964 resultados para Language Games
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This paper investigates the effect of focal points and initial relative position in the outcome of a bargaining process. We conduct two on-line experiments. In the first experiment we attempt to replicate Güth, Huck and Müller's (2001) results about the relevance of equal splits. In our second experiment, we recover the choices of participants in forty mini-ultimatum games. This design allows us to test whether the equal split or any other distribution or set of distributions are salient. Our data provide no support for a focal-point explanation but we find support for an explanation based on relative position. Our results confirm that there is a norm against hyper-fair offers. Proposers are expected to behave selfishly when the unselfish distribution leads to a change in the initial relative position.
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Presentation for the 5th International Conference on Corpus Linguistics (CILC 2013), V Congreso Internacional de Lingüistica de Corpus.
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[EN] In this study, we explore native and non-native syntactic processing, paying special attention to the language distance factor. To this end, we compared how native speakers of Basque and highly proficient non-native speakers of Basque who are native speakers of Spanish process certain core aspects of Basque syntax. Our results suggest that differences in native versus non-native language processing strongly correlate with language distance: native/non-native processing differences obtain if a syntactic parameter of the non-native grammar diverges from the native grammar. Otherwise, non-native processing will approximate native processing as levels of proficiency increase. We focus on three syntactic parameters: (i) the head parameter, (ii) argument alignment (ergative/accusative), and (iii) verb agreement. The first two diverge in Basque and Spanish, but the third is the same in both languages. Our results reveal that native and non-native processing differs for the diverging syntactic parameters, but not for the convergent one. These findings indicate that language distance has a significant impact in non-native language processing.
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Boeckx C., M.C. Horno & J.L. Mendívil (Eds.)
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The aim of this study is to develop a reference model for intervention in the language processes applied to the transformation of language normalisation within organisations of a socio-economic nature. It is based on the case study of an experience carried out over10 years within a trades’ union confederation, and has pursued a strategy of a basically qualitative research carried out in three stages: 1) undertaking field work through application of action-research methodology, 2) reconstructing experiences following processes of systematisation and conceptualisation of the systematised data, applying methodologies for the Systematisation of Experiences and Grounded Theory, and 3) formulating a model for intervention, applying the Systems Approach methodology. Finally, we identified nine key ideas that make up the conceptual framework for the ENEKuS reference model, which is structured in nine ‘action points', each having an operating sub-model applicable in practice.
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This paper is a version of the discussion paper titled "Simple coalitional strategy profiles"
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In noncooperative cost sharing games, individually strategic agents choose resources based on how the welfare (cost or revenue) generated at each resource (which depends on the set of agents that choose the resource) is distributed. The focus is on finding distribution rules that lead to stable allocations, which is formalized by the concept of Nash equilibrium, e.g., Shapley value (budget-balanced) and marginal contribution (not budget-balanced) rules.
Recent work that seeks to characterize the space of all such rules shows that the only budget-balanced distribution rules that guarantee equilibrium existence in all welfare sharing games are generalized weighted Shapley values (GWSVs), by exhibiting a specific 'worst-case' welfare function which requires that GWSV rules be used. Our work provides an exact characterization of the space of distribution rules (not necessarily budget-balanced) for any specific local welfare functions remains, for a general class of scalable and separable games with well-known applications, e.g., facility location, routing, network formation, and coverage games.
We show that all games conditioned on any fixed local welfare functions possess an equilibrium if and only if the distribution rules are equivalent to GWSV rules on some 'ground' welfare functions. Therefore, it is neither the existence of some worst-case welfare function, nor the restriction of budget-balance, which limits the design to GWSVs. Also, in order to guarantee equilibrium existence, it is necessary to work within the class of potential games, since GWSVs result in (weighted) potential games.
We also provide an alternative characterization—all games conditioned on any fixed local welfare functions possess an equilibrium if and only if the distribution rules are equivalent to generalized weighted marginal contribution (GWMC) rules on some 'ground' welfare functions. This result is due to a deeper fundamental connection between Shapley values and marginal contributions that our proofs expose—they are equivalent given a transformation connecting their ground welfare functions. (This connection leads to novel closed-form expressions for the GWSV potential function.) Since GWMCs are more tractable than GWSVs, a designer can tradeoff budget-balance with computational tractability in deciding which rule to implement.
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Edited by Andrea Abel, Chiara Vettori, Natascia Ralli.
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Roughly one half of World's languages are in danger of extinction. The endangered languages, spoken by minorities, typically compete with powerful languages such as En- glish or Spanish. Consequently, the speakers of minority languages have to consider that not everybody can speak their language, converting the language choice into strategic,coordination-like situation. We show experimentally that the displacement of minority languages may be partially explained by the imperfect information about the linguistic type of the partner, leading to frequent failure to coordinate on the minority language even between two speakers who can and prefer to use it. The extent of miscoordination correlates with how minoritarian a language is and with the real-life linguistic condition of subjects: the more endangered a language the harder it is to coordinate on its use, and people on whom the language survival relies the most acquire behavioral strategies that lower its use. Our game-theoretical treatment of the issue provides a new perspective for linguistic policies.
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Gaur egungo eskola euskaldunak ikasleak alfabetatzeko erronka izateaz gain, ikasleak euskalduntzeko erantzukizuna ere bere gain hartzen du. Esku artean duzun lan honetan, herri eta eskola zehatz baten hizkuntza egoera aztertu da. Herritar gehienek euskaraz jakin arren, asko ez dira etxean euskaraz mintzatzen eta honek eragin zuzena du eskolako ikasleek ahoz adierazteko duten euskara maila baxuan eta elkarrekin komunikatzeko erabiltzen duten hizkuntzan, gaztelania alegia. Ahozkotasuna lantzeko hutsuneei eta eskolako hizkuntza beharrizan errealei erantzuna emateko, esku-hartze enpiriko baten proposamena diseinatu da; jolasetan oinarritutako tailerren bidez euskarazko ahozko adierazpena lantzeko.
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RESUMEN: Con este Trabajo de Fin de Grado hemos diseñado y construido un juego que trabaja la diversidad cultural y lingüística, y que facilita, por consiguiente, una mejor integración del alumnado inmigrante. Para ello, en primer lugar, hemos analizado la situación del alumnado inmigrante en el País Vasco. Posteriormente, hemos recogido algunas concepciones del juego de ciertos autores y hemos investigado qué juegos había en el mercado que trabajaran aspectos culturales ylingüísticos. Así, al no cumplirse nuestras expectativas, hemos creado un juego para fomentar la diversidad lingüística y la educación intercultural y antirracista.