Assessing Dodd Frank Effects on banking capital structure and Banker´s Pay structure

The systemic financial crisis that started in 2008 in the United States had some severe effects in the economic activity and required the bailout of financial institutions with the use of taxpayer’s money. It also originated claims for stronger regulatory framework in order to avoid another threat in the financial market. The Dodd Frank Act was proposed and approved in the United States in the aftermath of the crisis and brought, among many other features, the creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council and the tougher inspection of financial institutions with asset above 50 billion dollars. The objective of this work is to study the causal effect of the Dodd Frank Act on the behavior of the treatment group subject to monitoring by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (financial institutions with assets above 50 billion dollars) regarding capital and compensation structure in comparison to the group that was not treated. We use data from Compustat and our empirical strategy is the Regression Discontinuity Design, not usually applied to the banking literature, but very useful for the present work since it allows us to compare the treatment group and the non-treatment group in the year of the enactment of the law (2010). No change of behavior was observed for the Capital Structure. In the Compensation Schemes, however, a decrease was found in the item other compensation for CEOs and CFOs. We also performed a robustness check by running a placebo test on the variables in the year before the law was enacted. No significance was found, which supports the conclusion that our main results were caused by the enactment of the DFA.

Contagion and regulation in endogenous bank networks

We develop a simple model of endogenous bank networks to study financial contagion and how leverage regulation may affect it. Banks maximize expected profit by choosing the optimal allocation of resources between three different classes of assets. An interbank network arise as result of loans between banks, creating a direct channel of contagion in the financial system. Contagion may occur when the realized return of the risky asset is sufficiently low to make a bank insolvent, subsequently triggering a cascade effect that propagates through default in interbank loans. Contrary to what would be expected, our results show that despite forcing banks to deleverage, increasing minimum capital requirements may lead to a system with higher aggregate levels of default.

Essays in Corporate Bankruptcy

Esta tese é composta por três ensaios sobre o mercado de crédito e as instituições que regem bancarrota corporativa. No capítulo um, trazemos evidências que questionam a ideia de que maiores níveis de proteção ao credor sempre promovem desenvolvimento do mercado de crédito. Desde a publicação dos artigos seminais de La Porta et al (1997,1998), a métrica de proteção ao credor que os autores propuseram -- o índice de proteção ao credor -- tem sido amplamente utilizada na literatura de Law and Finance como variável explicativa em modelos de regressão linear em forma reduzida para determinar a correlação entre proteção ao credor e desenvolvimento do mercado de crédito. Neste artigo, exploramos alguns problemas com essa abordagem. Do ponto de vista teórico, essa abordagem geralmente supõe uma relação monotônica entre proteção ao credor e expansão do crédito. Nós apresentamos um modelo teórico para um mercado de crédito com seleção adversa em que um nível intermediário de proteção ao credor é capaz de implementar equilíbrios first best. Este resultado está de acordo com diversos outros artigos teóricos, tanto em equilíbrio geral quanto em equilíbrio parcial. Do ponto de vista empírico, tiramos proveito das reformas realizadas por alguns países durante as décadas de 1990 e 2000 para implementar uma estratégia inspirada na literatura de treatment effects e estimar o efeito sobre o valor de mercado e sobre a dívida de: i) permitir automatic stay a firmas em recuperação; e ii) conceder aos credores o direito de afastar os administradores. Os resultados que obtivemos apontam para um impacto positivo de automatic stay sobre todas as variáveis que dependem do valor de mercado da firma. Não encontramos efeito sobre dívida, e não encontramos efeitos significativos do direito de afastar administradores sobre valor de mercado ou dívida. O capítulo dois avalia as consequências empíricas de uma reforma na lei de falências sobre um mercado de crédito pouco desenvolvido. No início de 2005, o Congresso Nacional brasileiro aprovou uma nova lei de falências, a lei 11.101/05. Usando dados de firmas brasileiras e não-brasileiras, nós estimamos, usando dois modelos diferentes, o efeito da reforma falimentar sobre variáveis contratuais e não-contratuais de dívida. Ambos os modelos produzem resultados similares. Encontramos um aumento no volume total de dívida e na dívida de longo prazo, e uma redução no custo de dívida. Não encontramos efeitos significativos sobre a estrutura de propriedade da dívida. No capítulo três, desenvolvemos um modelo estimável de equilíbrio em search direcionado aplicado ao mercado de crédito, modelo este que pode ser usado para realizar avaliações ex ante de mudanças institucionais que afetem o crédito (como reformas em leis de falência). A literatura em economia há muito reconhece uma relação causal entre instituições (como leis e regulações) e desenvolvimento dos mercados financeiros. Essa conclusão qualitativa é amplamente reconhecida, mas há pouca evidência de sua importância quantitativa. Com o nosso modelo, é possível estimar como contratos de dívida mudam em resposta a mudanças nos parâmetros que descrevem as instituições da economia. Também é possível estimar o impacto sobre investimentos realizados pelas firmas, bem como caracterizar a distribuição do tamanho, idade e produtividade das firmas antes e depois da mudança institucional. Como ilustração, realizamos um exercício empírico em que usamos dados de firmas brasileiras para simular o impacto de variações na taxa de recuperação de créditos sobre os valores médios e totais de dívida e capital das firmas. Encontramos dívida crescente e capital quase sempre também crescente na taxa de recuperação.

