Choice of partners in multiple two-person prisoner's dilemma games: An experimental study

We examine the effect of unilateral and mutual partner selection in the context of prisoner's dilemmas experimentally. Subjects play simultaneously several finitely repeated two-person prisoner's dilemma games. We find that unilateral choice is the best system. It leads to low defection and fewer singles than with mutual choice. Furthermore, with the unilateral choice setup we are able to show that intendingdefectors are more likely to try to avoid a match than intending cooperators. We compare our results of multiple games with single game PD-experiments and find no difference in aggregate behavior. Hence the multiple game technique is robust and might therefore be an important tool in the future for testing the use of mixed strategies.

Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium

In this paper we consider dynamic processes, in repeated games, that are subject to the natural informational restriction of uncoupledness. We study the almost sure convergence to Nash equilibria, and present a number of possibility and impossibility results. Basically, we show that if in addition to random moves some recall is introduced, then successful search procedures that are uncoupled can be devised. In particular, to get almost sure convergence to pure Nash equilibria when these exist, it su±ces to recall the last two periods of play.

Illusory correlation in the remuneration of chief executive officers: It pays to play golf, and well

Illusory correlation refers to the use of information in decisions that is uncorrelated with the relevantcriterion. We document illusory correlation in CEO compensation decisions by demonstrating thatinformation, that is uncorrelated with corporate performance, is related to CEO compensation. We usepublicly available data from the USA for the years 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004 to examine the relationsbetween golf handicaps of CEOs and corporate performance, on the one hand, and CEO compensationand golf handicaps, on the other hand. Although we find no relation between handicap and corporateperformance, we do find a relation between handicap and CEO compensation. In short, golfers earnmore than non-golfers and pay increases with golfing ability. We relate these findings to the difficultiesof judging compensation for CEOs. To overcome this and possibly other illusory correlations inthese kinds of decisions, we recommend the use of explicit, mechanical decision rules.

Pre-play communication and credibility: A test of Aumann's conjecture

The effectiveness of pre-play communication in achieving efficientoutcomes has long been a subject of controversy. In some environments,cheap talk may help to achieve coordination. However, Aumannconjectures that, in a variant of the Stag Hunt game, a signal forefficient play is not self-enforcing and concludes that an "agreementto play [the efficient outcome] conveys no information about what theplayers will do." Harsanyi and Selten (1988) cite this example as anillustration of risk-dominance vs. payoff-dominance. Farrell and Rabin(1996) agree with the logic, but suspect that cheap talk willnonetheless achieve efficiency. The conjecture is tested with one-waycommunication. When the sender first chooses a signal and then anaction, there is impressive coordination: a 94% probability for thepotentially efficient (but risky) play, given a signal for efficientplay. Without communication, efforts to achieve efficiency wereunsuccessful, as the proportion of B moves is only 35%. I also test ahypothesis that the order of the action and the signal affects theresults, finding that the decision order is indeed important. WhileAumann s conjecture is behaviorally disconfirmed when the signal isdetermined initially, the signal s credibility seems to be much moresuspect when the sender is known to have first chosen an action, andthe results are not statistically distinguishable from those whenthere is no signal. Some applications and issues in communication andcoordination are discussed.

On some geometry and equivalence classes of normal form games

Equivalence classes of normal form games are defined using the geometryof correspondences of standard equilibiurm concepts like correlated, Nash,and robust equilibrium or risk dominance and rationalizability. Resultingequivalence classes are fully characterized and compared across differentequilibrium concepts for 2 x 2 games. It is argued that the procedure canlead to broad and game-theoretically meaningful distinctions of games aswell as to alternative ways of viewing and testing equilibrium concepts.Larger games are also briefly considered.

Multiple prisoner's dilemma games with (out) an outside option: An experimental study

Experiments in which subjects play simultaneously several finite prisoner's dilemma supergames with and without an outside optionreveal that: (i) subjects use probabilistic start and endeffect behaviour, (ii) the freedom to choose whether to play the prisoner's dilemma game enhances cooperation, (iii) if the payoff for simultaneous defection is negative, subjects' tendency to avoid losses leads them to cooperate; while this tendency makes them stick to mutual defection if its payoff is positive.

Communication, coordination and efficiency in evolutionary one-population models

We analyze the role of commitment in pre-play communication for ensuringefficient evolutionarily stable outcomes in coordination games. All players are a priori identical as they are drawn from the same population. In games where efficient outcomes can be reached by players coordinating on the same action we find commitment to be necessary to enforce efficiency. In games where efficienct outcomes only result from play of different actions, communication without commitment is most effective although efficiency can no longer be guaranteed. Only when there are many messages then inefficient outcomes are negligible as their basins of attraction become very small.

Elicited beliefs and social information in modified dictator games: What do dictators believe other dictators do?

