Effective Surface Water Quality Policies: A Contrast of Policies in the United States and the European Union

The United States and the European Union each have their own policy approach to protect surface water quality. Both policy approaches are similar in many ways. Both rely heavily on command and control. However, there are differences in the application of the details. Both the U.S. and E.U. began current efforts to protect surface water quality in the 1970s, yet quality continues to less than desired in both places. Both have reduced point source pollutants but have had difficulty controlling non-point source pollutants even though policies have been in place for many decades. The successes and failures of the two policies are studied in this project to determine which aspects of both policies will best protect surface water quality in an increasingly complex future.

Visibility of sparkle in metallic paints

For suitable illumination and observation conditions, sparkles may be observed in metallic coatings. The visibility of these sparkles depends critically on their intensity, and on the paint medium surrounding the metallic flakes. Based on previous perception studies from other disciplines, we derive equations for the threshold for sparkles to be visible. The resulting equations show how the visibility of sparkles varies with the luminosity and distance of the light source, the diameter of the metallic flakes, and the reflection properties of the paint medium. The predictions are confirmed by common observations on metallic sparkle. For example, under appropriate conditions even metallic flakes as small as 1 μm diameter may be visible as sparkle, whereas under intense spot light the finer grades of metallic coatings do not show sparkle. We show that in direct sunlight, dark coarse metallic coatings show sparkles that are brighter than the brightest stars and planets in the night sky. Finally, we give equations to predict the number of visually distinguishable flake intensities, depending on local conditions. These equations are confirmed by previous results. Several practical examples for applying the equations derived in this article are provided.

Town law journals from Concord, Mass., 1798-1839

Seven manuscript journals written by Abiel Heywood (Justice of the Peace, town clerk, and chairman of the board of selectmen, Concord, Mass.), Nathan Brooks, William Parkman, and John L. Tuttle containing criminal records, defaulted cases, and civil actions.

L’usage des mesures restrictives autonomes de l’Union européenne: deux poids deux mesures ou des mesures de poids? = The use of autonomous restrictive measures in the European Union: double standards or weight measures? EU Diplomacy Paper 09/2012, October 2012

No abstract.

The autonomy of the EU legal order and the law-making activities of international organizations. Some examples regarding the Council most recent practice. Research Papers in Law 03/2012

[Introduction.] It is generally believed that while the principle of the autonomy of the EU legal order, in the sense of constitutional and institutional autonomy that is to say what concerns the autonomous decision-making of the EU, has been clearly strengthened by the most recent jurisprudence of the Court of Justice (eg. Moxplant3, Intertanko or the Kadi/Al Baraakat judgements or the Opinion 1/2009 of the CJEU etc.) as well as, in my opinion, in many aspects by the Treaty of Lisbon, it is still valid to add that the principle of a favourable approach, stemming from the Court jurisprudence, for the enhanced openness of the EU legal order to international law has remained equally important for the EU4. On the other hand, it should be also seen that in a globalized world, and following the increased role of the EU as an international actor, its indispensable and crucial role concerning the creation of world (legal) order in many policy fields ( for example let's think about the G20 issues, the global economic and financial crisis, the role of the EU in promoting and protecting human rights worldwide, the implementation of the multilateral or regional conventional law, developed in the framework the UN (e.g. in the field of agriculture or environment etc) or what concerns the Kyoto process on climate change or the conservation of marine biological resources at international level etc), it seems reasonable and justified to submit that the influence, for example, of the law-making activities of the main stakeholder international organizations in the mentioned policy-areas on the EU (especially on the development of its constantly evolving legal order) or vice-versa the influence of the EU law-making practice on these international organizations is significant, in many aspects mutually interdependent and more and more remarkable. This tendency of the 21st century doesn't mean, however, in my view, that the notion of the autonomy of the EU legal order would have been weakened by this increasing interaction between international law and EU law over the passed years. This contribution is going to demonstrate and prove these departuring points by giving some concrete examples from the most recent practice of the Council (all occuring either in the second half of 2009 or after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty), and which relate to two very important policy areas in the EU, namely the protection of human rights and the Common Fishery Policy.

