The Regulatory Choice between a Label and a Minimum-Quality Standard, 2005


Autoria(s): Desconhecido
Data(s)

2005

Resumo

This paper revisits the issue of the regulatory choice between a mandatory label and a minimum-quality standard. When the cost of regulation is relatively low, we show that the socially optimal choice depends on the producers’ cost structure for complying with regulation and improving quality. Under a marginal cost for improving quality, the mandatory labeling is sufficient for reaching the socially optimal level of quality. Under a fixed cost for improving quality, we show that each instrument or the combination of both instruments may emerge at the equilibrium.

Formato

application/pdf

Identificador

http://publications.iowa.gov/3344/1/05wp416.pdf

(2005) The Regulatory Choice between a Label and a Minimum-Quality Standard, 2005. Iowa State University

Idioma(s)

en

Relação

http://publications.iowa.gov/3344/

Palavras-Chave #Trade and commerce #Economic forecasts
Tipo

Departmental Report

NonPeerReviewed