Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization

In this paper, we take an organizational view of organized crime. In particular, we study the organizational consequences of product illegality attending at the following characteristics: (i) contracts are not enforceable in court, (ii) all participants are subject to the risk of being punished, (iii) employees present a major threat to the entrepreneur having the most detailed knowledge concerning participation, (iv) separation between ownership and management is difficult because record-keeping and auditing augments criminal evidence.

Iowa Law Enforcement Academy, Strategic Plan, 2007

This report outlines the strategic plan for Iowa Law Enforcement Academy, goals and mission.

Fick's law adapted to cationic diffusion in a semi-infinite solid: application to spinel megacrystals

In alkaline lavas, the chemical zoning of megacrystals of spinel is due to the cationic exchange between the latter and the host lava. The application of Fick's law to cationic diffusion profiles allows to calculate the time these crystals have stayed in the lava. Those which are in a chemical equilibrium were in contact with the lava during 20 to 30 days, whereas megacrystals lacking this equilibrium were in contact only for 3 or 4 days. The duration of the rise of an ultrabasic nodule in the volcanic chimney was calculated by applying Stokes' law.

Dynamic optimal law enforcement with learning

We incorporate the process of enforcement learning by assuming that the agency's current marginal cost is a decreasing function of its past experience of detecting and convicting. The agency accumulates data and information (on criminals, on opportunities of crime) enhancing the ability to apprehend in the future at a lower marginal cost.We focus on the impact of enforcement learning on optimal stationary compliance rules. In particular, we show that the optimal stationary fine could be less-than-maximal and the optimal stationary probability of detection could be higher-than-otherwise.

Optimal law enforcement under asymmetric information

In this paper, we focus on the problem created by asymmetric informationabout the enforcer's (agent's) costs associated to enforcement expenditure. This adverse selection problem affects optimal law enforcement because a low cost enforcer may conceal its information by imitating a high cost enforcer, and must then be given a compensation to be induced to reveal its true costs. The government faces a trade-off between minimizing the enforcer's compensation and maximizing the net surplus of harmful acts. As a consequence, the probability of apprehension and punishment is usually reduced leading to more offenses being committed. We show that asymmetry of information does not affect law enforcement as long as raising public funds is costless. The consideration of costly raising of public funds permits to establish the positive correlation between asymmetry of information between government and enforcers andthe crime rate.

Audit report on the Webster County Metropolitan Law Enforcement Telecommunications Board for the year ended June 30, 2008

Audit report on the Webster County Metropolitan Law Enforcement Telecommunications Board for the year ended June 30, 2008