Entry into motherhood: The effect of wages

Using the ECHP, we explored the determinants of having the first child in Spain. Our main goal was to study the relation between female wages and the decision to enter motherhood. Since the offered wage of non-working women is not observed, we estimate it and impute a potential wage to each woman (working and non-working). This potential wage enable us to investigate the effect of wages (the opportunity cost of time non-worked and dedicated to children) on the decision to have the first child, for both workers and non-workers. Contrary to previous results, we found that female wages are positively related to the likelihood of having the first child. This result suggests that the income effect overcomes the substitution effect when non-participants opportunity cost is also taken into account.

Computing abuse related damages in the case of new entry: An illustration for the Directory Enquiry Services market

A number of European countries, among which the UK and Spain, have opened up their Directory Enquiry Services (DQs, or 118AB) market to competition. We analyse the Spanish case, where both local and foreign firms challenged the incumbent as of April 2003. We argue that the incumbent had the ability to abuse its dominant position, and that it was a perfectly rational strategy. In short,the incumbent raised its rivals' costs directly by providing an inferior quality version of the (essential) input, namely the incumbent's subscribers' database. We illustrate how it is possible to quantify the effect of abuse in situation were the entrant has no previous history in the market. To do this, we use the UK experience to construct the relevant counterfactual, that is the "but for abuse" scenario. After controlling for relative prices and advertising intensity, we find that one of the foreign entrants achieved a Spanish market share of only half of what it would have been in the absence of abuse.

Vertical Differentiation and Entry Deterrence: A Reconsideration

In this work we emphasize why market coverage should be considered endogenous for a correct analysis of entry deterrence in vertical differentiation models and discuss the implications of this endogeneity for that analysis. We consider contexts without quality costs and also contexts with convex fixed quality costs.