Queen execution in the Argentine ant, Iridomyrmex humilis

Field censuses and laboratory experiments show that in the Argentine ant, Iridomyrmex humilis (Mayr), c. 90% of the queens are executed by workers in May, at the beginning of the reproductive season. The reduction in the number of queens probably decreases the inhibition exerted by queens on the differentiation of sexuals and thus allows the production of new queens and males shortly thereafter. In the laboratory, there was no correlation between the percentage of queens executed and their weight or fecundity. At the time of execution of queens, nearly all queens were of the same age; less than 1 year. Therefore it is not likely that the age of queens plays any role in the choice that workers make in the queens they executed. Execution of these queens results in a heavy energetic cost for the colony which amounts c. 8% of the total biomass. This behaviour of workers executing nestmate queens is discussed with regard to possible evolutionary significance at the queen and worker level.

Integration of olfactory information in a spatial representation enabling accurate arm choice in the radial arm maze

The aim of the present study was to determine whether and how rats can use local olfactory cues for spatial orientation. Rats were trained in an eight-arm radial maze under different conditions as defined by the presence or absence of supplementary olfactory cues marking each arm, the availability of distant visuospatial information, and the illumination of the maze (light or darkness). The different visual conditions were designed to dissociate among the effects of light per se and those of visuospatial cues, on the use of olfactory cues for accurate arm choice. Different procedures with modifications of the arrangement of olfactory cues were used to determine if rats formed a representation of the spatial configuration of the olfactory cues and if they could rely on such a representation for accurate arm choice in the radial maze. The present study demonstrated that the use of olfactory cues to direct arm choice in the radial arm maze was critically dependent on the illumination conditions and implied two different modes of processing of olfactory information according to the presence or the absence of light. Olfactory cues were used in an explicit manner and enabled accurate arm choice only in the absence of light. Rats, however, had an implicit memory of the location of the olfactory cues and formed a representation of the spatial position of these cues, whatever the lighting conditions. They did not memorize the spatial configuration of the olfactory cues per se but needed these cues to be linked to the external spatial frame of reference.

Occupational choice and development

The rise in world trade since 1970 has been accompanied by a rise in the geographic span of control of management and, hence, also a rise in the e ective international mobility of labor services. We study the e ect of such a globalization of the world's labor markets. The world's welfare gains depend positively on the skill-heterogeneity of the world's labor force. We nd that when peoplecan choose between wage work and managerial work, the worldwide labor market raises output by more in the rich and the poor countries, and by less in the middle-income countries. This is because the middle-income countries experience the smallest change in the factor-price ratio, and where the option to choose between wage work and managerial work has the least value in the integratedeconomy. Our theory also establishes that after economic integration, the high skill countries see a disproportionate increase in managerial occupations. Using aggregate data on GDP, openness and occupations from 115 countries, we find evidence for these patterns of occupational choice.

Size-dependent predation by Dugesia lugubris (Turbellaria) on Physa acuta (Gastropoda): experiments and model

1. We investigated experimentally predation by the flatworm Dugesia lugubris on the snail Physa acuta in relation to predator body length and to prey morphology [shell length (SL) and aperture width (AW)]. 2. SL and AW correlate strongly in the field, but display significant and independent variance among populations. In the laboratory, predation by Dugesia resulted in large and significant selection differentials on both SL and AW. Analysis of partial effects suggests that selection on AW was indirect, and mediated through its strong correlation with SL. 3. The probability P(ij) for a snail of size category i (SL) to be preyed upon by a flatworm of size category j was fitted with a Poisson-probability distribution, the mean of which increased linearly with predator size (i). Despite the low number of parameters, the fit was excellent (r2 = 0.96). We offer brief biological interpretations of this relationship with reference to optimal foraging theory. 4. The largest size class of Dugesia (>2 cm) did not prey on snails larger than 7 mm shell length. This size threshold might offer Physa a refuge against flatworm predation and thereby allow coexistence in the field. 5. Our results are further discussed with respect to previous field and laboratory observations on P acuta life-history patterns, in particular its phenotypic variance in adult body size.

