Hanging Together, Falling Apart: Self-Understandings of German Society from 1800 to the Present. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 04.7 (Series 51), 1994

In recent years, interest in comtemporary conceptions and self-understandings of the social order has grown among historians, yet the field of an "intellectual history of society" is little expJored for modern Germany. This paper surveys the field and asks how Germans from the early modern era up to the present time of German reunification conceived of the social order they were building and living in, and it provides an overview of the developments of such major concepts as "estate" and "class," "community" and "society," "individual" and "mass," "state" and "nation." Three major points emerge as persistent and distinctive features of German social self-conception in the nineteenth cand twentieth centuries: the intellectual construction of dilemmas between social conformity and social fragmentation; the difficulties of conceiving of society as a plitical society; and the "futurization" of an idealized, utopian social roder of harmony that was hoped would one day replace the perceived social disintegration.

Knowledge-Bearing Elites and Industrial Performance in France and Germany. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 04.5, December 1993

Most comparative studies of public policies for competitiveness focus on the links among public agencies and industrial sectors. This paper argues that the professions---or knowledge-bearing elites-that animate these organizational links are equally significant. For public policies to promote technological advance, the visions and self-images of knowledge-bearing elites are par­ ticularly important. By examining administrative and technical elites in France and Germany in the 1980s, the paper identifies characteristics that enable these elites to implement policy in some cases, but not in others. France's "state-created" elites were well-positioned to initiate and implement large technology projects, such as digitizing the telecommunications network. Germany's state-recognized elites were, by contrast, better positioned to facilitate framework­ oriented programs that aimed at the diffusion of new technologies throughout industry. The linkages among administrative and technical elites also explain why French policymakers had difficulty adapting policy to changing circumstances over time while German policymakers managed in many cases to learn more from previous policy experiences and to adapt subsequent initiatives accordingly.

Central Bank Independence & Coordinated Wage Bargaining: Their Interaction in Germany & Europe. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 04.4, 1994

This paper explores the fashionable proposition that with a more independent central bank, a country can secure lower levels of inflation without higher unemployment. Hall shows that the operation of the central bank depends on the character of wage bargaining. He illustrates this point with some cross-national data and an analysis of how coordinated wage bargaining is secured in Germany. He concludes by exploring the implications of this analysis for European Monetary Union.

The Cultural Construction of Political Action: The Case of the European Community's Single Market Program. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 04.3, December 1993

Explaining the emergence of the European Community's Single Market Program requires making sense of how that institutional project carne onto the political agenda. I suggest that there are two features of the political process that have been not well understood. First, large-scale institutional projects usually require political opportunities to come to fruition. Second, they require strategic actors who can frame such projects in broad ways in order to attract a wide variety of groups. My basic argument is that the European Commission is an organization whose function is primarily to solve the bargaining game that characterizes interaction within the Community and act as a strategic actor. This does not suggest that they are always successful or are the only source of ideas, but instead that they are the collective actor responsible for trying to frame collective interests in new cultural ways. To illustrate this point, I document how the; Single Market program evolved within the Commission and how other important Community actors carne to sign on to its goals over time.

The Political Response of Firms to the 1992 Single Market Program: The Case of the German Automobile Industry Pamela Camer. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 03.1, 1994

This paper examines the political responses of German automobile firms to the 1992 Single Market initiative. I argue that the decision by firms to try to influence EC policies depends on the perceived economic impact of the single market and ,the market alternative open to firms, while the decision on how to lobby depends on the size of the finn and the institutional and strategic environment in which a firm operates. I use this framework to explain why German automobile firms were slow in responding the single market initiative and why, when they did choose to lobby, the firms pursued different political strategies. The research suggests that we should not limit our studies to the political activity of trade associations and sectors, but should also examine the political strategies and activities of individual firms. It also suggests that, as integration efforts in Europe proceed, there is likely to be increased activity by individual firms and national associations because European trade associations may not be able to agree on specific EC policy proposals.

Is Regulatory Convergence Efficient? CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 02.3, May 1992

One of the important themes in the new institutionalism is the convergence of market regulations in a world with three powerful clusters of countries (Western Europe, North America, and East Asia) on a small number of regimes, like disorganized capitalism, free market capitalism, and coordinated market capitalism. This paper examines the political-economic theory of regulatory convergence. It reconstructs and compares three welfarist approaches: the optimal regulatory regime (Tinbergen), the rule of constitutional law (Buchanan), and regulatory rivalry (Hayek). The paper concludes that most plausible results of convergence theory are completely opposite to the expressed political intentions of the theorists. Tinbergen's theory predicts neoliberalism, not social democracy. The theories of Buchanan and Hayek predict respectively a consensual or spontaneous formation of corporatist regulations, not the return of classical constitutionalism or liberalism. The paper summons new institutionalists to repair the weak scientific elements of convergence theory and to make a distinction between the ideological origins of this theory and its unintended ideological consequences.