Reflections on the institutional balance, the Community Method and the interplay between jurisdictions after Lisbon. Research Papers in Law, 04/2012

[Introduction.] Over the last two years, not only inside but also outside the framework of the EU treaties, far reaching measures have been taken at the highest political level in order to address the financial and economic crisis in Europe and in particular the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro area. This has triggered debates forecasting the “renationalisation of European politics.” Herman Van Rompuy, the President of the European Council, countered the prediction that Europe is doomed because of such a renationalisation: “If national politics have a prominent place in our Union, why would this not strengthen it?” He took the view that not a renationalisation of European politics was at stake, but an Europeanization of national politics emphasising that post war Europe was never developed in contradiction with nation states.1 Indeed, the European project is based on a mobilisation of bundled, national forces which are of vital importance to a democratically structured and robust Union that is capable of acting in a globalised world. To that end, the Treaty of Lisbon created a legal basis. The new legal framework redefines the balance between the Union institutions and confirms the central role of the Community method in the EU legislative and judiciary process. This contribution critically discusses the development of the EU's institutional balance after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, with a particular emphasis on the use of the Community Method and the current interplay between national constitutional courts and the Court of Justice. This interplay has to date been characterised by suspicion and mistrust, rather than by a genuine dialogue between the pertinent judicial actors.

The future of the Eurozone and the role of the German Constitutional Court. Research Papers in Law, 05/2012

[Introduction.] Necessary reforms towards a deepened and increased European shaped economic, financial and budgetary policy, paraphrased with the term “fiscal union”, could possibly reach constitutional limits. In its EFSF judgment1, the German Constitutional Court, following the Lisbon judgment in which certain government tasks were determined as being part of the “constitutional identity”2, connected the budget right of the parliament via the principle of democracy to the eternity clause of Art. 79 para 3 Basic Law. A transfer of essential parts of the budget right of the German Bundestag, which would be in conflict with the German constitution, is said to exist when the determination of the nature and amount of the tax affecting the citizens is largely regulated on the supranational level and thereby deprived of the Bundestag’s right to disposition. A reform of the Economic and Monetary Union that touches the core of the budget right can, according to the German Federal Court, with regard to Art. 79 (3) of the Basic Law only be realized by way of Art. 146 of the Basic Law, thus with a new constitution given by the people that replaces the Basic Law.3

Current challenges in EU politics. A perspective from North Rhine-Westphalia. ZEI Discussion Paper C216, 2013

I would like to briefly recapitulate where Europe stands today, and what has been achieved. Because I maintain that in the EU’s 27 Member States we have, despite the failings and shortcomings we all bemoan, reached a level of unity, prosperity and rule of law unheard of in the history of this continent, and possibly of the world. As far as territory is concerned: the European Economic Community started out with six members. The late Bronislaw Geremek, former Foreign Minister of Poland and an eminent historian, used to point out that this, at the time, corresponded in size and shape roughly to the empire of Charlemagne, one of the greatest unified territories the continent has ever known. And yet, a mere 55 years after the Treaty of Rome we have gone far beyond that. Today’s European Union encompasses 27 countries, more than 4 million square kilometers in territory and 500 million people. When it comes to Europe’s policies, at present, all eyes are on the Euro and the future of our common monetary and financial policy. But within our common space, we have achieved so much more than a common currency for a majority of Member States.

Talking with the “pouvoir constituant” in times of constitutional reform: The European Court of Justice on Private Applicants’ Access to Justice. Research Paper in Law 3/2003

[From the Introduction]. European lawyers, at least those dealing predominantly with institutional matters, are living particularly interesting times since the setting-up of the “European Convention on the Future of Europe” in December 2001.1 As the Convention’s mandate, spelled out in rather broad terms in the European Council’s declaration of Laeken,2 is potentially unlimited, and as the future constitution of the European Union (EU) will be ultimately adopted by the subsequent Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), there appears to be a great possibility to clarify, to simplify and also to reform many of the more controversial elements in the European legal construction. The present debate on the future of the European constitution also highlights the relationship between the pouvoir constituant3 and the European Courts, the Court of Justice (ECJ) and its Court of First Instance (CFI), who have to interpret the basic rules and principles of the EU.4 In that light, the present article will focus on a classic theme of the Court’s case law: the relationship between judges and pouvoir constituant. In the EU, this relationship has traditionally been marked by the ECJ’s role as driving force in the “constitutionalisation” of the EC Treaties – which has, to a large extent, been accepted and even codified by the Member States in subsequent treaty revisions. However, since 1994, the ECJ appears to be more reluctant to act as a “law-maker.”5 The recent judgment in Unión de Pequeños Agricultores (UPA)6 – an important decision by which the ECJ refused to liberalize individuals’ access to the Community Courts – is also interesting in this context. UPA may be seen as another proof of judicial restraint - or even as indicator of the beginning of a new phase in the “constitutional dialogue” between the ECJ and the “Masters of the Treaties.”

