906 resultados para display rules
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A booklet of rules and regulations for industrial alcohol. A portion of the preparatory note reads: "We endeavoured to bring together in this booklet as much information as possible regarding the Dominion and Provincial rules and regulations at present in force controlling the sale and use of Alcohol for manufacturing, etc."
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The booklet is a printed set of rules and regulations for the St. Catharines Club. It is pocket size and has several blank pages in the back. The blank pages have handwritten names including H.K. Woodruff. Also included in the booklet are lists of past officers. R. Woodruff is listed as president in 1883, and H.K. Woodruff is listed as a committee member in 1885 and 1886.
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The book is signed by S.D. Woodruff. A label the book indicates that it was also owned by "Band, of De Vere Gardens in Toronto".
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Flyer containing the standing Rules of the Board of Water Commissioners for the Town of St. Catharines (2 copies), Nov. 27, 1875.
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Feature selection plays an important role in knowledge discovery and data mining nowadays. In traditional rough set theory, feature selection using reduct - the minimal discerning set of attributes - is an important area. Nevertheless, the original definition of a reduct is restrictive, so in one of the previous research it was proposed to take into account not only the horizontal reduction of information by feature selection, but also a vertical reduction considering suitable subsets of the original set of objects. Following the work mentioned above, a new approach to generate bireducts using a multi--objective genetic algorithm was proposed. Although the genetic algorithms were used to calculate reduct in some previous works, we did not find any work where genetic algorithms were adopted to calculate bireducts. Compared to the works done before in this area, the proposed method has less randomness in generating bireducts. The genetic algorithm system estimated a quality of each bireduct by values of two objective functions as evolution progresses, so consequently a set of bireducts with optimized values of these objectives was obtained. Different fitness evaluation methods and genetic operators, such as crossover and mutation, were applied and the prediction accuracies were compared. Five datasets were used to test the proposed method and two datasets were used to perform a comparison study. Statistical analysis using the one-way ANOVA test was performed to determine the significant difference between the results. The experiment showed that the proposed method was able to reduce the number of bireducts necessary in order to receive a good prediction accuracy. Also, the influence of different genetic operators and fitness evaluation strategies on the prediction accuracy was analyzed. It was shown that the prediction accuracies of the proposed method are comparable with the best results in machine learning literature, and some of them outperformed it.
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Report from the annual meeting of the shareholders held on June 1, 1886 in which amendments and field rules and regulations were made (copy of 1 handwritten page). This is signed by Louis N. Hayne, secretary, June 7, 1886.
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UANL
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We consider a probabilistic approach to the problem of assigning k indivisible identical objects to a set of agents with single-peaked preferences. Using the ordinal extension of preferences, we characterize the class of uniform probabilistic rules by Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and no-envy. We also show that in this characterization no-envy cannot be replaced by anonymity. When agents are strictly risk averse von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility maximizers, then we reduce the problem of assigning k identical objects to a problem of allocating the amount k of an infinitely divisible commodity.
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We reconsider the discrete version of the axiomatic cost-sharing model. We propose a condition of (informational) coherence requiring that not all informational refinements of a given problem be solved differently from the original problem. We prove that strictly coherent linear cost-sharing rules must be simple random-order rules.
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We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (houses, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and reallocation-consistency. Such a rule respects an acyclical priority structure and the allocations can be determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm.
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This paper derives optimal monetary policy rules in setups where certainty equivalence does not hold because either central bank preferences are not quadratic, and/or the aggregate supply relation is nonlinear. Analytical results show that these features lead to sign and size asymmetries, and nonlinearities in the policy rule. Reduced-form estimates indicate that US monetary policy can be characterized by a nonlinear policy rule after 1983, but not before 1979. This finding is consistent with the view that the Fed's inflation preferences during the Volcker-Greenspan regime differ considerably from the ones during the Burns-Miller regime.
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Affiliation: Faculté de Médecine Vétérinaire, Université de Montréal
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We study the problem of provision and cost-sharing of a public good in large economies where exclusion, complete or partial, is possible. We search for incentive-constrained efficient allocation rules that display fairness properties. Population monotonicity says that an increase in population should not be detrimental to anyone. Demand monotonicity states that an increase in the demand for the public good (in the sense of a first-order stochastic dominance shift in the distribution of preferences) should not be detrimental to any agent whose preferences remain unchanged. Under suitable domain restrictions, there exists a unique incentive-constrained efficient and demand-monotonic allocation rule: the so-called serial rule. In the binary public good case, the serial rule is also the only incentive-constrained efficient and population-monotonic rule.