanism uses the market clearing price in the allocation phase as well as in the payment phase. In concentrated markets, the proposed mechanism outperforms the current mechanism even when strategic behavior by suppliers is taken into account. The advantage of the proposed mechanism increases with increased price competition.

It's your game, keep it real. Sexual education study

Purpose: This study translated and adapted the It's Your Game, Keep It Real study currently being implemented with middle school youth in Southeast Texas for a middle school population in rural western Honduras. The study tested the effects of a sexual health education program focused on human immunodeficiency virus, sexually transmitted infections, and pregnancy prevention. We hypothesized that the number of adolescents in the intervention group who initiate sexual activity will reduce in comparison to the control group and there will be an increase consistent condom use in sexually active adolescents in the intervention group. ^ Methods: The target population included Spanish-speaking Hispanic middle school students from a small, semi-urban city in western Honduras. One school was randomly selected to receive the intervention and one to the comparison condition. The intervention curriculum consisted of 10 seventh-grade lessons that included individual and group classroom-based activities and personal journaling. Follow-up surveys were completed three months after the last lesson with 146 students (79.3% of the defined cohort). ^ Results: In the comparison condition, 21.4% of students initiated sex by the post-test follow-up three months after the intervention compared to 7.8% in the intervention condition. ^ Conclusions: A multi-component, curriculum-based program that is theory driven and culturally relevant can increase knowledge about STIs and HIV, increase self-confidence amongst middle school students, and develop communication skills amongst friends and partners. Further research must be conducted to assess delay in sexual initiation and the generalizability of these results.^

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

A Mathematical Representation of "Excitement" in Games: A Contribution to the Theory of Game Systems

Researchers have long believed the concept of "excitement" in games to be subjective and difficult to measure. This paper presents the development of a mathematically computable index that measures the concept from the viewpoint of an audience and from that of a player. One of the key aspects of the index is the differential of the probability of "winning" before and after one specific "play" in a given game. The index makes a large contribution to the study of games and enables researchers to compare and analyze the “excitement” of various games. It may be applied in many fields, especially the area of welfare economics, and applications may range from those related to allocative efficiency to axioms of justice and equity.

Financial Policies and Dynamic Game Simulation in Poland and Hungary

Recently, steady economic growth rates have been kept in Poland and Hungary. Money supplies are growing rather rapidly in these economies. In large, exchange rates have trends of depreciation. Then, exports and prices show the steady growth rates. It can be thought that per capita GDPs are in the same level and development stages are similar in these two countries. It is assumed that these two economies have the same export market and export goods are competing in it. If one country has an expansion of monetary policy, price increase and interest rate decrease. Then, exchange rate decrease. Exports and GDP will increase through this phenomenon. At the same time, this expanded monetary policy affects another country through the trade. This mutual relationship between two countries can be expressed by the Nash-equilibrium in the Game theory. In this paper, macro-econometric models of Polish and Hungarian economies are built and the Nash- equilibrium is introduced into them.