A fascinating game;

Mode of access: Internet.

It's all in the game,

Mode of access: Internet.

The Board; a weekly magazine devoted to the game of checkers.

Vol. <3, no. 6> published in Williamsport, Pa.

Central African game and its spoor /

Includes index.

A digest of the law of carriers of goods and passengers by land and internal navigation.

Mode of access: Internet.

Consumption of luxury goods in Brazil: purchasing motives and values of Brazilian consumers and implications for marketing

Aiming at success in the currently challenging Brazilian market, luxury firms must consider a number of factors. Not only the adaptation to certain economic and political conditions but also the understanding of Brazilian luxury consumers’ characteristics as well as their value perceptions towards luxury are crucial in order to create an effective marketing strategy. This study investigated the value perceptions and purchasing motives of 428 Brazilian consumers. Brazilians purchase luxury goods in order to conspicuously put them on show to certain social reference group or to the general public. Thus, they display their wealth, income and social status. Social groups therefore play a distinct role in the purchasing decision process. Moreover, Brazilians are found to be hedonic consumers, seeking pleasurable moments and the reduction of stress when consuming luxury products. In addition to that, they use luxurious products to express their own personality. Brazilians hence place a much higher importance on self-expressive, emotional product benefits rather than on rational, functional product benefits. Marketers of luxury goods are advised to make use of this knowledge in order to adequately address consumers’ needs, wants and beliefs. The study focuses on consumers living in Rio de Janeiro and does not take into account different value perceptions on different luxury product categories. Therefore, suggestions for further research include replicating the study in different Brazilian regions and probing for differences among product categories.

Essays on the Issue of Piracy in the Market of Information Goods

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06

Optimal price regulation in a growth model with monopolistic suppliers of intermediate goods

In this paper we investigate the trade-off faced by regulators who must set a price for an intermediate good somewhere between the marginal cost and the monopoly price. We utilize a growth model with monopolistic suppliers of intermediate goods. Investment in innovation is required to produce a new intermediate good. Marginal cost pricing deters innovation, while monopoly pricing maximizes innovation and economic growth at the cost of some static inefficiency. We demonstrate the existence of a second-best price above the marginal cost but below the monopoly price, which maximizes consumer welfare. Simulation results suggest that substantial reductions in consumption, production, growth, and welfare occur where regulators focus on static efficiency issues by setting prices at or near marginal cost.

Association of public support for survival of wildlife species with their likeability

We surveyed 204 individuals from the general public in Brisbane, Australia, to ascertain the extent to which they liked or disliked 24 species of wildlife (belonging to three classes: mammals, birds and reptiles) present in tropical Australia. We calculated likeability indices for each species. We also asked respondents if they favored the survival of each of these species, and were able to calculate the percentage of respondents favoring survival of each. Using linear regression analysis, we could relate the percentage of respondents favoring survival of each of the species to their indices of likeability. In addition, we compared the mean likeability of species in the three classes (mammals, birds and reptiles) with the respondents' allocation of funds (hypothetical 1,000 Australian dollars) between conservation of species and a human charity. From this, we were able to assess how important stated likeability is for preferences to conserve species by animal class, and reconsidered the hypothesis in the literature that there is likely to be more public support for the survival of mammals than for birds, and more support for the survival of birds than for reptiles.

Reforming the social housing waiting game

The UK’s social housing stock is a precious resource that needs to be allocated as fairly and transparently as possible, says Ed Turner, who highlights inadequacies in the current approach and argues for two major changes to the way social housing is allocated and the support councils give those in housing needed.

iServe:a serious game for servitization

Servitization concerns the process of manufacturers shifting from a focus on producing and selling tangible goods to service-based business models. Factors that drive adoption of servitization are financial, strategic (competitive advantage) and marketing. However, uptake is slow and active efforts are being made to transfer knowledge about servitization to the manufacturing sector. This paper presents early results from the first test of a serious computer game which has the goal of educating managers about what advanced services are and how they fit in supply chains. Results suggest the role-play scenario tested is appropriate for an audience of largely non-expert gamers, and that the approach has the potential to instruct users about the role of services in the supply chain.

Felsőoktatási intézmények közbeszerzési sajátosságai = Public Procurement Characteristics of Higher Education Institutions

A kutatók a 2000-es évek eleje óta foglalkoznak a közbeszerzés és a versenyképesség kapcsolatával. A két terület közötti összefüggés egyértelmű, melyet vizsgálatainak is megerősítenek. Az Európai Unió tagállamainak jogalkotón folyamatos a nyomás, hogy a közbeszerzést különböző célokra használják fel. Mindez segít a közbeszerzés értelmezési körének kitágításában, de felhívja a figyelmet arra, hogy a jogalkotóknak elsősorban néhány kiemelt témára kell összpontosítaniuk, mint az innováció vagy a fenntarthatóság. A felsőoktatási intézmények közbeszerzésben betöltött szerepén túl fontosságuk a konzorciális beszerzések, a közbeszerzés képzés, továbbá az innovatív termékek, technológiák beszerzési gyakorlatában betöltött szerepük miatt kiemelkedő. Hazánkban ez az első alkalom, hogy feltárjuk kifejezetten nagy közbeszerző felsőoktatási intézményeik piaci szerepét és elemezzük közbeszerzési gyakorlatuk sajátosságait, viszonyítjuk eddigi kutatási eredményeinkhez. ______ Researchers have focused on the relation between public procurement and competitiveness since the early 2000s. The relation between corporate competitiveness and public procurement is beyond doubt, evidenced by our research findings. There is growing pressure on the legislators of EU Member States to use public procurement for certain purposes. This helps to widen the scope of procurement, but the regulators have to focus on several priorities like innovation and sustainability. The importance of universities in the development of consortial purchasing, purchasing education, procurement of innovative goods and technologies is unquestionable. It is the first opportunity in Hungary to analyze the role of large contracting authorities, participants of the higher educational market in public procurement and to explore the characteristics of their public procurement practice in order to make comparison between universities and other public procurement market players.

