An analysis of the revenue policy -making process of the Texas Legislature

The purpose of this dissertation was to develop a conceptual framework which can be used to account for policy decisions made by the House Ways and Means Committee (HW&MC) of the Texas House of Representatives. This analysis will examine the actions of the committee over a ten-year period with the goal of explaining and predicting the success of failure of certain efforts to raise revenue.^ The basis framework for modelling the revenue decision-making process includes three major components--the decision alternatives, the external factors and two competing contingency theories. The decision alternatives encompass the particular options available to increase tax revenue. The options were classified as non-innovative or innovative. The non-innovative options included the sales, franchise, property and severance taxes. The innovative options were principally the personal and corporate income taxes.^ The external factors included political and economic constraints that affected the actions of the HW&MC. Several key political constraints on committee decision-making were addressed--including public attitudes, interest groups, political party strength and tradition and precedents. The economic constraints that affected revenue decisions included court mandates, federal mandates and the fiscal condition of the nation and the state.^ The third component of the revenue decision-making framework included two alternative contingency theories. The first alternative theory postulated that the committee structure, including the individual member roles and the overall committee style, resulted in distinctive revenue decisions. This theory will be favored if evidence points to the committee acting autonomously with less concern for the policies of the Speaker of the House. The Speaker assignment theory, postulated that the assignment of committee members shaped or changed the course of committee decision-making. This theory will be favored if there was evidence that the committee was strictly a vehicle for the Speaker to institute his preferred tax policies.^ The ultimate goal of this analysis is to develop an explanation for legislative decision-making about tax policy. This explanation will be based on the linkages across various tax options, political and economic constraints, member roles and committee style and the patterns of committee assignment. ^

Sobre la homogeinización de la presión fiscal en la agricultura pampeana tras la devaluación

La década del '90 marcó una fuerte aceleración del proceso de concentración económica de la producción agrícola pampeana, evolución que continuaría tras la devaluación de 2002. En la determinación del mismo convergen distintos factores: las economías de escala, el manejo cambiario, la evolución tecnológica (entre otros). En este trabajo se estudia uno de estos condicionantes: la política impositiva del Estado Nacional. Se analizan los tributos que gravan al agro y sus alícuotas, diferenciando según la escala y perfil tecnológico del productor, calculando un indicador de la presión fiscal (peso de los tributos sobre el ingreso bruto de la explotación). Se concluye que en el nuevo siglo se produjo una nivelación importante en cuanto a los montos impositivos requeridos por el Estado a los distintos tipos de agentes, lo que minimizó la posibilidad que tiene éste a partir de aquella herramienta de modelar una trama social más desconcentrada

Sobre la homogeinización de la presión fiscal en la agricultura pampeana tras la devaluación

La década del '90 marcó una fuerte aceleración del proceso de concentración económica de la producción agrícola pampeana, evolución que continuaría tras la devaluación de 2002. En la determinación del mismo convergen distintos factores: las economías de escala, el manejo cambiario, la evolución tecnológica (entre otros). En este trabajo se estudia uno de estos condicionantes: la política impositiva del Estado Nacional. Se analizan los tributos que gravan al agro y sus alícuotas, diferenciando según la escala y perfil tecnológico del productor, calculando un indicador de la presión fiscal (peso de los tributos sobre el ingreso bruto de la explotación). Se concluye que en el nuevo siglo se produjo una nivelación importante en cuanto a los montos impositivos requeridos por el Estado a los distintos tipos de agentes, lo que minimizó la posibilidad que tiene éste a partir de aquella herramienta de modelar una trama social más desconcentrada

Sobre la homogeinización de la presión fiscal en la agricultura pampeana tras la devaluación

La década del '90 marcó una fuerte aceleración del proceso de concentración económica de la producción agrícola pampeana, evolución que continuaría tras la devaluación de 2002. En la determinación del mismo convergen distintos factores: las economías de escala, el manejo cambiario, la evolución tecnológica (entre otros). En este trabajo se estudia uno de estos condicionantes: la política impositiva del Estado Nacional. Se analizan los tributos que gravan al agro y sus alícuotas, diferenciando según la escala y perfil tecnológico del productor, calculando un indicador de la presión fiscal (peso de los tributos sobre el ingreso bruto de la explotación). Se concluye que en el nuevo siglo se produjo una nivelación importante en cuanto a los montos impositivos requeridos por el Estado a los distintos tipos de agentes, lo que minimizó la posibilidad que tiene éste a partir de aquella herramienta de modelar una trama social más desconcentrada