Capitalism without Capitalists? A Bottom-Up View of Industrial Transformation in East Germany. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 00.1, 1999

Research on the industrial transition in East Germany and its outcomes has long focused on the strategy of the Treuhand­ anstalt (IHA). According to institutionalists, David Stark and Lazlo Brust!: (1998), the powerful position of the German privatization agency was not only a result of German unification but also a function of a pathway rooted in the institutional peculiarities of the East German economy before 1989. This paper shows that neither a simple top-down perspective nor the pathway approach, as Stark and Brust!: suggested, are adequate for explaining the internal dynamic of enterprise transformation as well as the outcomes of this process. First of all, the dissolution of the former organizational structures and hierarchies was less coordinated by the 1HA than is often assumed. Often Kombinates fell apart more quickly from below than they could be dismantled from above since enterprises or their units chose the exit­ option and had good reasons to do so. Secondly, although the privatization by the 1HA resulted in the clear dominance of Western investors, the new ownership structure of East German industry as a whole could be characterized as a "capitalism without (East German) capitalists." In fact, what exists in East Germany is rather a kind of "small business capitalism" (KleinbetriebsknpitalifmllS) in which small-and medium-sized producers dominate the landscape. Finally, there was no single starting point in 1989. Two different industrial orders shaped the industrial history of the East German regions which were not destroyed between 1945-89, but rather transformed into the state socialist production system. It can be shown that these older historical patterns are relevant for transition and their outcomes as well.

Falling Labor Share and Rising Unemployment: Long-Run Consequences of Institutional Shocks? CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 00.2, 1999

The literature on unemployment has mostly focused on labor market issues while the impact of capital foonation is largely neglected Job-creation is often thought to be a matter of encouraging more employment on a given capital stock. In contrast, this paper explicitly deals with the long-run consequences of institutional shocks on capital foonation and employment. It is shown that the usual trade off between employment and wages disappears in the long run. In line with an appropriation model, the estimated values for the long-run elasticities of substitution between capital and labor for Germany and France are substantially greater than one.

Modell Deutschland as an Interdenominational Compromise, CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 00.3, 2000

Usually, Germany’s social market economy is understood to embody a compromise between a liberal market order and a corporatist welfare state. While this reading of the German case is certainly not entirely wrong, this paper argues that only if we account for the close intellectual correspondence between lutheran Protestantism and economic liberalism on the one hand and between Catholicism and welfare corporatism on the other, can we fully comprehend the nature of the German post-war compromise. In particular, this perspective allows to better explain the anti-liberal undercurrents of Germany’s soziale Marktwirtschaft. It was especially the role which Protestant Ordoliberals ascribed to the state in upholding economic order and market discipline which accounts for the major difference between ‘classic’ and ‘German-style’ economic liberalism. Yet, the postwar economic order did not represent a deliberately struck compromise between the two major Christian denominations. Rather, Germany’s social market economy was the result of the failure of German Protestant Ordoliberals to prevent the reconstruction of the catholic Bismarckian welfare state after the authoritarian solution, which Ordoliberals had endorsed so strongly up until 1936 and from which they had hoped the re-inauguration of Protestant hegemony, had so utterly failed. Since the ordoliberal doctrine up to the present day lacks a clear understanding of the role of the corporatist welfare state within the German political economy, its insights into the functioning logic of German capitalism have remained limit. The paper also claims that accounting for the denominational roots of the postwar compromise allows us to better understand the relationship between consociationalism and corporatism in ‘Modell Deutschland’.

When Labour and Capital Collude: The Varieties of Welfare Capitalism and Early Retirement in Europe, Japan and the USA. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 00.4, 2000

The institutionalisation of early retirement has become a universal feature of postwar industrial economies, though there are significant cross-national variations. This paper studies the impact of different types of welfare regimes, production systems and labour relations on early exit from work. After an analysis of the main trends, the paper discusses the costs and benefits of early retirement for the various actors — labour, capital and the state — at different levels. The paper outlines both the "pull” and "push” factors of early exit. It first compares the distinct welfare state regimes and private occupational pensions in their impact on early retirement. Then it looks at the labour-shedding strategies inherent to particular employment regimes, production systems and financial governance structures. Finally, the impact of particular industrial relations systems, and especially the role of unions is discussed. The paper finds intricate "institutional complementarities” between particular welfare states, production regimes and industrial relations systems, and these structure the incentives under which actors make decisions on work and retirement. The paper argues that the "collusion” between capital, labour and the state in pursuing early retirement is not merely following a labour-shedding strategy to ease mass unemployment, but also caused by the need for economic restructuration, the downsizing pressures from financial markets, the maintenance of peaceful labour relations, and the consequences of a seniority employment system.

