Gender inequalities in occupational health related to the unequal distribution of working and employment conditions: a systematic review

Introduction: Gender inequalities exist in work life, but little is known about their presence in relation to factors examined in occupation health settings. The aim of this study was to identify and summarize the working and employment conditions described as determinants of gender inequalities in occupational health in studies related to occupational health published between 1999 and 2010. Methods: A systematic literature review was undertaken of studies available in MEDLINE, EMBASE, Sociological Abstracts, LILACS, EconLit and CINAHL between 1999 and 2010. Epidemiologic studies were selected by applying a set of inclusion criteria to the title, abstract, and complete text. The quality of the studies was also assessed. Selected studies were qualitatively analysed, resulting in a compilation of all differences between women and men in the prevalence of exposure to working and employment conditions and work-related health problems as outcomes. Results: Most of the 30 studies included were conducted in Europe (n=19) and had a cross-sectional design (n=24). The most common topic analysed was related to the exposure to work-related psychosocial hazards (n=8). Employed women had more job insecurity, lower control, worse contractual working conditions and poorer self-perceived physical and mental health than men did. Conversely, employed men had a higher degree of physically demanding work, lower support, higher levels of effort-reward imbalance, higher job status, were more exposed to noise and worked longer hours than women did. Conclusions: This systematic review has identified a set of working and employment conditions as determinants of gender inequalities in occupational health from the occupational health literature. These results may be useful to policy makers seeking to reduce gender inequalities in occupational health, and to researchers wishing to analyse these determinants in greater depth.

Adaptación de la gestión de empresas turísticas al nuevo escenario del sector del turismo: especial referencia a la gestión hotelera

Resulte incuestionable que, en la actualidad, el Turismo constituye un complejo fenómeno con perfiles complejos y heterogéneos dentro del cual son abordados ámbitos muy diversos (económico, jurídico, político, cultural…). De forma inicial, dentro de la pluralidad de las relaciones que circunscriben el mismo, presentan especial transcendencia las conectadas, en mayor o menor grado, con la gestión y el alojamiento turístico. Lo que hace medio siglo resultaba inimaginable o, casi extravagante, constituye hoy una circunstancia común y frecuente en el escenario propuesto, de forma particular, dentro del complejo y escasamente analizado ámbito de la gestión hotelera. Al hilo de lo expresado, en este trabajo se analizará, partiendo del supuesto de que la colaboración interempresarial en el sector turístico puede sustentarse en capital o en relaciones contractuales, sus esenciales trazos conformadores (gestor hotelero y titular del hotel gestionado) sobre los cuales poder elaborar un concepto ordenado y de subsunción del mismo como paso previo para la fijación de su régimen jurídico básico. Con idéntico tenor, se discutirá la posibilidad de integración del hotel determinado en las grandes cadenas hoteleras, la utilización de su know-how estandarizado y marca propia. Finalmente, será estudiada su incidencia en las grandes cadenas hoteleras al objeto de valorar su expansión tanto desde un punto de vista nacional como internacional.

Nuevas perspectivas de la contratación on line de servicios turísticos y paquetes dinámicos de turismo

La implementación de las nuevas tecnologías o TIC’s en el sector turístico se ha visto favorecida, en los últimos años, por las posibilidades que Internet ofrece de poder comprobar instantáneamente la existencia real del proveedor del servicio, la veracidad del servicio prestado o las condiciones en que se presta.. El aumento de la contratación electrónica de servicios turísticos exige que los proveedores de estos servicios y los turistas tengan en cuenta las diferentes normas jurídicas que resultan de aplicación en el ámbito de los servicios de la sociedad de la información, principalmente, la Ley 34/2002, de 11 de julio, de Servicios de la Sociedad de la Información y de Comercio Electrónico (LSSI), las normas reguladoras del consumo, en concreto, el Real Decreto legislativo 1/2007, de 16 de noviembre, por el que se aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley General para la Defensa de los Consumidores y Usuarios y otras leyes complementarias (TRLGDCU) y su modificación por la Ley 3/2014, de 27 de marzo, así como las diferentes normas autonómicas reguladoras del turismo que existen en la actualidad. En definitiva, un estudio detallado de las implicaciones que la contratación electrónica de servicios turísticos supone realizar una descripción legal del régimen jurídico que resulta de aplicación a los diferentes oferentes e intermediarios que intervienen esta nueva modalidad contractual y a los denominados paquetes dinámicos de turismo.