Mandatory profit sharing, entrepreneurial incentives and capital accumulation

The impact of a mandatory tax on profits which is transferred to workers is analyzed in a general equilibrium entrepreneurial model. In the short run, this distortion reduces the number of fmns and the aggregate output. In the long run, if capital and labor are bad substitutes, it fosters capital accumulation and increases the aggregate output. In a small open economy with free movement of capital, it improves the welfare of the economy's average individual. One concludes that the benefits of sharing schemes may go beyond the short run employment-stabilization goal focused by the profit sharing literature.

Capital flows and monetary control under a domestic currency substitution regime: the recent Brazilian experience

The 90s have witnessed a resumption in capital flows to Latin America. due to the conjugation of low interest rates in the US and economic reforms in most LA countries. In Brazil. however. substantial capital flows have becn induced by the extremely high domestic interest rates practiced by the Central Bank as a measure of last reson given the absence of successful stabilization policies. These very high interest rates were needed to prevent capital flight in a context of a surprisingly stable inflation rate above 20% a month. and keep interest bearing govemment securities preferable to foreign assets as money substitutes. We carefully describe how this domestic currency substitution regime (interest bearing govemment securities are substituted for MIas cash holdings) requires the Central Bank to renounce aoy control over monerary aggregates. In this domestic currency substitution regime. hyperinflation is the most likely outcome of an isolated (i.e.. without fiscal adjusanents) attempt by the Brazilian Central Bank to control money.

Health and development with imperfect capital markets

This paper investigates the interaction between investment in education and in life-expanding investments, in a simple two-period model in which individuaIs are liquidity constrained in the first period. We show that under low leveIs of health and capital, investments in human capital and in health are complement: since the probability of survival is small, there is littIe incentive to invest in human capital; therefore the return on health investment is also low. This reinforcing effect does not hold for higher leveIs of health or capital, and the two investments become substitute. This property has many consequences. First, subsidizing health care may have dramatically different effects on private investment in human capital, depending on the initial leveI of health and capital. Second, the assumption that mortality is endogenous induces an increase in inequality of income: since health investment is a normal good, the return on education is also lower for poor individuaIs. Third,in a non-overlapping generation madel with non-altruistic agents, the hea1th leveI of the population has strong consequences on growth. For a very low leveI of hea1th, mortality is too high for the investment on education to be profitable. For a higher, but still low, levei of hea1th the economy grows on1y if the initial stock of capital is high enough; bad health and low capital create a poverty trapo Fourth, we compare redistributive income policies versus public hea1th measures. Redistributing income reduces both static and dynamic inequality, but slows growth. In contrast, a paternalistic health policy that forces the poor to invest in hea1th reduces dynamic inequality and may foster growth.

