Foreign acquisition and internal organization

NIPE WP 05/2016

Os técnicos superiores de reeducação e o trabalho prisional

Dissertação de mestrado em Crime, Diferença e Desigualdade

Desafios de uma comunidade minoritária: os apoios sociais na comunidade cigana de Barcelos

Dissertação de mestrado em Crime Diferença e Desigualdade

On modified simple reacting spheres kinetic model for chemically reactive gases

Versão dos autores para esta publicação.

Sôbre um sistema de equações relativas a um modêlo matemático de populações de Himenópteros endogâmicos

This paper deals with the solution of a system of equations relating with a mathematical model of populations of endogamic Hymenoptera. The Author proves that, unless inequality (5.1) 4R5 + 8R R4 - 4R R³ + 8R² (R -1) R² - A a A a A a a A - R² (4R² + 4R - 1) R +2R³ < 0 a a A a is satisfied, one of the genes is eliminated from the population. He shows that the relative frequencies of different kinds of matings in the population can be obtained when the root R between zero and VRa of equation 2R4 + 2R³ -2R² (RA + Ra) - R(RA +Ra) + 2RA Ra =0 is known. In special, if we let b = RA / Ra > 1 , inequation (5.1) shows that we must have __________________ b³ + 2b² + b + V2b4 + 2b³ - 2b² + 2b Ra < __________________________________ = f(b) 2 (b4 + 2b³ + 2b - 1) The greatest value of f (b) is 0,75 and is obtained for b = 1, that is for RA = Ra.

Estudo comparativo entre métodos de contrôle quantitativo da produção leiteira

This paper deals with the estimation of milk production by means of weekly, biweekly, bimonthly observations and also by method known as 6-5-8, where one observation is taken at the 6th week of lactation, another at 5th month and a third one at the 8th month. The data studied were obtained from 72 lactations of the Holstein Friesian breed of the "Escola Superior de Agricultura "Luiz de Queiroz" (Piracicaba), S. Paulo, Brazil), being 6 calvings on each month of year and also 12 first calvings, 12 second calvings, and so on, up to the sixth. The authors criticize the use of "maximum error" to be found in papers dealing with this subject, and also the use of mean deviation. The former is completely supersed and unadvisable and latter, although equivalent, to a certain extent, to the usual standard deviation, has only 87,6% of its efficiency, according to KENDALL (9, pp. 130-131, 10, pp. 6-7). The data obtained were compared with the actual production, obtained by daily control and the deviations observed were studied. Their means and standard deviations are given on the table IV. Inspite of BOX's recent results (11) showing that with equal numbers in all classes a certain inequality of varinces is not important, the autors separated the methods, before carrying out the analysis of variance, thus avoiding to put together methods with too different standard deviations. We compared the three first methods, to begin with (Table VI). Then we carried out the analysis with the four first methods. (Table VII). Finally we compared the two last methods. (Table VIII). These analysis of variance compare the arithmetic means of the deviations by the methods studied, and this is equivalent to compare their biases. So we conclude tht season of calving and order of calving do not effect the biases, and the methods themselves do not differ from this view point, with the exception of method 6-5-8. Another method of attack, maybe preferrable, would be to compare the estimates of the biases with their expected mean under the null hypothesis (zero) by the t-test. We have: 1) Weekley control: t = x - 0/c(x) = 8,59 - 0/ = 1,56 2) Biweekly control: t = 11,20 - 0/6,21= 1,80 3) Monthly control: t = 7,17 - 0/9,48 = 0,76 4) Bimonthly control: t = - 4,66 - 0/17,56 = -0,26 5) Method 6-5-8 t = 144,89 - 0/22,41 = 6,46*** We denote above by three asterisks, significance the 0,1% level of probability. In this way we should conclude that the weekly, biweekly, monthly and bimonthly methods of control may be assumed to be unbiased. The 6-5-8 method is proved to be positively biased, and here the bias equals 5,9% of the mean milk production. The precision of the methods studied may be judged by their standard deviations, or by intervals covering, with a certain probability (95% for example), the deviation x corresponding to an estimate obtained by cne of the methods studied. Since the difference x - x, where x is the mean of the 72 deviations obtained for each method, has a t distribution with mean zero and estimate of standard deviation. s(x - x) = √1+ 1/72 . s = 1.007. s , and the limit of t for the 5% probability, level with 71 degrees of freedom is 1.99, then the interval to be considered is given by x ± 1.99 x 1.007 s = x ± 2.00. s The intervals thus calculated are given on the table IX.

Personal redistribution and the regional allocation of public investment

How should an equity-motivated policy-marker allocate public capital (infrastructure) across regions. Should it aim at reducing interregional differences in per capita output, or at maximizing total output? Such a normative question is examined in a model where the policy-marker is exclusively concerned about personal inequality and has access to two policy instruments. (i) a personal tax-transfer system (taxation is distortionary), and (ii) the regional allocation of public investment. I show that the case for public investment as a significant instrument for interpersonal redistribution is rather weak. In the most favorable case, when the tax code is constrained to be uniform across regions, it is optimal to distort the allocation of public investment in favor of the poor regions, but only to a limited extent. The reason is that poor individuals are relatively more sensitive to public trans fers, which are maximized by allocating public investment efficiently. If! the tax code can vary across regions then the optimal policy may involve an allocation of public investment distorted in favor of the rich regions.