Fiscal Federalism and Tax Equalization: The potential for progressive local taxes

We construct an empirically informed computational model of fiscal federalism, testing whether horizontal or vertical equalization can solve the fiscal externality problem in an environment in which heterogeneous agents can move and vote. The model expands on the literature by considering the case of progressive local taxation. Although the consequences of progressive taxation under fiscal federalism are well understood, they have not been studied in a context with tax equalization, despite widespread implementation. The model also expands on the literature by comparing the standard median voter model with a realistic alternative voting mechanism. We find that fiscal federalism with progressive taxation naturally leads to segregation as well as inefficient and inequitable public goods provision while the alternative voting mechanism generates more efficient, though less equitable, public goods provision. Equalization policy, under both types of voting, is largely undermined by micro-actors' choices. For this reason, the model also does not find the anticipated effects of vertical equalization discouraging public goods spending among wealthy jurisdictions and horizontal encouraging it among poor jurisdictions. Finally, we identify two optimal scenarios, superior to both complete centralization and complete devolution. These scenarios are not only Pareto optimal, but also conform to a Rawlsian view of justice, offering the best possible outcome for the worst-off. Despite offering the best possible outcomes, both scenarios still entail significant economic segregation and inequitable public goods provision. Under the optimal scenarios agents shift the bulk of revenue collection to the federal government, with few jurisdictions maintaining a small local tax.

Post-Crisis Economic Reform in Indonesia:Policy for Intervening in Ownership in Historical Perspective

Introduction : Economic reform in Indonesia after the Asian currency crisis is often discussed in parallel with Thailand and South Korea, which were alike hit by the crisis. It should however be noted that what happened in Indonesia was a change of political regime from authoritarianism to democracy, not just a change of government as seen in Thailand and South Korea. Indonesia’s post-crisis reform should be understood in the context of dismantling of the Soeharto regime to seek a new democratic state system. 　　　In the political sphere, dramatic institutional changes have occurred since the downfall of the Soeharto government in May 1998. In comparison, changes in the economic sphere are more complex than the political changes, as the former involve at least three aspects. The first is the continuity in the basic framework of capitalist system with policy orientation toward economic liberalization. In this framework, the policies to overcome the crisis are continued from the last period of the Soeharto rule, under the support system of IMF and CGI (Consultative Group on Indonesia). The second aspect is the impact of the political regime change on the economic structure. It is considered that the structure of economic vested interests of the Soeharto regime is being disintegrated as the regime breaks down. The third aspect is the impact of the political regime change on economic policy-making process. The process of formulating and implementing policies has changed drastically from the Soeharto time. With these three aspects simultaneously at work, it is not so easy to identify which of them is the main cause for a given specific economic phenomenon emerging in Indonesia today. 　　　Keeping this difficulty in mind, this paper attempts to situate the post-crisis economic reform in the broader context of the historical development of Indonesian economic policies and their achievements. We focus in particular on the reform policies for banking and corporate sectors and resulting structural changes in these sectors. This paper aims at understanding the significance of the changes in the economic ownership structure that are occurring in the post-Soeharto Indonesia. Economic policies here do not mean macro economic policies, such as fiscal, financial and trade policies, but refer to micro economic policies whereby the government intervenes in the economic ownership structure. In Section 1, we clarify why economic policies for intervening in the ownership structure are important in understanding Indonesia. Section 2 follows the historical development of Indonesia’s economic policies as specified above, throughout the four successive periods since Indonesia’s independence, namely, the parliamentary democracy period, the Guided Democracy period under Soekarno, the Soeharto-regime consolidation period, and the Soeharto-regime transfiguration period2. Then we observe what economic ownership structure was at work in the pre-crisis last days of the Soeharto rule as an outcome of the economic policies. In Section 3, we examine what structural changes have taken place in the banking and corporate sectors due to the reform policies in the post-crisis and post-Soeharto Indonesia. Lastly in Section 4, we interpret the current reorganization of the economic ownership in the context of the historical transition of the ownership structure, taking account of the changes in the policy-making processes under democratization.

