Central Bank Independence & Coordinated Wage Bargaining: Their Interaction in Germany & Europe. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 04.4, 1994
Data(s) |
1994
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Resumo |
This paper explores the fashionable proposition that with a more independent central bank, a country can secure lower levels of inflation without higher unemployment. Hall shows that the operation of the central bank depends on the character of wage bargaining. He illustrates this point with some cross-national data and an analysis of how coordinated wage bargaining is secured in Germany. He concludes by exploring the implications of this analysis for European Monetary Union. |
Formato |
application/pdf |
Identificador |
http://aei.pitt.edu/63694/1/PSGE_WP4_4.pdf Hall, Peter A. (1994) Central Bank Independence & Coordinated Wage Bargaining: Their Interaction in Germany & Europe. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 04.4, 1994. [Working Paper] |
Relação |
https://ces.fas.harvard.edu/#/publications/working_papers/146 http://aei.pitt.edu/63694/ |
Palavras-Chave | #European Central Bank #Germany #EMU/EMS/euro |
Tipo |
Working Paper NonPeerReviewed |