The Kreps-Scheinkman game in mixed duopolies

In this paper we extend the results of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to mixedduopolies. We show that quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes not only in the case of private firms but also when a public firm is involved.

Essays on durable goods consumption and firm innovation

This dissertation comprises three individual chapters. Chapter Two examines how free riding across neighbors influenced the diffusion of color television sets in rural China. Chapter Three tests for asymmetric information between a firm’s management and other investors concerning its patent output. Chapter Four discusses how knowledge stocks influence a patenting firm’s later diversification. Chapter Two documents the existence of a type of network effects—free riding across neighbors—in the consumption of color television sets in rural China, which reduces the propensity of non-owners to purchase. I construct a model of the timing of the purchase of a durable good in the presence of free riding, and test its key implications using household survey data in rural China. Chapter Three tests for asymmetric information between a firm’s management and other investors about its patent output by examining insider trading patterns and stock price changes in R&D intensive firms. It demonstrates that management has considerable information about its patent output beyond what is known to investors. It also shows that the predictive power of insider trading patterns on patent output comes from purchases rather than sales. Chapter Four discusses two sequential channels through which knowledge stocks may influence a firm’s later diversification. One is that firms with more knowledge are more likely to enter a new industry. The other is that firms’ businesses have a better chance of surviving, conditional on being formed. By examining U.S. public patenting firms in manufacturing sectors for 1984-1996, I find that knowledge stocks predict the likelihood of new industry entry when controlling for firm size. However, this predictive power is weakened when diversification effects are included. On the other hand, a survival study of newly established segments shows that initial knowledge stocks have significant positive effects on segment survival, whereas diversification effects are insignificant.

Essays on the Role of Government Incentives in the Private Provision of Social Goods

The economic rationale for public intervention into private markets through price mechanisms is twofold: to correct market failures and to redistribute resources. Financial incentives are one such price mechanism. In this dissertation, I specifically address the role of financial incentives in providing social goods in two separate contexts: a redistributive policy that enables low income working families to access affordable childcare in the US and an experimental pay-for-performance intervention to improve population health outcomes in rural India. In the first two papers, I investigate the effects of government incentives for providing grandchild care on grandmothers’ short- and long-term outcomes. In the third paper, coauthored with Manoj Mohanan, Grant Miller, Katherine Donato, and Marcos Vera-Hernandez, we use an experimental framework to consider the the effects of financial incentives in improving maternal and child health outcomes in the Indian state of Karnataka.

Grandmothers provide a significant amount of childcare in the US, but little is known about how this informal, and often uncompensated, time transfer impacts their economic and health outcomes. The first two chapters of this dissertation address the impact of federally funded, state-level means-tested programs that compensate grandparent-provided childcare on the retirement security of older women, an economically vulnerable group of considerable policy interest. I use the variation in the availability and generosity of childcare subsidies to model the effect of government payments for grandchild care on grandmothers’ time use, income, earnings, interfamily transfers, and health outcomes. After establishing that more generous government payments induce grandmothers to provide more hours of childcare, I find that grandmothers adjust their behavior by reducing their formal labor supply and earnings. Grandmothers make up for lost earnings by claiming Social Security earlier, increasing their reliance on Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and reducing financial transfers to their children. While the policy does not appear to negatively impact grandmothers’ immediate economic well-being, there are significant costs to the state, in terms of both up-front costs for care payments and long-term costs as a result of grandmothers’ increased reliance on social insurance.

The final paper, The Role of Non-Cognitive Traits in Response to Financial Incentives: Evidence from a Randomized Control Trial of Obstetrics Care Providers in India, is coauthored with Manoj Mohanan, Grant Miller, Katherine Donato and Marcos Vera-Hernandez. We report the results from “Improving Maternal and Child Health in India: Evaluating Demand and Supply Side Strategies” (IMACHINE), a randomized controlled experiment designed to test the effectiveness of supply-side incentives for private obstetrics care providers in rural Karnataka, India. In particular, the experimental design compares two different types of incentives: (1) those based on the quality of inputs providers offer their patients (inputs contracts) and (2) those based on the reduction of incidence of four adverse maternal and neonatal health outcomes (outcomes contracts). Along with studying the relative effectiveness of the different financial incentives, we also investigate the role of provider characteristics, preferences, expectations and non-cognitive traits in mitigating the effects of incentive contracts.

We find that both contract types input incentive contracts reduce rates of post-partum hemorrhage, the leading cause of maternal mortality in India by about 20%. We also find some evidence of multitasking as output incentive contract providers reduce the level of postnatal newborn care received by their patients. We find that patient health improvements in response to both contract types are concentrated among higher trained providers. We find improvements in patient care to be concentrated among the lower trained providers. Contrary to our expectations, we also find improvements in patient health to be concentrated among the most risk averse providers, while more patient providers respond relatively little to the incentives, and these difference are most evident in the outputs contract arm. The results are opposite for patient care outcomes; risk averse providers have significantly lower rates of patient care and more patient providers provide higher quality care in response to the outputs contract. We find evidence that overconfidence among providers about their expectations about possible improvements reduces the effectiveness of both types of incentive contracts for improving both patient outcomes and patient care. Finally, we find no heterogeneous response based on non-cognitive traits.