En recuerdo de Herbert Simon (1916-2001)

Las ciencias sociales padecen esquizofrenia aguda en su tratamiento de la racionalidad. Tenemos, a un extremo, a los economistas, que atribuyen al hombre económico una racionalidad absurdamente omnisciente. El hombre económico dispone de un sistema completo y consistente de preferencias, que le permite elegir siempre entre las alternativas que se le presentan; se da siempre perfecta cuenta de lo que son estas alternativas; no existen límites en la complejidad de los cálculos que puede realizar para determinar qué alternativas son mejores; los cálculos de probabilidad no le asustan ni encierran misterios para él. Durante la última década este cuerpo de teoría ha alcanzado, en relación con las situaciones de juego competitivo y la toma de decisiones en situación de incertidumbre, un estado de refinamiento tomístico que posee considerable interés normativo, pero escasa relación discernible con el comportamiento real o posible de los seres humanos de carne y hueso.

Early Modern Trading Networks in Europe. Cooperation and the case of Simon Ruiz.

In the early modern period, trade became a truly global phenomenon. The logistics, financial and organizational complexity associated with it increased in order to connect distant geographies and merchants from different backgrounds. How did these merchants prevent their partners from dishonesty in a time where formal institutions and legislation did not traverse these different worlds? This book studies the mechanisms and criteria of cooperation in early modern trading networks. It uses an interdisciplinary approach, through the case study of a Castilian long-distance merchant of the sixteenth century, Simon Ruiz, who traded within the limits of the Portuguese and Spanish overseas empires. Early Modern Trading Networks in Europe discusses the importance of reciprocity mechanisms, trust and reputation in the context of early modern business relations, using network analysis methodology, combining quantitative data with qualitative information. It considers how cooperation and prevention could simultaneously create a business relationship, and describes the mechanisms of control, policing and punishment used to avoid opportunism and deception among a group of business partners. Using bills of exchange and correspondence from Simon Ruiz’s private archive, it charts the evolution of this business network through time, debating which criteria should be included or excluded from business networks, as well as the emergence of standards. This book intends to put forward a new approach to early modern trade which focuses on individuals interacting in self-organized structures, rather than on states or empires. It shows how indirect reciprocity was much more frequent than direct reciprocity among early modern merchants and how informal norms, like ostracism or signaling, helped to prevent defection and deception in an effective way.

The Evolution of Norms in Trade and Financial Networks in the First Global Age: the case of Simon Ruiz's network

In the 16th century, merchants and bankers gained a social influence and political relevance, due to their capacity of ‘faire travailler l’argent des autres’ (Benassar 1972:50). For the success of their activity, they built evolving networks with cooperative partners. These networks were much more than the sum of all partners. In the case study of the Castilian merchant Simon Ruiz, the network functioned in an unique way and independent from any formal institutional control. Its functioning varied in how different partners were associated and the particular characteristics and contents of these social ties. Being a self-organized network, since the formal institutions of trade regulation and the Crown control didn’t influence the network functioning, the Simon Ruiz network was deeply embedded in the economic and financial performance of the Hispanic Empires, in two different ways. The first, purely commercial. The monopolistic regime which was applied by the two crowns in the trade of certain colonial goods was insufficient to the costs of imperial maintenance. In such manner, particulars tried to rent a contract of exploration of trade, paying an annual sum to the crown, as in the Portuguese trade. Some of these agents also moved along Simon Ruiz’s network. But others were involved in relations with the imperial crowns on a second way, the finance. Maintaining Empires implied a lot of human, technical but also financial means, and most of the times Kings were forced to recur to these merchants, as we will demonstrate. What were the implications of these collaborative relations in both parts? The main goal of this paper is to comprehend the evolution of informal norms within Simon Ruiz’s network and how they influenced cooperative behavior of the agents, particularly analyzing mechanisms of sanctioning, control, punishment and reward, as well as their consequences in different dimensions: future interactions, social repercussions and in agent’s economic health and activity. The research is based in the bills of exchange and commercial correspondence of the private archive of Simon Ruiz, located in the Provincial Archive of Valladollid, Spain.

Physiological and symptomatic responses to cycling and walking in intermittent claudication

To shed light on the potential efficacy of cycling as a testing modality in the treatment of intermittent claudication (IC), this study compared physiological and symptomatic responses to graded walking and cycling tests in claudicants. Sixteen subjects with peripheral arterial disease (resting ankle: brachial index (ABI) < 0.9) and IC completed a maximal graded treadmill walking (T) and cycle (C) test after three familiarization tests on each mode. During each test, symptoms, oxygen uptake (VO2), minute ventilation (VE), respiratory exchange ratio (RER) and heart rate (HR) were measured, and for 10 min after each test the brachial and ankle systolic pressures were recorded. All but one subject experienced calf pain as the primary limiting symptom during T; whereas the symptoms were more varied during C and included thigh pain, calf pain and dyspnoea. Although maximal exercise time was significantly longer on C than T (690 +/- 67 vs. 495 +/- 57 s), peak VO2, peak VE and peak heart rate during C and T were not different; whereas peak RER was higher during C. These responses during C and T were also positively correlated (P < 0.05) with each other, with the exception of RER. The postexercise systolic pressures were also not different between C and T. However, the peak decline in ankle pressures from resting values after C and T were not correlated with each other. These data demonstrate that cycling and walking induce a similar level of metabolic and cardiovascular strain, but that the primary limiting symptoms and haemodynamic response in an individual's extremity, measured after exercise, can differ substantially between these two modes.