A Median Voter Theorem for Postelection Politics

We analyze a model of 'postelection politics', in which (unlike in the more common Downsian models of 'preelection politics') politicians cannot make binding commitments prior to elections. The game begins with an incumbent politician in office, and voters adopt reelection strategies that are contingent on the policies implemented by the incumbent. We generalize previous models of this type by introducing heterogeneity in voters' ideological preferences, and analyze how voters' reelection strategies constrain the policies chosen by a rent-maximizing incumbent. We first show that virtually any policy (and any feasible level of rent for the incumbent) can be sustained in a Nash equilibrium. Then, we derive a 'median voter theorem': the ideal point of the median voter, and the minimum feasible level of rent, are the unique outcomes in any strong Nash equilibrium. We then introduce alternative refinements that are less restrictive. In particular, Ideologically Loyal Coalition-proof equilibrium also leads uniquely to the median outcome.

Tiebout Choice and the Voucher

This paper examines who is likely to gain and who is likely to lose under a universal voucher program. Following Epple and Romano (1998, 2003), and Nechyba (2000, 2003a), we focus on the idea that gains and losses under a universal voucher depend on two effects: changes in peer group composition and changes in housing values. We show that the direction and magnitude of each of these effects hinges critically on market structure, i.e., the amount of school choice that already exists in the public sector. In markets with little or no Tiebout choice, potential changes in peer group composition create an incentive for high-socioeconomic (SES) households to vote for the voucher and for low-SES households to vote against voucher. In contrast, in markets with significant Tiebout choice, potential changes in housing values create an incentive for high-SES households to vote against the voucher and for low-SES households to vote for the voucher. Using data on vote outcomes from California's 2000 voucher initiative, we find evidence consistent with those predictions.

How Decisive Is the Decisive Voter?

This paper examines whether the voter with the median income is decisive in local spending decisions. Previous tests have relied on cross-sectional data while we make use of a pair of California referenda to estimate a first difference specification. The referenda proposed to lower the required vote share for passing local educational bonding initiatives from 67 to 50 percent and 67 to 55 percent, respectively. The jurisdiction median income appears to accurately capture the expected outcomes of majority votes on public service spending, and voters rationally consider such future public service decisions when deciding how to vote on voting rules.

A Model of Endogenous Union Density and Membership

We develop a theoretical model of endogenously determined union density and union membership. A union is formed, continued, or dissolved by majority voting. Given the profitability, production technology, and labor and product market conditions, the union determines the reservation wage that is acceptable to the firm. Based on this reservation wage and other subjective factors, workers vote for or against the union. If the union is formed, the firm determines the employment level at the union wage.

Finite Characterizations and Paretian Preferences

A characterization of a property of binary relations is of finite type if it is stated in terms of ordered T-tuples of alternatives for some positive integer T. A characterization of finite type can be used to determine in polynomial time whether a binary relation over a finite set has the property characterized. Unfortunately, Pareto representability in R2 has no characterization of finite type (Knoblauch, 2002). This result is generalized below Rl, l larger than 2. The method of proof is applied to other properties of binary relations.

Na 1 Nachlass Max Horkheimer, 581 - Korrespondenzen mit Friedrich (Frederick) Pollock und Henryk Grossmann (p. VI 34, 199-464)

1 Brief von Edith Kriss an Margot von Mendelssohn, 13.10.1943; 1 Brief von Margot von Mendelssohn an Max Horkheimer, 23.01.1944; 1 Brief von Max Horkheimer an Henryk Grossman, 10.04.1944; 1 Brief von Nevitt Sanford an Max Horkheimer, 21.01.1944; 2 Briefe zwischen Richard C. Rothschild und Frederick Pollock, 1944; 1 Brief von Frederick Pollock an das Registrar for Voting in New York Country, [1944]; 1 Brief von Theodor W. Adorno an Frederick Pollock, 07.06.1944;

Application of cell line based genomic predictors to predict response to targeted therapies in breast cancer

Cancer cell lines can be treated with a drug and the molecular comparison of responders and non-responders may yield potential predictors that could be tested in the clinic. It is a bioinformatics challenge to apply the cell line-derived multivariable response predictors to patients who respond to therapy. Using the gene expression data from 23 breast cancer cell lines, I developed three predictors of dasatinib sensitivity by selecting differentially expressed genes and applying different classification algorithms. The performance of these predictors on independent cell lines with known dasatinib response was tested. The predictor based on weighted voting method has the best overall performance. It correctly predicted dasatinib sensitivity in 11 out of 12 (92%) breast and 17 out of 23 (74%) lung cancer cell lines. These predictors were then applied to the gene expression data from 133 breast cancer patients in an attempt to predict how the patients might respond to dasatinib therapy. Two predictors identified 13 patients in common to be dasatinib sensitive. Sixty two percent of these cases are triple negative (ER-negative, HER2-negative and PR-negative) and 76% are double negative. The result is consistent with the findings from other studies, which identified a target population for dasatinib treatment to be triple negative or basal breast cancer subtype. In conclusion, we think that the cell line-derived dasatinib classifiers can be applied to the human patients. ^

Cost analysis of opt-in consent procedures for the Texas statewide immunization information system, ImmTrac

