Islam and the Legal Enforcement of Morality

Over sixty years ago, British high court judge Patrick Devlin and legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart fought out a famous debate over the legal enforcement of morality, which was generated by the question whether homosexuality should be legalized or not. Jurists agree that this debate was won by Hart, also evidenced in the fact that the state has since been retreating from its previous role of moral watchdog. I argue in this paper that the two most conflicted and essentially unresolved issues in the integration of Islam, the regulation of the female body and of free speech, have reopened this debate anew, pushing the liberal state toward the legal regulation of morality, thus potentially putting at risk its liberalness. I use the Hart-Devlin debate as a template for comparing and contrasting the Muslim quest for restricting free speech with the host-society quest for restricting the Islamic veil. Accordingly, there is a double threat to liberalism, which this paper brings into view in tandem, one originating from Islam and another from a hypertrophied defense of liberalism.

Islamophobia as Reactive Co-Radicalization

Since 9/11, 2001, a new form of religious extremism has arguably emerged, one which paradoxically portrays itself as a counter to another perceived extremism regarded as a real and imminent threat. Within North America and Western Europe, as elsewhere, there is an upsurge of various forms of reactionary rhetoric and opposition expressed towards Islam and Muslims. An increase in extremist behaviour, even violence, is appearing from quarters opposed to, or varyingly fearful of, Islamic extremism if not Islam or Muslims. Islamophobia, as a manifestation of fear of an exclusionary Islam, manifests as exclusionary or negatively reactive behaviours with Muslims and Islam as the target. This article explores the idea that Islamophobia can be regarded as a manifestation of religious extremism and, further, that such extremism is construable as “reactive co-radicalization.” It focuses on two European cases – the 2009 Swiss ban on the building of minarets and the 2011 Norwegian massacre carried out by Anders Breivik – as examples of this “reactive co-radicalization.” This term, I suggest, is an apt denominator for the exclusionary reaction to the rising presence of Islam within otherwise secular, albeit nominally Christian, Western European and North American societies, among others.

Reactive Co-Radicalization: Religious Extremism as Mutual Dicontent

Extremist rhetoric and behaviour, including violence, emanating from those fearing and opposed to Islamic extremism—and typically generalising that to Islam or Muslims—is undeniable. Equally, there is evidence of Muslim rhetoric that fires up fears of a threatening West and antipathy to religious ‘others’ as damned infidels, including Christians and Jews who are otherwise regarded as co-religionists—as ‘peoples of the Book’. Mutual discontent and antipathy abound. On the one hand, Islamic extremism provokes a reactionary extremism from parts, at least, of the non-Muslim world; on the other hand, Muslim extremism appears often in response to the perception of an aggressive and impositional colonising non-Muslim world. ‘Reactive Co-Radicalization’, I suggest, names this mutual rejection and exclusionary circle currently evident, in particular, with respect to many Muslim and non-Muslim communities. This article discusses reactive co-radicalization as a hermeneutical perspective on religious extremism with particular reference to two European cases.

Veil: Mirror of Identity

The Islamic headscarf has become the subject of heated legal and political debate. France and Germany have legislated against it, and even the UK, long a champion of multiculturalism, has recently restricted the veil proper. Ever since home-grown Islamic terrorism struck Europe, these debates have become even more prominent, impassioned and wide-ranging, with vital global importance. In this concise and beautifully written introduction to the politics of the veil in modern societies, Christian Joppke examines why a piece of clothing could have led to such controversy. He dissects the multiple meanings of the Islamic headscarf, and explores its links with the global rise of Islam, Muslim integration, and the retreat from multiculturalism. He argues that the headscarf functions as a mirror of identity, but one in which national and liberal identities overlap, exposing the paradox that while it may be an affront to liberal values, its suppression is equally illiberal.

イスラーム銀行の発展と銀行をめぐる問題―既存の体制との矛盾と高利回りへの志向―

本稿では初めに、イスラーム銀行に関する内外の研究状況について俯瞰し、その後でイスラーム銀行が設立される基にある「利子(リバー)の禁止」について述べ、そして歴史上のイスラーム金融について述べた。続いて、1970年代以降のイスラーム銀行の発展について整理した。そこでは、ダール・アル・マール・アル・イスラーミー・グループやアル・バラカ・グループなどのイスラーム銀行グループにも言及しながらイスラーム銀行の発展について述べ、また、中東や南アジア、東南アジアの主要国における状況やアフリカやヨーロッパなどへの拡大についてもまとめた。後半では、イスラーム銀行・イスラーム金融がどのような問題を抱えているかという点について、サウジアラビアを例として既存の金融体制との矛盾の問題を検討し、続いて、実際の金融活動ではムラーバハ金融やその類似手法が多く用いられていることやマレーシアでは非イスラーム教徒の中国系住民がイスラーム銀行の顧客の過半数を占めていることを示しながら、イスラーム金融でも実際には「高利回り」への志向が強まっているなど、イスラーム金融抱えている根本的な問題についても検討した。

サウジアラビアにおけるザカートの徴収－イスラームの税制と国家財政－

本稿ではサウジアラビアにおけるザカート(ザカー)の徴収について検討した。イスラーム諸国におけるザカートは、一般的には、イスラーム教徒が任意で提供する「お布施」的なものとして理解されることが多い。しかし、ザカートは初期イスラーム時代には、イスラームの教団国家の歳入の大きな柱であり、事実上、公租の役割を果たしていた。サウジアラビアでは18世紀半ばにサウード朝が興ったが、サウード朝は初期イスラーム時代を模範とするワッハーブ派と協力して国家を建設したため、サウード朝においてはザカートが重要な国家の歳入源となった。20世紀には石油開発が進み、石油収入が国家歳入の大部分を占めるようになったが、ザカートの徴収は現在でも続けられている。続いて、イスラーム法で定められているザカートの賦課対象と賦課率について述べ、のサウジアラビアの事例を示しながら賦課対象と賦課率について検討した。さらに、企業や個人がザカートを支払う場合の賦課対象や賦課率について述べ、サウジ企業に課せられるザカートと外資に課せられる所得税の相違について検討した。

Non-economic voting and incumbent strength in Turkey

Evidence suggests that incumbent parties find it harder to be re-elected in emerging than in advanced democracies because of more serious economic problems in the former. Yet the pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) has ruled Turkey since 2002. Does economic performance sufficiently account for the electoral strength of the AKP government? Reliance on economic performance alone to gain public support makes a government vulnerable to economic fluctuations. This study includes time-series regressions for the period 1950-2011 in Turkey and demonstrates that even among Turkey's long-lasting governments, the AKP has particular electoral strength that cannot be adequately explained by economic performance.

Voting behavior in Indonesia from 1999 to 2014 : religious cleavage or economic performance?

In this study, we examine the voting behavior in Indonesian parliamentary elections from 1999 to 2014. After summarizing the changes in Indonesian parties' share of the vote from a historical standpoint, we investigate the voting behavior with simple regression models to analyze the effect of regional characteristics on Islamic/secular parties' vote share, using aggregated panel data at the district level. Then, we also test the hypothesis of retrospective economic voting. The results show that districts which formerly stood strongly behind Islamic parties continued to select those parties, or gave preference to abstention over the parties in some elections. From the point of view of retrospective economic voting, we found that districts which experienced higher per capita economic growth gave more support to the ruling parties, although our results remain tentative because information on 2014 is not yet available.