977 resultados para Organizational processes
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Passive trip system, reactor trip, runaway reaction, batch reactor
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Mathematik, Diss., 2009
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Informatik, Diss., 2009
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Elektrotechnik und Informationstechnik, Diss., 2012
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Verfahrens- und Systemtechnik, Diss., 2012
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Elektrotechnik und Informationstechnik, Diss., 2013
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Verfahrens- und Systemtechnik, Diss., 2012
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Verfahrens- und Systemtechnik, Diss., 2014
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Verfahrens- und Systemtechnik, Diss., 2014
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Elektrotechnik und Informationstechnik, Diss., 2015
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Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg, Fakultät für Naturwissenschaften, Univ., Dissertation, 2015
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We address the question of how a third-party payer (e.g. an insurer) decides what providers to contract with. Three different mechanisms are studied and their properties compared. A first mechanism consists in the third-party payer setting up a bargaining procedure with both providers jointly and simultaneously. A second mechanism envisages the outcome of the same simultaneous bargaining but independently with every provider. Finally, the last mechanism is of different nature. It is the so-called "any willing provider" where the third-party payer announces a contract and every provider freely decides to sign it or not. The main finding is that the decision of the third-party payer depends on the surplus to be shared. When it is relatively high the third-party payer prefers the any willing provider system. When, on the contrary, the surplus is relatively low, the third-party payer will select one of the other two systems accor ing to how bargaining power is distributed.
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Purpose - This paper focuses on analyzing the effect that public reforms have on the efficiency of state-owned enterprises in regulated environments. Design/methodology/approach - The research is focused in the postal sector where public and private companies must obey a legal framework related to provide a universal service. The analysis is carried out using a panel of 7 European postal operators for the period 1997-2003. The activity analyzed was the letter mail division; we take as key variable the unit cost of a letter and use a translog cost function where as independent variables we include traffic levels, labor cost per employee, quality and availability of the service as well as the type of ownership (public or private). Additionally, in a second stage the geographical differences among countries are considered. Findings - Results indicate that postal operators that experienced organizational changes without being privatized, such as the Spanish and Greek operators, do not have higher unit costs than privatized postal operators like the one of Germany and the Netherlands. Moreover, we find that in all cases the operator of Ireland appear to be the most efficient. In this case restructuring process has been carried out giving an important leadership role to workers. This suggests us that labor culture could be a key variable to study when analyzing reform processes in public enterprises. Originality/value - Our findings show that in a regulated environment like in the postal sector, public and private companies can obtain similar efficiency levels in term of unit costs.
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We study how personal relations affect performance in organizations. In the experimental game we use a manager has to assign different degrees of decision power to two employees. These two employees then have to make distributive decisions which affect themselves and the manager. Our focus is on the effects on managers' assignment of decision power and on employees' distributive decisions of one of the employees and the manager knowing each other personally. Our evidence shows that managers tend to favor employees that they personally know and that these employees tend, more than other employees, to favor the manager in their distributive decisions. However, this behavior does not affect the performance of the employees that do not know the manager. All these effects are independent of whether the employees that know the manager are more or less productive than those who do not know the manager. The results shed light on discrimination and nepotism and its consequences for the performance of family firms and other organizations.
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In this article we investigate the reforms of human resource management in the European Commission and the OECD by analyzing comparatively to what extent both organizations have adjusted their respective structures towards the ideal type of the so-called New Public Management (NPM). The empirical findings show that reforms towards NPM are more pronounced in the Commission than in the OECD. These findings are surprising for two reasons: First, it seems rather paradoxical that the OECD as central promoter of NPM at the international level lags behind the global trend when it comes to reforming its own structures. Second, this result is in contradiction with theoretical expectations, as they can be derived from theories of institutional isomorphism. To nevertheless account for the surprising results, it is necessary to modify and complement existing theories especially with regard to the scope conditions of their causal mechanisms.