From supervision to resolution: next steps on the road to European Banking Union. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/04, February 2012

The European Council has outlined the creation of a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), complementing the Single Supervisory Mechanism. The thinking on the SRM’s legal basis, design and mission is still preliminary and depends on other major initiatives, including the European Stability Mechanism’s involvement in bank recapitalisations and the Bank Recovery and Resolution (BRR) Directive. The SRM should also not be seen as the final step creating Europe’s future banking union. Both the BRR Directive and the SRM should be designed to enable the substantial financial participation of existing creditors in future bank restructurings. To be effective, the SRM should empower a central body. However, in the absence of Treaty change and of further fiscal integration, SRM decisions will need to be implemented through national resolution regimes. The central body of the SRM should be either the European Commission, or a new authority. This legislative effort should not be taken as an excuse to delay decisive action on the management and resolution of the current European banking fragility, which imposes a major drag on Europe’s growth and employment.

Europe's growth problem (and what to do about it). Bruegel Policy Brief 2013/03, April 2013

The issue: The European Union's pre-crisis growth performance was disappointing enough, but the performance has been even more dismal since the onset of the crisis. Weak growth is undermining private and public deleveraging,and is fuelling continued banking fragility. Persistently high unemployment is eroding skills, discouraging labour market participation and undermining the EU’s long-term growth potential. Low overall growth is making it much tougher for the hard-hit economies in southern Europe to recover competitiveness and regain control of their public finances. Stagnation would reduce the attractiveness of Europe for investment. Under these conditions, Europe's social models are bound to prove unsustainable. Policy Challenge: The European Union's weak long-term growth potential and unsatisfactory recovery from the crisis represent a major policy challenge. Over and above the structural reform agenda, which vitally important, bold policy action is needed. The priority is to get bank credit going. Banking problems need to be assessed properly and bank resolution and recapitalisation should be pursued. Second, fostering the reallocation of factors to the most productive firms and the sectors that contribute to aggregate rebalancing is vital. Addressing intra-euro area competitiveness divergence is essential to support growth in southern Europe. Third, the speed of fiscal adjustment needs to be appropriate and EU funds should be front loaded to countries in deep recession, while the European Investment Bank should increase investment.

The euro area's tightrope walk: debt and competitiveness in Italy and Spain. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/11, September 2013

Competitiveness adjustment in struggling southern euro-area members requires persistently lower inflation than in major trading partners, but low inflation worsens public debt sustainability. When average euro-area inflation undershoots the two percent target, the conflict between intra-euro relative price adjustment and debt sustainability is more severe. In our baseline scenario, the projected public debt ratio reduction in Italy and Spain is too slow and does not meet the European fiscal rule. Debt projections are very sensitive to underlying assumptions and even small negative deviations from GDP growth, inflation and budget surplus assumptions can easily result in a runaway debt trajectory. The case for a greater than five percent of GDP primary budget surplus is very weak. Beyond vitally important structural reforms, the top priority is to ensure that euro area inflation does not undershoot the two percent target, which requires national policy actions and more accommodative monetary policy. The latter would weaken the euro exchange rate, thereby facilitating further intra-euro adjustment. More effective policies are needed to foster growth. But if all else fails, the European Central Bank’s Outright Monetary Transactions could reduce borrowing costs.

Does the European Semester deliver the right policy advice? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/12, 20 September 2013

The July 2013 European Council recommendations to the euro area recognise a number of fiscal and macrostructural challenges, but do not fully exploit the options made possible by the European economic governance framework. There are particular problems with the Council's suggestions for the euro area as whole, which are not (or not adequately) reflected by the country-specific recommendations. A major drawback is that the Council recommendations do not give sufficient importance to symmetric intra-euro area adjustments. Reference to the euro area's ‘aggregate fiscal stance’ is empty rhetoric. Insufficient attention is paid to demand management. The most comprehensive recommendations are made on structural reforms. The July/August 2013 Article IV IMF recommendations on macroeconomic policies could also have been more ambitious, but they correspond better to the economic situation of the euro area than the Council’s recommendations. The President of the Eurogroup should continue discussions on the completion of the economic governance framework, including completion of the banking union and the setting-up of a euro-area institution responsible for managing the euro area’s aggregate fiscal stance.