Conventions in comparative constitutional law. Research Paper in Law 4/2003

Introduction. “Convention” is an ambiguous term, not only for lawyers, containing a wide variety of different meanings. Even when restricted to denote an assembly it may be used for all sorts of gatherings. In the context of constitutional law a convention is a very specific instrument, and the question is to what extent it is actually known in European constitutional law and whether the “Convention on the Future of Europe” as called forth by the Declaration of Laeken conforms to what is understood in constitutional law by “convention”.1 Or did the Laeken Council pick up a term without any foundation in European constitutional law, rarely practiced and even less understood, the only precedents of which are supposed to be the American Federal Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 and the convention that drafted the European Charter on Fundamental Rights, as can be read time and again? 2 As it is the privilege of the constitutional historian to make aware the evolution of legal institutions and to analyze their conferred meaning so that they will be available in political discourse, I shall examine the meaning of “convention” in constitutional history and comparative constitutional law in a first part, while a second part will place the Convention on the Future of the European Union according to its composition and commission into the context of constitutional conventions as understood in law.

Greece and the European Agenda: EU Enlargement and European Monetary Union. Program for the Study of Germany & Europe Working Paper 8.2

In the decade to come, the European Union will embark on two new projects, each destined to transform it in fundamental ways: (i) Eastern enlargement, and (ii) economic and monetary union. Neither of these projects will affect all members equally or in the same way. But Greece will, for two reasons, be affected in a manner qualitatively different to all other member states. First, Greece is the only country physically affected by the Luxembourg Summit's decision to begin accession negotiations with some, but not all, Central and Eastern European applicant countries: as a result of this decision, she will continue, for at least another eight to ten years, to be the only member country not to share a common border with another member state, with all the consequent implications in economic and geostrategic tenns. Second, when the European Council meets in early May to select those member states that are deemed to have met the convergence criteria, it will find that Greece is the only member state falling short of those criteria. This development may create additional difficulties for her economy during the transitional period of derogation. It will also pose new risks to Greece, insofar as she will be absent during the initial-and crucial-years of establishing a common monetary policy.

Russia and the Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice. CEPS Paper on Liberty and Security in Europe No. 54, 25 February 2013

EU-Russia cooperation in the framework of the Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice, launched almost a decade ago in 2003, has borne fruit more in the security aspects than the justice and liberty-related policy areas. This study assesses the uneven cooperation on justice and home affairs between the EU and Russia, while delving into the intersection between cooperation on justice, liberty and security and the promotion of human rights, democracy and rule of law in EU-Russia relations. The study concludes by proposing a set of policy recommendations to the European Parliament for playing a more active role in this important field of cooperation between the EU and Russia.

spotlight europe #2013/03 – March 2013: The European Union and Russia at a Crossroads

The European Union and Russia are strategic partners – through their geographic situation, their common history, through social and economic obligations. Currently, the EU’s relations with Russia are under pressure for innovation. The EU’s ability to manoeuvre is hindered by the financial crisis, which has developed into a crisis of the Union’s political integration. For that reason, the EU’s relations with Russia depend on the Union’s ability to overcome the crisis and undertake reforms.

Do European Union fines deter price-fixing? Bruegel Policy Brief 2013/04, May 2013

The issue: Anti-cartel enforcement is the least controversial of competition policy themes. Agreements to restrict competition such as price fixing or market sharing have obvious negative effects on welfare. Within the European Union, however, industry representatives have increasingly voiced concern that the European Commission applies a too-strict fining policy to enforce anti-cartel law, particularly since the introduction of new guidelines on fines in 2006. Fines are said to be too high, disproportionate and liable to introduce distortions into the market, ultimately leading to higher prices for consumers. It is often argued that more lenient approaches should be followed in crisis times. Policy challenge: High fines for cartel activity could entail costs for society and might be difficult to implement. Nevertheless, there is no case for reducing current levels of EU anti-cartel fines. Fine levels already take the economic crisis into account, and the net present value of fines might prove to be too low to discourage collusion. We estimate that fines might even be not high enough to offset the additional profits yielded by collusion. Fines should be complemented with other measures to increase deterrence, in particular personal sanctions targeting company officers who are responsible for leading the company to commit infringements. In the short term, pressure on decision makers could be increased by reducing the expected duration of investigations.

A Copernican Turn for Banking Union. CEPS Policy Brief No. 290, 14 May 2013

Despite apparent consensus that the creation of a ‘Banking Union’ is essential for the survival of the euro, progress is painfully slow. The Single Supervisory Mechanism may not be ready before the middle of next year, the Single Resolution Mechanism may require a laborious change of the EU Treaty and common deposit insurance has been postponed into the indefinite future. Any real progress has been prevented by the protracted fights over which government will be the payer of last resort when banks fail because of past bad loans. In this Policy Brief, Thomas Mayer suggests that a radically new approach is needed if there is any prospect of moving beyond this impasse to reach full Banking Union. Instead of trying to move from common bank supervision over to resolution and then on to deposit insurance, he argues that policy-makers should go backwards and start with deposit insurance, move from there to resolution, and end with supervision.