Balance of payment crises and capital flows : the role of liquidity

A model of externaI CrISIS is deveIoped focusing on the interaction between Iiquidity creation by financiaI intermediaries and foreign exchange collapses. The intermediaries' role of transforming maturities is shown to result in larger movements of capital and a higher probability of crisis. This resembles the observed cycle in capital fiows: large infiows, crisis and abrupt outfiows. The mo deI highlights how adverse productivity and international interest rate shocks can be magnified by the behavior of individual foreign investors linked together through their deposits in the intermediaries. An eventual collapse of the exchange rate can link investors' behavior even further. The basic model is then extended, quite naturally, to study the effects of capital fiow contagion between countries.

Do capital controls boost EME´s resilience to financial crises?

Capital controls are again in vogue as a number of emerging markets have reintroduced these measures in recent years in response to a “flood” of international capital. Policymakers use these tools to buttress their economies against the “sudden stop” risk that accompanies international capital flows. Using a panel VAR model, we show that capital controls appear to make emerging market economies (EMEs) more resistant to financial crises by showing that lower post-crisis output loss is correlated with stronger capital controls. However, EMEs that employ capital controls seem to be more crisis-prone. Thus, policymakers should carefully evaluate whether the benefits of capital controls outweigh their costs.

General equilibrium model with restricted participation in financial markets

The paper analyses a general equilibrium model with financiaI markets in which households may face restrictions in trading financiaI assets such as borrowing constraints and collateral (restricted participation model). However, markets are not assumed to be incomplete. We consider a standard general equilibrium model with H > 1 households, 2 periods and S states of nature in the second period. We show that generically the set of equilibrium allocations ia indeterminate, provided the existence of at least one nominal asset and one household for who some restriction is binding. Suppose there are C > 1 commodities in each state of nature and assets pays in units of some commodity. In this case for each household with binding restrictions it is possible to reduce the set of feasible assets trading and obtain a new equilibrium that utility improve alI those households. There is however an upper bound on the number of households to be improved related to the number of states of nature and the number of commodities. In particular, if the number of households ia smaller than the number of states of nature it is possible to Pareto improve any equilibrium by reducing the feasible choice set for each household.

Growth and distribution: a revised classical model

This paper discusses distribution and the historical phases of capitalism. It assumes that technical progress and growth are taking place, and, given that, its question is on the functional distribution of income between labor and capital, having as reference classical theory of distribution and Marx’s falling tendency of the rate of profit. Based on the historical experience, it, first, inverts the model, making the rate of profit as the constant variable in the long run and the wage rate, as the residuum; second, it distinguishes three types of technical progress (capital-saving, neutral and capital-using) and applies it to the history of capitalism, having the UK and France as reference. Given these three types of technical progress, it distinguishes four phases of capitalist growth, where only the second is consistent with Marx prediction. The last phase, after World War II, should be, in principle, capital-saving, consistent with growth of wages above productivity. Instead, since the 1970s wages were kept stagnant in rich countries because of, first, the fact that the Information and Communication Technology Revolution proved to be highly capital using, opening room for a new wage of substitution of capital for labor; second, the new competition coming from developing countries; third, the emergence of the technobureaucratic or professional class; and, fourth, the new power of the neoliberal class coalition associating rentier capitalists and financiers