A book of miscellanies, 1770

A legal commonplace book by kept by Henry Wells of Worcester, Mass. Focuses on such topics as libel of a man to his wife, common recovery in writs and deeds, pleadings, trover, damages and costs, imprisonment, leases, mortgages, covenants, and ejectment. Also contains a number of miscellaneous entries touching on abridgements of law texts, minutes of court proceedings, kings of England, and biblical quotes. Five-page index located at the end of the work.

A transmissão contratual do direito de propriedade sobre os bens imóveis em Portugal : a "crise" do princípio da consensualidade e o regime do Código de Registo Predial

A presente Dissertação versa sobre a aplicação do princípio da consensualidade à transmissão contratual do direito de propriedade na ordem jurídica portuguesa, dando especial destaque à transmissão contratual dos bens imóveis. A transmissão contratual do direito de propriedade sobre os bens imóveis suscita a problemática da articulação entre o princípio da consensualidade e as restantes normas do ordenamento jurídico, principalmente as normas da ordem registal, na medida em que, se discute se no plano da transmissão contratual dos bens imóveis o princípio da consensualidade consiste numa regra geral ou, por outro lado, assume um papel residual ou supletivo. Tanto a Doutrina maioritária como a Jurisprudência portuguesas defendem a prevalência do Direito substantivo e do princípio da consensualidade na transferência do direito de propriedade, mesmo no caso dos bens imóveis. Já uma Doutrina minoritária defende a prevalência do Direito Registal ao dar relevância ao papel da inscrição registal da transmissão do direito de propriedade sobre os bens imóveis, defendendo que a transferência de bens imóveis por mero efeito do contrato é uma regra supletiva ou residual na ordem jurídica portuguesa. Da análise da ordem jurídica portuguesa verificou-se que o sistema do título português possui “efeitos fracos”; a transmissão contratual do direito de propriedade ocorre por efeito do contrato mesmo em relação aos bens imóveis, logo, o princípio da consensualidade é a regra geral; o sistema de registo é semi-obrigatório; o registo não é elemento de transmissão do direito de propriedade mas condição de oponibilidade face aos terceiros (apenas os terceiros tutelados pelo legislador), por isso, o registo possui um efeito consolidativo do direito registado.

The Future Organisation of the European Courts. Research Papers in Law, 2/2005

From the Introduction. According to Article 220 of the EC Treaty, the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance (hereinafter CFI) “each within its jurisdiction, shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of [the EC] Treaty the law is observed”. The “pre-Nice” allocation of jurisdiction between the two Community courts can be summarized as follows. At Court of Justice level, mention should first of all be made of references for a preliminary ruling. A national court, in a case pending before it, can - or in some circumstances must - refer to the Court of Justice a question relating to the interpretation of provisions of the EC Treaty or of secondary Community law, or relating to the validity of provisions of secondary Community law.1 Moreover, the Court of Justice ensures the observance of the law in the context of actions for annulment or failure to act brought before it by the Community institutions, the European Central Bank (hereinafter ECB) and the Member States.2 These actions concern, respectively, the legality of an act of secondary Community law and the legality of the failure of the institution concerned to adopt such act. The Court of Justice also has jurisdiction in actions brought by the Commission or by a Member State relating to the infringement of Community law by a Member State (hereinafter infringement actions)3 and in actions relating to compensation for non-contractual damage brought by Member States against the Community.4 Finally, as regards the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, mention should be made of appeals which can be lodged on points of law only against rulings of the CFI.5

The EU essential facilities doctrine. Research Papers in Law, 6/2006

Introduction. The essential facilities doctrine may be seen as the ‘extra weight’ which is put onto the balance, in order to give precedence to the maintenance of competition over the complete contractual freedom of undertakings controlling an important and unique facility. The main purpose of the doctrine is to impose upon such ‘dominant’ undertakings the duty to negotiate and/or give access to the facility, against a reasonable fee, to other undertakings, which cannot pursue their own activity (and therefore will perish) without access to such a facility. This very simple description of the content of the doctrine underlines its limitations: through the imposition of a duty to negotiate or contractual obligations, the rule tends to compensate for the weaknesses of the competitive structure of a market, which are due to the existence of some essential facility. In other words, the doctrine does not by itself provide a definitive solution to the lack of competition, but tends to contractually maintain or even create some competition.1 The doctrine of essential facilities originates in the US antitrust case law of the Circuit and District Courts, but has never been officially acknowledged by the Supreme Court. It has been further developed and hotly debated by scholars in the US, both from a legal and from an economic viewpoint. In the EU, the essential facilities doctrine was openly introduced by the Commission during the early 1990s, but has received only limited and indirect support by the Court of First Instance (the CFI) and the European Court of Justice (the ECJ). It also indirectly inspired the legislation concerning the deregulation of traditional ‘natural’ monopolies. The judicial origin of the doctrine, combined with the hesitant application by the appeal courts, both in the US and the EU, cast uncertainty not only on the precise scope of the doctrine, but also on the issue of its very existence. These questions receive a particular light within the EU context, where the doctrine is called upon to play a different role from its US counterpart. In order to address the above issues, we will first pretend that an EU essential facility doctrine does indeed exist and we shall try to identify the scope and content thereof, through its main applications (Section 1). Subsequently, we will try to answer the question whether such a doctrine should exist at all in the EU (Section 2).