Classical horizontal inequity and reranking: an integrated approach

The last 20 years have seen a significant evolution in the literature on horizontal inequity (HI) and have generated two major and "rival" methodological strands, namely, classical HI and reranking. We propose in this paper a class of ethically flexible tools that integrate these two strands. This is achieved using a measure of inequality that merges the well-known Gini coefficient and Atkinson indices, and that allows a decomposition of the total redistributive effect of taxes and transfers in a vertical equity effect and a loss of redistribution due to either classical HI or reranking. An inequality-change approach and a money-metric cost-of-inequality approach are developed. The latter approach makes aggregate classical HI decomposable across groups. As in recent work, equals are identified through a nonparametric estimation of the joint density of gross and net incomes. An illustration using Canadian data from 1981 to 1994 shows a substantial, and increasing, robust erosion of redistribution attributable both to classical HI and to reranking, but does not reveal which of reranking or classical HI is more important since this requires a judgement that is fundamentally normative in nature.

Absolute and relative deprivation and the measurement of poverty

This paper develops the link between poverty and inequality by focussing on a class of poverty indices (some of them well-known) which aggregate normative concerns for absolute and relative deprivation. The indices are distinguished by a parameter that captures the ethical sensitivity of poverty measurement to ``exclusion'' or ``relative-deprivation'' aversion. We also show how the indices can be readily used to predict the impact of growth on poverty. An illustration using LIS data finds that he United States show more relative deprivation than Denmark and Belgium whatever the percentiles considered, but that overall deprivation comparisons of the four countries considered will generally necessarily depend on the intensity of the ethical concern for relative deprivation. The impact of growth on poverty is also seen to depend on the presence of and on the attention granted to concerns over relative deprivation. }

An Atkinson-Gini family of social evaluation functions

We investigate the properties of a family of social evaluation functions and inequality indices which merge the features of the family of Atkinson (1970) and S-Gini (Donaldson and Weymark (1980, 1983), Yitzhaki (1983) and Kakwani (1980)) indices. Income inequality aversion is captured by decreasing marginal utilities, and aversion to rank inequality is captured by rank-dependent ethical weights, thus providing an ethically-flexible dual basis for the assessment of inequality and equity. These ocial evaluation functions can be interpreted as average utility corrected for the illfare of relative deprivation. They can alternatively be understood as averages of altruistic well-being in a population. They moreover have a simple graphical interpretation.

Regional income inequalities in Europe: an updated measurement and some decomposition results

In this paper well-known summary inequality indexes are used to explore interregional income inequalities in Europe. In particular, we mainly employ Theils’population-weighted index because of its appealing properties. Two decomposition analysis are applied. First, regional inequalities are decomposed by regional subgroups (countries). Second, intertemporal inequality changes are separated into income and population changes. The main results can be summarized as follows. First, data confirm a reduction in crossregional inequality during 1982-97. Second, this reduction is basically due to real convergence among countries. Third, currently the greater part of European interregional disparities is within-country by nature, which introduce an important challenge for the European policy. Fourth, inequality changes are due mainly to income variations, population changes playing a minor role.

A Model of ethnic conflict

We present a model of conflict, in which discriminatory government policy or social intolerance is responsive to various forms of ethnic activism, including violence. It is this perceived responsiveness -captured by the probability that the government gives in and accepts a proponed change in ethnic policy- that induces individuals to mobilize in support for their cause. Yet, mobilization is costly and demonstrators have to be compensated accordingly. Individuals have to weigh their ethnic radicalism with their material well-being to determine the size of their money contribution to the cause. Our main results are: (i) a one-sided increase in radicalism or in population size increases conflict; (ii) a one-sided increase in income has ambiguous effects depending on the elasticity of contributions to income; (iii) an increase in within-group inequality increases conflict; and (iv) an increase in the correlation between ethnic radicalism and inequality also increases conflict.

The Social contract with endogenous sentiments

Moral values infuence individual behavior and social interactions. A specially signif- cant instance is the case of moral values concerning work e¤ort. Individuals determine what they take to be proper behaviour and judge the others, and themselves, accordingly. They increase their esteem -and self-esteem- for those who perform in excess of the standard and decrease their esteem for those who work less. These changes in self-esteem result from the self-regulatory emotions of guilt or pride extensively studied in Social Psychology. We examine the interactions between sentiments, individual behaviour and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution where individual self-esteem and relative es-teem for others are endogenously determined. Individuals di¤er in their productivities. The desired extent of redistribution depends both on individual income and on individual attitudes toward others. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are simultaneously determined. The model has two types of equilibria. In "cohesive" equilibria, all individuals conform to the standard of proper behav- iour, income inequality is low and social esteem is not biased toward any particular type. Under these conditions equilibrium redistribution increases in response to larger inequality. In a "clustered" equilibrium skilled workers work above the mean while unskilled workers work below. In such an equilibrium, income inequality is large and sentiments are biased in favor of the industrious. As inequality increases, this bias may eventually overtake the egoistic demand for greater taxation and equilibrium redistribution decreases. The type of equilibrium that emerges crucially depends on inequality. We contrast the predictions of the model with data on inequality, redistribution, work values and attitudes toward work and toward the poor for a set of OECD countries.

Variational inequalities in Hilbert spaces with measures and optimal stopping problems

We study the existence theory for parabolic variational inequalities in weighted L2 spaces with respect to excessive measures associated with a transition semigroup. We characterize the value function of optimal stopping problems for finite and infinite dimensional diffusions as a generalized solution of such a variational inequality. The weighted L2 setting allows us to cover some singular cases, such as optimal stopping for stochastic equations with degenerate diffusion coeficient. As an application of the theory, we consider the pricing of American-style contingent claims. Among others, we treat the cases of assets with stochastic volatility and with path-dependent payoffs.

Participació de la dona en l’esport i l’Olimpisme

Aquest document es va presentar a l’Assignatura Campus de la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB) “Esport, Olimpisme i Cultura Contemporània”, durant el curs acadèmic 1998/1999. L’autora analitza l’accés diferencial de la dona en l’esport dins l’ampli panorama de la desigualtat i de la discriminació social i cultural que, històricament, ha patit i sovint pateix la dona.