809 resultados para Smart-RBAC
Resumo:
Introduction. Unintended as it was, the European Court of Justice (ECJ, the Court, the Court of the EU) has played an extremely important role in the construction of the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ). The AFSJ was set up by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and only entered into force in May 1999. The fact that this is a new field of EU competence, poses afresh all the fundamental questions – both political and legal – triggered by European integration, namely in terms of: a) distribution of powers between the Union and its Member States, b) attribution of competences between the various EU Institutions, c) direct effect and supremacy of EU rules, d) scope of competence of the ECJ, and e) extent of the protection given to fundamental rights. The above questions have prompted judicial solutions which take into account both the extremely sensible fields of law upon which the AFSJ is anchored, and the EU’s highly inconvenient three-pillar institutional framework.1 The ECJ is the body whose institutional role is to benefit most from this upcoming ‘depilarisation’, possibly more than that of the European Parliament. This structure is on the verge of being abandoned, provided the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force.2 However spectacular this formal boost of the Court’s competence, the changes in real terms are not going to be that dramatic. This apparent contradiction is explained, to a large extent, by the fact that the Court has in many ways ‘provoked’, or even ‘anticipated’, the depilarisation of its own jurisdictional role, already under the existing three-pillar structure. Simply put, under the new – post Treaty of Lisbon – regime, the Court will have full jurisdiction over all AFSJ matters, as those are going to be fully integrated in what is now the first pillar. Some limitations will continue to apply, however, while a special AFSJ procedure will be institutionalised. Indeed, if we look into the new Treaty we may identify general modifications to the Court’s structure and jurisdiction affecting the AFSJ (section 2), modifications in the field of the AFSJ stemming from the abolition of the pillar structure (section 3) and, finally, some rules specifically applicable to the AFSJ (section 4).
Resumo:
The European Union (EU) has increasingly become a comprehensive security actor. With the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as a reaction to the failure of the EU to act during the wars in Yugoslavia/Western Balkans in the 1990s, the EU has a wide range of instruments for crisis prevention, crisis management as well as post-crisis intervention at its disposal. Observers typically agree that “hard power” is no longer sufficient to address the complex security challenges of today’s world while the EU, often criticised for only utilising “soft power”, is now able to exercise “smart power”. Through a comprehensive approach, facilitated by the Lisbon Treaty, the EU can now use the various instruments at its disposal, such as diplomacy, development aid, humanitarian assistance, trade, sanctions, international cooperation and crisis management capabilities in a joined-up manner. This mix of tools and instruments is helping the EU to achieve the aim set out in its European Security Strategy: “a secure Europe in a better world”.
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Summary. The European electricity sector will have to deal with a huge challenge in the decades to come. On the one hand, electrical power is increasingly substituted for other forms of energy. It has been forecast that electricity demand will increase in the future (notably because of new needs in transport and heat sectors), although it is currently stagnant, mainly because of the economic crisis. Unless a major alternative energy source is discovered, electricity will become the central energy pillar in the long term. On the other hand, electricity production remains uncertain and will depend on numerous factors: the growth of renewable energy and decentralized energy, the renewal of old power generation capacities, increased external dependency, CO2 charges, etc. This increases the demand for electricity networks that are more reliable, more efficient, and more flexible. Europe’s current electricity networks are ageing, and, as already indicated by the International Energy Agency, many of them will need to be modernized or replaced in the decades to come. Finally, the growing impact of energy trading also needs to be taken into account. These considerations explain the need to modernize the electric grid through various ICT means. This modernization alone may allow the grid to become more flexible and interactive, to provide real time feedback, more adaptation to a fluctuating demand, and finally to reduce the global electricity costs. The paper begins with a description of the EU definition of the term ‘smart grid’ (§ 1) and of the body in charge of advising the Commission (§ 2). The EU legal framework applicable to smart grids is also detailed (§ 3). It is a rather complex domain, connected to various regulations. The paper then examines three critical factors in the development of smart grids (and smart meters as a precondition). Standardization is quite complex, but absolutely essential (§ 4). Innovation is not easily put into action (§ 5). Finally, as digital insecurity has worsened dramatically in recent years, the security of electricity networks, and especially their multiplied electronic components, will become increasingly important (§ 6). Lastly, the paper provides a concise overview of the progress of smart grids in the EU in recent years (§ 7). In a nutshell, the conclusion is that progress is quite slow, many obstacles remain, and, given the appearance of many new regulatory problems, it would be useful to organize a review of the present EU strategy.
Resumo:
When they look at Internet policy, EU policymakers seem mesmerised, if not bewitched, by the word ‘neutrality’. Originally confined to the infrastructure layer, today the neutrality rhetoric is being expanded to multi-sided platforms such as search engines and more generally online intermediaries. Policies for search neutrality and platform neutrality are invoked to pursue a variety of policy objectives, encompassing competition, consumer protection, privacy and media pluralism. This paper analyses this emerging debate and comes to a number of conclusions. First, mandating net neutrality at the infrastructure layer might have some merit, but it certainly would not make the Internet neutral. Second, since most of the objectives initially associated with network neutrality cannot be realistically achieved by such a rule, the case for network neutrality legislation would have to stand on different grounds. Third, the fact that the Internet is not neutral is mostly a good thing for end users, who benefit from intermediaries that provide them with a selection of the over-abundant information available on the Web. Fourth, search neutrality and platform neutrality are fundamentally flawed principles that contradict the economics of the Internet. Fifth, neutrality is a very poor and ineffective recipe for media pluralism, and as such should not be invoked as the basis of future media policy. All these conclusions have important consequences for the debate on the future EU policy for the Digital Single Market.
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A China whose economy is growing at a slower pace is something the world can cope with. But a China with doubts about whether the government can maintain control and implement reform – that would be a serious problem. The signals currently coming from the economic and political spheres are cause for concern. China is in danger of falling into a downward spiral of declining confidence. What are the consequences for Germany?
Resumo:
Dissertação para obtenção do grau de Mestre no Instituto Superior de Ciências da Saúde Egas Moniz