With or without you...judging politically in the field of Area of Freedom, Security and Justice? Research Papers in Law, 3/2007

From the Introduction. The study of the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) case law of the regarding the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) is fascinating in many ways.1 First, almost the totality of the relevant case law is extremely recent, thereby marking the first ‘foundational’ steps in this field of law. This is the result of the fact that the AFSJ was set up by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and only entered into force in May 1999.2 Second, as the AFSJ is a new field of EU competence, it sets afresh all the fundamental questions – both political and legal – triggered by European integration, namely in terms of: a) distribution of powers between the Union and its member states, b) attribution of competences between the various EU Institutions, c) direct effect and supremacy of EU rules, d) scope of competence of the ECJ, and e) measure of the protection given to fundamental rights. The above questions beg for answers which should take into account both the extremely sensible fields of law upon which the AFSJ is anchored, and the EU’s highly inconvenient three-pillar institutional framework.3 Third, and as a consequence of the above, the vast majority of the ECJ’s judgments relating to the AFSJ are a) delivered by the Full Court or, at least, the Grand Chamber, b) with the intervention of great many member states and c) often obscure in content. This is due to the fact that the Court is called upon to set the foundational rules in a new field of EU law, often trying to accommodate divergent considerations, not all of which are strictly legal.4 Fourth, the case law of the Court relating to the AFSJ, touches upon a vast variety of topics which are not necessarily related to one another. This is why it is essential to limit the scope of this study. The content of, and steering for, the AFSJ were given by the Tampere European Council, in October 1999. According to the Tampere Conclusions, the AFSJ should consist of four key elements: a) a common immigration and asylum policy, b) judicial cooperation in both civil and penal matters, c) action against criminality and d) external action of the EU in all the above fields. Moreover, the AFSJ is to a large extent based on the Schengen acquis. The latter has been ‘communautarised’5 by the Treaty of Amsterdam and further ‘ventilated’ between the first and third pillars by decisions 1999/435 and 1999/436.6 Judicial cooperation in civil matters, mainly by means of international conventions (such as the Rome Convention of 1981 on the law applicable to contractual obligations) and regulations (such as (EC) 44/20017 and (EC) 1348/20008) also form part of the AFSJ. However, the relevant case law of the ECJ will not be examined in the present contribution.9 Similarly, the judgments of the Court delivered in the course of Article 226 EC proceedings against member states, will be omitted.10 Even after setting aside the above case law and notwithstanding the fact that the AFSJ only dates as far back as May 1999, the judgments of the ECJ are numerous. A simple (if not simplistic) categorisation may be between, on the one hand, judgments which concern the institutional setting of the AFSJ (para. 2) and, on the other, judgments which are related to some substantive AFSJ policy (para. 3).

La réforme Dodd-Frank des produits dérivés de gré à gré : vers un modèle mondial?