The role of territory choice mate choice and arrival date on breeding success in the Savi's warbler (Locustella luscinioides)

We investigated how territory quality, settlement date and morphometry affected several components of yearly breeding success of a Swiss population of Savi's Warblers Locustella luscinioides. Territories occupied by males differed from unoccupied sites of similar size and location by having higher and denser reeds, a more extensive straw litter, and a thicker cover of dead sedge leaves. Territories with these characteristics were the ones first chosen by males upon spring arrival. These males, however, did not differ in morphometry from those that arrived later. Availability of suitable nesting sites; rather than food availability, appears to be an important choice criterion for territories. Early arriving males had higher breeding success than late males because of a higher mating success and more successful clutches. The positive correlation between male breeding success and territory quality was thus mediated through their common dependence on occupancy date. Female breeding success decreased with the date of first-clutch laying, mainly because late-nesting females fledged fewer broods. Breeding success in either sex did not correlate with morphometry. Our results provide clear support for territory choice by males, but not for mate or territory choice by females, and show the crucial role played by individual settlement date on many aspects of the breeding cycle of both sexes. We propose a lottery model of mate choice. arriving females obtain the best available territories even without choosing mates or territories; since males occupy territories sequentially and in order of decreasing quality, the few unpaired males available at any moment also occupy the best available territories.

The Regulatory Choice between a Label and a Minimum-Quality Standard, 2005

This paper revisits the issue of the regulatory choice between a mandatory label and a minimum-quality standard. When the cost of regulation is relatively low, we show that the socially optimal choice depends on the producers’ cost structure for complying with regulation and improving quality. Under a marginal cost for improving quality, the mandatory labeling is sufficient for reaching the socially optimal level of quality. Under a fixed cost for improving quality, we show that each instrument or the combination of both instruments may emerge at the equilibrium.

Health Information and the Choice of Fish Species: An Experiment Measuring the Impact of Risk and Benefit Information, April 2006

An experiment was conducted in France to evaluate the impact of health information on consumers’ choice between two different types of fish. Successive messages revealing risks (methylmercury) and benefits (omega-3s) of consuming the fish, along with consumption recommendations, were delivered. Results show a significant difference of reaction according to the order and type of information. The information about risks had a larger marginal impact on change in willingness to pay (WTP) than did the information about benefits. While the results show that detailed messages on risks/benefits, including recommendations for nutrition behavior, matter in the modification of WTP, 40% of respondents did not change their initial choices after the revelation of health information.

Field Experiments of Current Concrete Pavement Surface Characteristics Practices: Iowa Data Collection and Analysis, December 2005

One of the most important issues in portland cement concrete pavement research today is surface characteristics. The issue is one of balancing surface texture construction with the need for durability, skid resistance, and noise reduction. The National Concrete Pavement Technology Center at Iowa State University, in conjunction with the Federal Highway Administration, American Concrete Pavement Association, International Grinding and Grooving Association, Iowa Highway Research Board, and other states, have entered into a three-part National Surface Characteristics Program to resolve the balancing problem. As a portion of Part 2, this report documents the construction of 18 separate pavement surfaces for use in the first level of testing for the national project. It identifies the testing to be done and the limitations observed in the construction process. The results of the actual tests will be included in the subsequent national study reports.

Organizational Choice and Environmental Change

We explain the choice between franchising and vertical integration by estimating a model of relative performance in a sample of 250 Spanish car distributors, controlling for self-selection and including environmental factors. The method allows us to estimate performance counterfactuals. Organizational choice seemingly aims to contain moral hazard for both distributors and manufacturers but it is subject to start-up constraints and switching costs. While the market for franchises remained underdeveloped, information asymmetries led to the opening of integrated outlets. Their subsequent conversion into franchised outlets probably involved prohibitive transaction costs. Consequently, they performed worse than would have been expected had they been independent, as confirmed by the systematic improvement observed when they were in fact converted. The timing of such conversions suggests that switching costs were prohibitive until firms developed a substantial cushion of temporary contracts, previously forbidden by regulation.

Salience theory of choice under risk

We present a theory of choice among lotteries in which the decision maker's attention is drawn to (precisely defined) salient payoffs. This leads the decision maker to a context-dependent representation of lotteries in which true probabilities are replaced by decision weights distorted in favor of salient payoffs. By endogenizing decision weights as a function of payoffs, our model provides a novel and unified account of many empirical phenomena, including frequent risk-seeking behavior, invariance failures such as the Allais paradox, and preference reversals. It also yields new predictions, including some that distinguish it from Prospect Theory, which we test.

