The Kreps-Scheinkman game in mixed duopolies


Autoria(s): Bakó, Barna; Tasnádi, Attila
Data(s)

15/07/2014

Resumo

In this paper we extend the results of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to mixedduopolies. We show that quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes not only in the case of private firms but also when a public firm is involved.

Formato

application/pdf

Identificador

http://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/1655/1/cewp_201411.pdf

Bakó, Barna and Tasnádi, Attila (2014) The Kreps-Scheinkman game in mixed duopolies. Working Paper. Corvinus University of Budapest Faculty of Economics, Budapest.

Publicador

Corvinus University of Budapest Faculty of Economics

Relação

http://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/1655/

Palavras-Chave #Mathematics, Econometrics
Tipo

Monograph

NonPeerReviewed