Suite à la crise financière de 2008 les pays du G20 se sont interrogés sur la transparence des marchés, la stabilité du système et une façon de réguler les risques posés par le nouvel environnement économique. Les produits dérivés de gré à gré ont été identifiés et des engagements ont été pris en faveur de nouvelles régulations des dérivés de gré à gré et la gestion des risques sous-jacents. Les régulateurs ont donc adopté chacun à leur tour un cadre législatif régulant les dérivés de gré à gré tout en déployant un effort international d'harmonisation et de reconnaissance des contreparties assujetties à des régimes équivalents. Les autorités canadiennes en valeurs mobilières ont publié des projets de règlements. Nous nous interrogerons sur ce nouveau cadre réglementaire des dérivés de gré à gré élaboré par les autorités canadiennes en valeurs mobilières, prenant en considération les spécificités canadiennes et les acteurs actifs sur leur territoire. Notre étude traite de ces projets de règlements et de la difficulté d'encadrer les marchés des dérivés de gré à gré qui par définition ne comportent pas de plateformes de négociation ou de lieu géographique et de frontières mais se caractérisent surtout par le lien contractuel entre les parties et l'identification de ces parties. L'élaboration d'un nouveau cadre pour les dérivés de gré à gré qui régule les transactions transfrontières semble très délicat à traiter et les possibles conflits et chevauchements de lois seront inévitables. Confrontés à des définitions divergentes de contreparties locales, les parties à une opération seront condamnées à un risque de qualification en vertu des règlements nationaux sur les dérivés de gré à gré. Une concertation pourrait être renforcée et la détermination de l'autorité compétente ainsi que les concepts de contreparties locales, succursales ou filiales pourraient être harmonisés.

Bénéfices de la diversité culturelle en entreprises : Études de cas dans les entreprises québécoises

Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal

Informational Barriers to Energy Efficiency - Theory and European Policies. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 15/2009

This BEER addresses informational barriers to energy efficiency. It is a widely acknowledged result that an energy efficiency gap exists implying that the level of energy efficiency is at an inefficiently low level. Several barriers to energy efficiency create this gap and the presence of asymmetric information is likely to be one such barrier. In this article a theoretical framework is presented addressing the issues of moral hazard and adverse selection related to energy efficiency. Based on the theoretical framework, European policies on energy efficiency are evaluated. The article is divided into two main parts. The first part presents the theory on information asymmetries and its consequences on energy efficiency focusing on the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. Having established a theoretical framework to understand the agency barriers to energy efficiency, the second part evaluates the policies of the European Union on energy efficiency. The BEER finds that problems of moral hazard and adverse selection indeed can help explain the seemingly low levels of energy. In both presented models the cost to the principal from implementing high energy efficiency outcome is increased with the informational asymmetries. The theory reveals two implications to policies on energy efficiency. First, the development of measures to enable contractual parties to base remuneration on energy performance must be enhanced, and second, the information on technologies and the education of consumers and installers on energy efficiency must be increased. This could be complemented with certification of installers and energy efficiency advisors to enable consumers to select good agents. Finally, it is found that the preferred EU policy instrument on energy efficiency, so far, seems to be the use of minimum requirements. Less used in EU legislation is the use of measuring and verification as well as the use of certifications. Therefore, it is concluded that the EU should consider an increased use of these instruments, and in particular focus on a further development of standards on measurability and verification as well as an increased focus on education of consumers as well as installers and advisors on energy efficiency.

Mixed Public-Private Enterprises in Europe: Economic Theory and an Empirical Analysis of Italian Water Utilities. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 4/July 2006

Mixed enterprises, which are entities jointly owned by the public and private sector, are spreading all over Europe in local utilities. Well aware that in the vast majority of cases the preference of local authorities towards such governance structure is determined by practical reasons rather than by the ambition to implement new regulatory designs (an alternative to the typical “external” regulation), our purpose is to confer some scientific value to this phenomenon which has not been sufficiently investigated in the economic literature. This paper aims at proposing an economic analysis of mixed enterprises, especially of the specific configuration in which the public partner acts as controller and the private one (or “industrial” partner) as service provider. We suggest that the public service concession to mixed enterprises could embody, under certain conditions, a noteworthy substitute to the traditional public provision and the concession to totally private enterprises, as it can push regulated operators to outperform and limit the risk of private opportunism. The starting point of the entire analysis is that ownership allows the (public) owner to gather more information about the actual management of the firm, according to property rights theory. Following this stream of research, we conclude that under certain conditions mixed enterprises could significantly reduce asymmetric information between regulators and regulated firms by implementing a sort of “internal” regulation. With more information, in effect, the public authority (as owner/controller of the regulated firm, but also as member of the regulatory agency) can stimulate the private operator to be more efficient and can monitor it more effectively with respect to the fulfilment of contractual obligations (i.e., public service obligations, quality standards, etc.). Moreover, concerning the latter function, the board of directors of the mixed enterprise can be the suitable place where public and private representatives (respectively, welfare and profit maximisers) can meet to solve all disputes arising from incomplete contracts, without recourse to third parties. Finally, taking into account that a disproportionate public intervention in the “private” administration (or an ineffective protection of the general interest) would imply too many drawbacks, we draw some policy implications that make an equitable debate on the board of the firm feasible. Some empirical evidence is taken from the Italian water sector.