Optimal Contracts, Adverse Selection, and Social Preferences: An Experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Do the Wealthy Risk More Money? An Experimental Comparison

Are poor people more or less likely to take money risks than wealthy folks? We find that risk attraction is more prevalent among the wealthy when the amounts of money at risk are small (not surprising, since ten dollars is a smaller amount for a wealthy person than for a poor one), but, interestingly, for the larger amounts of money at risk the fraction of the nonwealthy displaying risk attraction exceeds that of the wealthy. We also replicate our previous finding that many people display risk attraction for small money amounts, but risk aversion for large ones. We argue that preferences yielding risk attraction for small money amounts, together with risk aversion for larger amounts, at all levels of wealth, while contradicting the expected utility hypothesis, may be well-defined, independently of reference points, on the choice space.

Evolutionary games on complex networks : the emergence and maintenance of cooperation

Abstract The object of game theory lies in the analysis of situations where different social actors have conflicting requirements and where their individual decisions will all influence the global outcome. In this framework, several games have been invented to capture the essence of various dilemmas encountered in many common important socio-economic situations. Even though these games often succeed in helping us understand human or animal behavior in interactive settings, some experiments have shown that people tend to cooperate with each other in situations for which classical game theory strongly recommends them to do the exact opposite. Several mechanisms have been invoked to try to explain the emergence of this unexpected cooperative attitude. Among them, repeated interaction, reputation, and belonging to a recognizable group have often been mentioned. However, the work of Nowak and May (1992) showed that the simple fact of arranging the players according to a spatial structure and only allowing them to interact with their immediate neighbors is sufficient to sustain a certain amount of cooperation even when the game is played anonymously and without repetition. Nowak and May's study and much of the following work was based on regular structures such as two-dimensional grids. Axelrod et al. (2002) showed that by randomizing the choice of neighbors, i.e. by actually giving up a strictly local geographical structure, cooperation can still emerge, provided that the interaction patterns remain stable in time. This is a first step towards a social network structure. However, following pioneering work by sociologists in the sixties such as that of Milgram (1967), in the last few years it has become apparent that many social and biological interaction networks, and even some technological networks, have particular, and partly unexpected, properties that set them apart from regular or random graphs. Among other things, they usually display broad degree distributions, and show small-world topological structure. Roughly speaking, a small-world graph is a network where any individual is relatively close, in terms of social ties, to any other individual, a property also found in random graphs but not in regular lattices. However, in contrast with random graphs, small-world networks also have a certain amount of local structure, as measured, for instance, by a quantity called the clustering coefficient. In the same vein, many real conflicting situations in economy and sociology are not well described neither by a fixed geographical position of the individuals in a regular lattice, nor by a random graph. Furthermore, it is a known fact that network structure can highly influence dynamical phenomena such as the way diseases spread across a population and ideas or information get transmitted. Therefore, in the last decade, research attention has naturally shifted from random and regular graphs towards better models of social interaction structures. The primary goal of this work is to discover whether or not the underlying graph structure of real social networks could give explanations as to why one finds higher levels of cooperation in populations of human beings or animals than what is prescribed by classical game theory. To meet this objective, I start by thoroughly studying a real scientific coauthorship network and showing how it differs from biological or technological networks using divers statistical measurements. Furthermore, I extract and describe its community structure taking into account the intensity of a collaboration. Finally, I investigate the temporal evolution of the network, from its inception to its state at the time of the study in 2006, suggesting also an effective view of it as opposed to a historical one. Thereafter, I combine evolutionary game theory with several network models along with the studied coauthorship network in order to highlight which specific network properties foster cooperation and shed some light on the various mechanisms responsible for the maintenance of this same cooperation. I point out the fact that, to resist defection, cooperators take advantage, whenever possible, of the degree-heterogeneity of social