The European Central Bank in the age of banking union. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/13, 1 October 2013

During the crisis the European Central Bank’s roles have been greatly extended beyond its price stability mandate. In addition to the primary objective of price stability and the secondary objective of supporting EU economic policies, we identify ten new tasks related to monetary policy and financial stability. We argue that there are three main constraints on monetary policy: fiscal dominance, financial repercussions and regional divergences. By assessing the ECB’s tasks in light of these constraints, we highlight a number of synergies between these tasks and the ECB’s primary mandate of price stability. But we highlight major conflicts of interest related to the ECB’s participation in financial assistance programmes. We also underline that the ECB’s government bond purchasing programmes have introduced the concept of ‘monetary policy under conditionality’, which involves major dilemmas. A solution would be a major change towards a US-style system, in which state public debts are small, there are no federal bail-outs for states, the central bank does not purchase state debt and banks do not hold state debt. Such a change is unrealistic in the foreseeable future.

Ending uncertainty: recapitalisation under European Central Bank supervision. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/18, 17 December 2013

Estimates of the recapitalisation needs of the euro-area banking system vary between €50 and €600 billion. The range shows the considerable uncertainty about the quality of banks’ balance sheets and about the parameters of the forthcoming European Central Bank stress tests, including the treatment of sovereign debt and systemic risk. Uncertainty also prevails about the rules and discretion that will applyto bank recapitalisation, bank restructuring and bank resolution in 2014 and beyond. The ECB should communicate the relevant parameters of its exercise early and in detail to give time to the private sector to find solutions. The ECB should establish itself as a tough supervisor and force non-viable banks into restructuring. This could lead to short-term financial volatility, but it should be weighed against the cost of a durably weak banking system and the credibility risk to the ECB. The ECB may need to provide large amounts of liquidity to the financial system. Governments should support the ECB, accept cross-border bank mergers and substantial creditor involvement under clear bail-in rules and should be prepared to recapitalise banks. Governments should agree on the eventual creation of a single resolution mechanism with efficient and fast decision-making procedures, and which can exercise discretion where necessary. A resolution fund, even when fully built-up, needs to have a common fiscal backstop to be credible.

The Asset Quality Review and Capital Needs: Why re-capitalise banks with public money? CEPS Policy Brief No. 311, 19 December 2013

It is generally assumed that any capital needs discovered by the Asset Quality Review the ECB is scheduled to finish by the end of 2014 should be filled by public funding (= fiscal backstop). This assumption is wrong, however. Banks that do not have enough capital should be asked to obtain it from the market; or be restructured using the procedures and rules recently agreed. The Directorate-General for Competition at the European Commission should be particularly vigilant to ensure that no further state aid flows to an already oversized European banking system. The case for a public backstop was strong when the entire euro area banking system was under stress, but this is no longer the case. Banks with a viable business model can find capital; those without should be closed because any public-sector re-capitalisation would likely mean throwing good money after bad.

Policy Lessons for Macroeconomic and Financial Crisis Management in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. CEPS Policy Brief No. 308, 13 December 2013

This Policy Brief attempts to draw lessons from the combination of the global financial crisis and the Arab uprisings focusing on the domains related to fiscal, monetary and financial policies. It does so by answering the following questions: What has been the impact of the crisis and the uprisings on the fiscal, monetary and financial policies of the SEMCs? What have been the crisis management actions? And what policy lessons can be drawn for crisis management in the future? And how can the EU contribute to this within the Euro-Med Partnership?

In sickness and in health: protecting and supporting public investment in Europe. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2014/02, February 2014

The long-term decline in gross public investment in European Union countries mirrors the trend in other advanced economies, but recent developments have been different: public investment has increased elsewhere, but in the EU it has declined and even collapsed in the most vulnerable countries, exaggerating the output fall. The provisions in the EU fiscal framework to support public investment are very weak.The recently inserted ‘investment clause’ is almost no help. In the short term, exclusion of national co-funding of EU-supported investments from the fiscal indicators considered in the Stability and Growth Pact would be sensible. In the medium term, the EU fiscal framework should be extended with an asymmetric ‘golden rule’ to further protect public investment in bad times, while limiting adverse incentives in good times. During a downturn, a European investment programme is needed and the European Semester should encourage greater investment by member states with healthy public finances and low public investment rates. Reform and harmonisation of budgeting, accounting, transparency and project assessment is also needed to improve the quality of public investment.