Growth for Europe – Is the Juncker Plan the answer? EPC Discussion Paper, 20 March 2015

Executive Summary. The euro area is still suffering from low growth and high unemployment. For the recovery to become a reality, there needs to be a balance between fiscal discipline, supply side improvements and actions aimed at stimulating demand and growth. Increasing investment, both private and public, are important components in overcoming the recession. This becomes especially clear when comparing investment dynamics during the crisis with pre-crisis levels. Total investment is still much lower than before the crisis and public investment is well below its pre-crisis peak as well. In late November 2014, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker submitted a long-awaited proposal for a European Investment Plan that aims to stimulate private investment. Apart from the creation of the new European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI), through which private investors will receive public guarantees, the investment plan also aims to provide project assistance and improve the Single Market by removing sector-specific or other financial barriers to investment. While generally perceived as a first positive step towards increasing private investment, some commentators have expressed reservations about the plan. These include, among others, the lack of fresh money for the initial contributions to EFSI. Since a substantial amount of these contributions is reshuffled from other places in the European budget, the question was raised whether EFSI can fund additional projects or just replicates investment projects that would have happened without the plan. Other criticism relates to the high estimate of the expected leverage ratio of 1:15, and to the risk that the plan will only have a limited impact on stressed economies. The Juncker Plan addresses private investment, but so far there really is no clear strategy to stimulate productive public investment on the European and national level. Countries with fiscal space are reluctant to engage in higher spending, while those willing and in need of it the most are restricted by the rules. Member States and the Commission should therefore discuss options for further improving the euro area's economic governance. In addition to urging countries with fiscal space to increase investing in national public goods, investment could be treated with budget flexibility. One could, for instance, upgrade the importance of public investment in the European Semester. Additional deficit granted for public investment purposes could be attached to certain Country-Specific Recommendations. Another solution would be to allow some form of budget flexibility, such as the formulation of a new Golden Rule for productive public investment becoming part of the Stability and Growth Pact's application. Besides relying on a larger amount of flexibility in the rules, the Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) could be another solution to fund investment in European public goods. It will also be necessary to overcome the mistrust among Member States that is preventing further action. The political bargain of stronger conditionality, such as through contractual arrangements, could improve the situation. Increased trust will also be an important condition for tackling long-reaching economic governance reforms such as the creation of a Fiscal Capacity, which could take the form of a macroeconomic shock insurance. Such a Fiscal Capacity could make a real difference in providing the necessary funding to maintain productive public investment, even in times of deep recessions. The proposals presented do not attempt to be conclusive, but shall rather be an input for a wider debate on how to increase growth and employment in Europe. The paper draws heavily on the discussion of a Workshop on Growth and Investment, which the European Policy Centre (EPC) hosted on 10 December 2014 under Chatham-House Rule, with a group of economists and representatives from the European institutions.

The EU and Azerbaijan: Game on for a more normative policy? CEPS Policy Brief No. 329, March 2015

The contradictory interests of the EU and Azerbaijan have brought negotiations on their contractual relations to a halt. The EU’s dependence on Azerbaijan’s rich energy resources has weakened the normative dimension of its policy towards Azerbaijan, rendering it incapable of countering rejection of democratic reform by Azerbaijan’s authorities. While the EU’s current approach seems to favour a more pragmatic focus on energy cooperation, this policy brief argues that a combination of normative obligations and pragmatic interests is required − implemented through leverage over Azerbaijan and a better coordination of this policy across the EU member states and institutions.

The EU power sector needs long-term price signals. CEPS Special Report No. 135/April 2016

By 2030, half of the EU’s electricity demand will be covered by renewables and will need to be accompanied by flexible conventional back-up resources. Due to the high upfront costs inherent to renewables and the progressively lower running times associated with back-up capacity, the cost of capital will have a proportionately greater impact on total costs than today. This report examines how electricity markets can be designed to provide long-term price signals, thereby reducing the cost of capital for these technologies and allowing for a more efficient transition. It finds that current market arrangements are unable to provide long-term price signals. To address this issue, we argue that a system for long-term contracts with a regulated counterparty could be implemented. A centralised system where capacity or energy or a combination of both is contracted, could be introduced for conventional and renewable capacity, based on a regional adequacy assessment and with a competitive bidding system in place to ensure cost-effectiveness. Member states face a number of legislative barriers while implementing these types of systems, however, which could be reduced by merging legislation and setting EU framework rules for the design of these contractual agreements.