Elasticity of substitution between capital and labor: a panel data approach

This paper estimates the elasticity of substitution of an aggregate production function. The estimating equation is derived from the steady state of a neoclassical growth model. The data comes from the PWT in which different countries face different relative prices of the investment good and exhibit different investment-output ratios. Then, using this variation we estimate the elasticity of substitution. The novelty of our approach is that we use dynamic panel data techniques, which allow us to distinguish between the short and the long run elasticity and handle a host of econometric and substantive issues. In particular we accommodate the possibility that different countries have different total factor productivities and other country specific effects and that such effects are correlated with the regressors. We also accommodate the possibility that the regressors are correlated with the error terms and that shocks to regressors are manifested in future periods. Taking all this into account our estimation resuIts suggest that the Iong run eIasticity of substitution is 0.7, which is Iower than the eIasticity that had been used in previous macro-deveIopment exercises. We show that this lower eIasticity reinforces the power of the neoclassical mo deI to expIain income differences across countries as coming from differential distortions.

A competitive growth model with endogenous fertility

This paper investigates the interaction between endogenous fertility behavior and the distribution of income and wealth arnong farnilies in a competitive market economy. We construct a growth model in which altruistic dynasties are heterogeneous in their initial stocks of physical capital. Dynasties make choices of farnily size along with decisions about consumption and intergenerational transfers. We show that if the rate of time preference is increasing in the number of children and preferences over nurnber of children satisfy a norrnality assumption, all steady states are characterized by equality of capital stocks and consumption arnong families. We also provide sufficient conditions for uniqueness of the steady state. In order to illustrate these results, we present an example in which preferences over number of children are logarithrnic and the technology is Cobb-Douglas. For this combination of preferences and technology, there exists a unique egalitarian steady state. Moreover, the economy converges to this steady state in only one generation .

Pricing and hedging of oil futures : a unifying approach

We develop and empirically test a continuous time equilibrium model for the pricing of oil futures. The model provides a link between no-arbitrage models and expectation oriented models. It highlights the role of inventories for the identification of different pricing regimes. In an empirical study the hedging performance of our model is compared with five other one- and two-factor pricing models. The hedging problem considered is related to Metallgesellschaft´s strategy to hedge long-term forward commitments with short-term futures. The results show that the downside risk distribution of our inventory based model stochastically dominates those of the other models.

Affine processes, arbitrage-Free Term structures of legendre polynomials,and option pricing

Multivariate Affine term structure models have been increasingly used for pricing derivatives in fixed income markets. In these models, uncertainty of the term structure is driven by a state vector, while the short rate is an affine function of this vector. The model is characterized by a specific form for the stochastic differential equation (SDE) for the evolution of the state vector. This SDE presents restrictions on its drift term which rule out arbitrages in the market. In this paper we solve the following inverse problem: Suppose the term structure of interest rates is modeled by a linear combination of Legendre polynomials with random coefficients. Is there any SDE for these coefficients which rules out arbitrages? This problem is of particular empirical interest because the Legendre model is an example of factor model with clear interpretation for each factor, in which regards movements of the term structure. Moreover, the Affine structure of the Legendre model implies knowledge of its conditional characteristic function. From the econometric perspective, we propose arbitrage-free Legendre models to describe the evolution of the term structure. From the pricing perspective, we follow Duffie et al. (2000) in exploring Legendre conditional characteristic functions to obtain a computational tractable method to price fixed income derivatives. Closing the article, the empirical section presents precise evidence on the reward of implementing arbitrage-free parametric term structure models: The ability of obtaining a good approximation for the state vector by simply using cross sectional data.

A monetary mechanism for sharing capital: Diamond and Dybvig meet Kiyotaki and Wright

Historically, payment systems and capital intermediation interact. Friedman (1959), and many observers of bank instabilities, have ad- vocated separating depositary from credit institutions. His proposal meets today an ever-increasing provision of inside money, and a short- age of monetary models of bank intermediation. In this paper, we eval- uate the proposal from a new angle, with a model in which isolating a safe payments system from commercial intermediation undermines information complementarities in banking activities. Some features of the environment resemble the models in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), and Kiyotaki and Wright (1989).