The Legal Construction of Membership: Nationality Law in Germany and the United States. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers No. 00.5, 2000

The argument of this paper is that several empirical puzzles in the citizenship literature are rooted in the failure to distinguish between the mainly legal concept of nationality and the broader, political concept of citizenship. Using this distinction, the paper analysis the evolution of German and American nationality laws over the last 200 years. The historical development of both legal structures shows strong communalities. With the emergence of the modern system of nation states, the attribution of nationality to newborn children is ascribed either via the principle of descent or place of birth. With regard to the naturalization of adults, there is an increasing ethnization of law, which means that the increasing complexities of naturalization criteria are more and more structured along ethnic ideas. Although every nation building process shows some elements of ethnic self-description, it is difficult to use the legal principles of ius sanguinis and ius soli as indicators of ethnic or non-ethnic modes of community building.

Social Democracy, Globalization and Governance: Why is there no European Left Program in the EU? CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 00.6, April 2000

This paper addresses globalization and governance in the EU by attempting to generate some plausible hypotheses that might explain the policy choices of the 12 out of 15 European democratic left governments. With all of the discussion in recent years of a democratic deficit, and then need to maintain a "social Europe," why have these governments not produced more explicit left-wing policies? It suggests three possible hypotheses to account for this apparently mysterious outcome. Hypothesis #1: They want to but they can't. Hypothesis #2: They don't want to because they aren't really left anymore. Hypothesis #3: They could, but they all are suffering from a fundamental failure of imagination. The paper explores each of these hypotheses in two ways. First it examines the initial years of the Schröder government in Germany apparently, pursuing each of these three hypotheses and different times during this period. Then it looks more systematically and comparatively and each of the three hypotheses by including analysis both of Germany and several other EU member states. The larger goal of this work is to provoke discussion and research on what role left political movements can actually play. Is it even reasonable to expect such a group of nation states to develop innovative forms of cross-national governance? Or are new and/or revised forms of representation and governance beyond traditional nation-state models.

Beyond Cooperation and Competition: What Kind of Federalism for EU Social Policy? CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 00.7, December 2000

The EU has become a loose kind ofsocial federation, a fact that has not been adequately taken into account due to the peculiarities ofthe Maastricht strategy for monetary integration. Yet, a new approach to the economic theory offederalism is required ifone wants to analyze the most pressing issues ofEU social policy. The social insurance view of redistribution and stabilization provides for such an approach. This view supports laboratory federalism in which it is the role ofthe EU Commission to contain systems competition in order to preserve "stability in diversity." The role ofthe EU level would be to promote horizontal and vertical learning processes and to make sure that stability concerns ofthe EU are taken seriously by member countries' governments. The minimum requirements framework for social policy that the EU Commission has adopted must be taken as a point of departure, even though it is a less than satisfactory approach from this point of view. Laboratory standardization, in contrast, would not set specific minimum requirements but meta-standards that protect systems functions and safeguard against systems failures.

Institutions and Structural Unemployment: Do Capital-Market Imperfections Matter? CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 00.8, December 2000

This paper analyzes whether differences in institutional structures on capital markets contribute to explaining why some DECO-countries, in particular the Anglo-Saxon countries, have been much more successful over the last two decades in producing employment growth and in reducing unem­ployment than most continental-European DECO-countries. It is argued that the often-blamed labor market rigidities alone, while important, do not provide a satisfactory explanation for these differ­ences across countries and over time. Financial constraints are potentially important obstacles against creating new firms and jobs and thus against coping well with structural change and against moving successfully toward the "new economy". Highly developed venture capital markets should help to alleviate such financial constraints. This view that labor-market institutions should be sup­plemented by capital market imperfections for explaining differences in employment performances is supported by our panel data analysis, in which venture capital turns out to be a significant insti­tutional variable.

Creating Stability: National Preferences and the Origins of European Monetary System. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 00.9, December 2000

This essay compares the preferences of France, Italy, and Britain on the creation of the European Monetary System in 1978-1979, especially the Exchange Rate Mechanism, which stabilised nominal exchange rates. My claim is that the different conclusions reached by the governments (France and Italy in, Britain out) cannot be explained by economic circumstances or by interests, and I elaborate an intervening institutional variable which helps explain preferences. Deducing from spatial theory that where decisionmakers `sit' on the left-right spectrum matters to their position on the EMS, I argue that domestic constitutional power-. sharing mechanisms privilege certain actors over others in a predictable and consistent way. Where centrists were in power, the government's decision was to join. Where left or right extremists were privileged, the government's decision was negative. The article measures the centrism of the governments in place at the time, and also reviews the positions taken by the national political parties in and out of government. It is intended to contribute to the growing comparativist literature on the European Union, and to the burgeoning literature on EU-member-state relations.