We use subjects actions in modified dictator games to perform a within-subject classification ofindividuals into four different types of interdependent preferences: Selfish, Social Welfaremaximizers, Inequity Averse and Competitive. We elicit beliefs about other subjects actions inthe same modified dictator games to test how much of the existent heterogeneity in others actions is known by subjects. We find that subjects with different interdependent preferences infact have different beliefs about others actions. In particular, Selfish individuals cannotconceive others being non-Selfish while Social Welfare maximizers are closest to the actualdistribution of others actions. We finally provide subjects with information on other subjects actions and re-classify individuals according to their (new) actions in the same modified dictatorgames. We find that social information does not affect Selfish individuals, but that individualswith interdependent preferences are more likely to change their behavior and tend to behavemore selfishly.

Vascular endothelial growth factor and angiopoietin-2 play a major role in the pathogenesis of vascular leakage in cirrhotic rats.

Background and aims: The extent and molecular mechanisms governing plasma extravasation and formation of ascites in cirrhosis are unknown. Vascular endothelial growth factor-A (VEGF-A) and angiopoietin-2 (Ang-2) are endogenous substances with powerful vascular permeability effects. We assessed regional blood flow, vascular leakage, mRNA and tissular expression of VEGF-A and Ang-2 and vascular permeability following VEGF receptor 2 blockade in control and cirrhotic rats to define the vascular territories showing altered vascular permeability in cirrhosis and to determine whether VEGF-A and Ang-2 are involved in this phenomenon. Methods: Arterial blood flow was analysed with the coloured microsphere method. Vascular leakage was measured and visualised with the dye Evan¿s Blue and colloidal carbon techniques, respectively. VEGF-A and Ang-2 expression were determined by real-time polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), immunohistochemistry and western blot. The effect on vascular permeability induced by VEGFR2 blockade was assessed by administration of the receptor inhibitor SU11248. Results: Arterial blood flow was increased in the mesentery, pancreas and small intestine but not in the kidney and spleen of cirrhotic rats as compared to controls. Increased vascular leakage was observed in the mesentery and liver, where colloidal carbon spread from microvessels to the adjacent fibrotic tracts. Increased hepatic and mesenteric expression of VEGF-A and Ang-2 was found in cirrhotic rats as compared to controls. Blockade of VEGFR2 markedly reduced hepatic and mesenteric vascular leakage in cirrhotic rats. Conclusions: Enhanced endothelial permeability is restricted to the hepatic and mesenteric vascular beds in cirrhotic rats with ascites and VEGF-A and Ang-2 are key factors in the signalling pathways regulating this dysfunction.

Hexokinase 2, Glycogen Synthase and Phosphorylase Play a Key Role in Muscle Glycogen Supercompensation

Background: Glycogen-depleting exercise can lead to supercompensation of muscle glycogen stores, but the biochemical mechanisms of this phenomenon are still not completely understood. Methods: Using chronic low-frequency stimulation (CLFS) as an exercise model, the tibialis anterior muscle of rabbits was stimulated for either 1 or 24 hours, inducing a reduction in glycogen of 90% and 50% respectively. Glycogen recovery was subsequently monitored during 24 hours of rest. Results: In muscles stimulated for 1 hour, glycogen recovered basal levels during the rest period. However, in those stimulated for 24 hours, glycogen was supercompensated and its levels remained 50% higher than basal levels after 6 hours of rest, although the newly synthesized glycogen had fewer branches. This increase in glycogen correlated with an increase in hexokinase-2 expression and activity, a reduction in the glycogen phosphorylase activity ratio and an increase in the glycogen synthase activity ratio, due to dephosphorylation of site 3a, even in the presence of elevated glycogen stores. During supercompensation there was also an increase in 59-AMP-activated protein kinase phosphorylation, correlating with a stable reduction in ATP and total purine nucleotide levels. Conclusions: Glycogen supercompensation requires a coordinated chain of events at two levels in the context of decreased cell energy balance: First, an increase in the glucose phosphorylation capacity of the muscle and secondly, control of the enzymes directly involved in the synthesis and degradation of the glycogen molecule. However, supercompensated glycogen has fewer branches.

A characterization of a new value and an existing value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation

En aquest treball presentem dues caracteritzacions de dos valors diferents en el marc dels jocs coalicionals amb cooperació restringida. Les restriccions són introduïdes com una seqüència finita de particions del conjunt del jugadors, de manera que cada una d'elles eés més grollera que l'anterior, formant així una estructura amb diferents nivells d'unions a priori.

Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution and convex descompositions of TU games

We study under which conditions the core of a game involved in a convex decomposition of another game turns out to be a stable set of the decomposed game. Some applications and numerical examples, including the remarkable Lucas¿ five player game with a unique stable set different from the core, are reckoning and analyzed.