networks and their underlying community structure. Finally, I show that cooperation level and stability depend not only on the game played, but also on the evolutionary dynamic rules used and the individual payoff calculations. Synopsis Le but de la théorie des jeux réside dans l'analyse de situations dans lesquelles différents acteurs sociaux, avec des objectifs souvent conflictuels, doivent individuellement prendre des décisions qui influenceront toutes le résultat global. Dans ce cadre, plusieurs jeux ont été inventés afin de saisir l'essence de divers dilemmes rencontrés dans d'importantes situations socio-économiques. Bien que ces jeux nous permettent souvent de comprendre le comportement d'êtres humains ou d'animaux en interactions, des expériences ont montré que les individus ont parfois tendance à coopérer dans des situations pour lesquelles la théorie classique des jeux prescrit de faire le contraire. Plusieurs mécanismes ont été invoqués pour tenter d'expliquer l'émergence de ce comportement coopératif inattendu. Parmi ceux-ci, la répétition des interactions, la réputation ou encore l'appartenance à des groupes reconnaissables ont souvent été mentionnés. Toutefois, les travaux de Nowak et May (1992) ont montré que le simple fait de disposer les joueurs selon une structure spatiale en leur permettant d'interagir uniquement avec leurs voisins directs est suffisant pour maintenir un certain niveau de coopération même si le jeu est joué de manière anonyme et sans répétitions. L'étude de Nowak et May, ainsi qu'un nombre substantiel de travaux qui ont suivi, étaient basés sur des structures régulières telles que des grilles à deux dimensions. Axelrod et al. (2002) ont montré qu'en randomisant le choix des voisins, i.e. en abandonnant une localisation géographique stricte, la coopération peut malgré tout émerger, pour autant que les schémas d'interactions restent stables au cours du temps. Ceci est un premier pas en direction d'une structure de réseau social. Toutefois, suite aux travaux précurseurs de sociologues des années soixante, tels que ceux de Milgram (1967), il est devenu clair ces dernières années qu'une grande partie des réseaux d'interactions sociaux et biologiques, et même quelques réseaux technologiques, possèdent des propriétés particulières, et partiellement inattendues, qui les distinguent de graphes réguliers ou aléatoires. Entre autres, ils affichent en général une distribution du degré relativement large ainsi qu'une structure de "petit-monde". Grossièrement parlant, un graphe "petit-monde" est un réseau où tout individu se trouve relativement près de tout autre individu en termes de distance sociale, une propriété également présente dans les graphes aléatoires mais absente des grilles régulières. Par contre, les réseaux "petit-monde" ont, contrairement aux graphes aléatoires, une certaine structure de localité, mesurée par exemple par une quantité appelée le "coefficient de clustering". Dans le même esprit, plusieurs situations réelles de conflit en économie et sociologie ne sont pas bien décrites ni par des positions géographiquement fixes des individus en grilles régulières, ni par des graphes aléatoires. De plus, il est bien connu que la structure même d'un réseau peut passablement influencer des phénomènes dynamiques tels que la manière qu'a une maladie de se répandre à travers une population, ou encore la façon dont des idées ou une information s'y propagent. Ainsi, durant cette dernière décennie, l'attention de la recherche s'est tout naturellement déplacée des graphes aléatoires et réguliers vers de meilleurs modèles de structure d'interactions sociales. L'objectif principal de ce travail est de découvrir si la structure sous-jacente de graphe de vrais réseaux sociaux peut fournir des explications quant aux raisons pour lesquelles on trouve, chez certains groupes d'êtres humains ou d'animaux, des niveaux de coopération supérieurs à ce qui est prescrit par la théorie classique des jeux. Dans l'optique d'atteindre ce but, je commence par étudier un véritable réseau de collaborations scientifiques et, en utilisant diverses mesures statistiques, je mets en évidence la manière dont il diffère de réseaux biologiques ou technologiques. De plus, j'extrais et je décris sa structure de communautés en tenant compte de l'intensité d'une collaboration. Finalement, j'examine l'évolution temporelle du réseau depuis son origine jusqu'à son état en 2006, date à laquelle l'étude a été effectuée, en suggérant également une vue effective du réseau par opposition à une vue historique. Par la suite, je combine la théorie évolutionnaire des jeux avec des réseaux comprenant plusieurs modèles et le réseau de collaboration susmentionné, afin de déterminer les propriétés structurelles utiles à la promotion de la coopération et les mécanismes responsables du maintien de celle-ci. Je mets en évidence le fait que, pour ne pas succomber à la défection, les coopérateurs exploitent dans la mesure du possible l'hétérogénéité des réseaux sociaux en termes de degré ainsi que la structure de communautés sous-jacente de ces mêmes réseaux. Finalement, je montre que le niveau de coopération et sa stabilité dépendent non seulement du jeu joué, mais aussi des règles de la dynamique évolutionnaire utilisées et du calcul du bénéfice d'un individu.