Background. Childhood immunization programs have dramatically reduced the morbidity and mortality associated with vaccine-preventable diseases. Proper documentation of immunizations that have been administered is essential to prevent duplicate immunization of children. To help improve documentation, immunization information systems (IISs) have been developed. IISs are comprehensive repositories of immunization information for children residing within a geographic region. The two models for participation in an IIS are voluntary inclusion, or "opt-in," and voluntary exclusion, or "opt-out." In an opt-in system, consent must be obtained for each participant, conversely, in an opt-out IIS, all children are included unless procedures to exclude the child are completed. Consent requirements for participation vary by state; the Texas IIS, ImmTrac, is an opt-in system.^ Objectives. The specific objectives are to: (1) Evaluate the variance among the time and costs associated with collecting ImmTrac consent at public and private birthing hospitals in the Greater Houston area; (2) Estimate the total costs associated with collecting ImmTrac consent at selected public and private birthing hospitals in the Greater Houston area; (3) Describe the alternative opt-out process for collecting ImmTrac consent at birth and discuss the associated cost savings relative to an opt-in system.^ Methods. Existing time-motion studies (n=281) conducted between October, 2006 and August, 2007 at 8 birthing hospitals in the Greater Houston area were used to assess the time and costs associated with obtaining ImmTrac consent at birth. All data analyzed are deidentified and contain no personal information. Variations in time and costs at each location were assessed and total costs per child and costs per year were estimated. The cost of an alternative opt-out system was also calculated.^ Results. The median time required by birth registrars to complete consent procedures varied from 72-285 seconds per child. The annual costs associated with obtaining consent for 388,285 newborns in ImmTrac's opt-in consent process were estimated at $702,000. The corresponding costs of the proposed opt-out system were estimated to total $194,000 per year. ^ Conclusions. Substantial variation in the time and costs associated with completion of ImmTrac consent procedures were observed. Changing to an opt-out system for participation could represent significant cost savings. ^

Campaign contributions to congressional candidates by the healthcare sector from 1990 to 2008

Stakeholder groups with special interests as donors to finance congressional campaigns have been a controversial issue in the United Sates. While previous studies concentrated on whether a connection existed between the campaign contributions provided by stakeholder groups and the voting behavior of congressional members, there is little evidence to show the trend of allocation of their campaign contributions to their favorite candidates during the elections. This issue has become increasingly important in the health sector since the health care reform bill was passed in early 2010.^ This study examined the long-term trend of campaign contributions offered by various top healthcare stakeholder groups to particular political parties (i.e. Democrat and Republican). The main focus of this paper was to observe and describe the financial donations provided by these healthcare stakeholder groups in the congressional election cycles from 1990 to 2008 in order to obtain an overview of their patterns of campaign contributions. Their contributing behaviors were characterized based on the campaign finance data collected by the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP). Specifically, I answered the questions: (1) to which political party did specific healthcare stakeholder groups give money and (2) what was the pattern of their campaign contributions from 1990 to 2008?^ The findings of my study revealed that the healthcare stakeholder groups had different political party preferences and partisanship orientations regarding the Democratic or Republican Party. These differences were obvious throughout the election cycles from 1990 to 2008 and their distinct patterns of financial contribution were evident across industries in the health sector as well. Among all the healthcare stakeholder groups in this study, physicians were the top contributors in the congressional election. The pharmaceutical industry was the only group where the majority of contribution funds were allocated to Republicans in every election period studied. This study found that no interest group has succeeded in electing the preferred congressional candidate by giving the majority of its financial support to the winning party in every election. Chiropractors, hospitals/nursing homes, and health services/HMOs performed better than other healthcare stakeholder groups by supporting the electoral winner 8 out of 9 election cycles.^

More Is Not Always Better: An Experimental Individual-Level Validation of the Randomized Response Technique and the Crosswise Model

Social desirability and the fear of sanctions can deter survey respondents from responding truthfully to sensitive questions. Self-reports on norm breaking behavior such as shoplifting, non-voting, or tax evasion may therefore be subject to considerable misreporting. To mitigate such misreporting, various indirect techniques for asking sensitive questions, such as the randomized response technique (RRT), have been proposed in the literature. In our study, we evaluate the viability of several variants of the RRT, including the recently proposed crosswise-model RRT, by comparing respondents’ self-reports on cheating in dice games to actual cheating behavior, thereby distinguishing between false negatives (underreporting) and false positives (overreporting). The study has been implemented as an online survey on Amazon Mechanical Turk (N = 6,505). Our results indicate that the forced-response RRT and the unrelated-question RRT, as implemented in our survey, fail to reduce the level of misreporting compared to conventional direct questioning. For the crosswise-model RRT, we do observe a reduction of false negatives (that is, an increase in the proportion of cheaters who admit having cheated). At the same time, however, there is an increase in false positives (that is, an increase in non-cheaters who falsely admit having cheated). Overall, our findings suggest that none of the implemented sensitive questions techniques substantially outperforms direct questioning. Furthermore, our study demonstrates the importance of distinguishing false negatives and false positives when evaluating the validity of sensitive question techniques.

Fiscal Federalism and Tax Equalization: The potential for progressive local taxes

We construct an empirically informed computational model of fiscal federalism, testing whether horizontal or vertical equalization can solve the fiscal externality problem in an environment in which heterogeneous agents can move and vote. The model expands on the literature by considering the case of progressive local taxation. Although the consequences of progressive taxation under fiscal federalism are well understood, they have not been studied in a context with tax equalization, despite widespread implementation. The model also expands on the literature by comparing the standard median voter model with a realistic alternative voting mechanism. We find that fiscal federalism with progressive taxation naturally leads to segregation as well as inefficient and inequitable public goods provision while the alternative voting mechanism generates more efficient, though less equitable, public goods provision. Equalization policy, under both types of voting, is largely undermined by micro-actors' choices. For this reason, the model also does not find the anticipated effects of vertical equalization discouraging public goods spending among wealthy jurisdictions and horizontal encouraging it among poor jurisdictions. Finally, we identify two optimal scenarios, superior to both complete centralization and complete devolution. These scenarios are not only Pareto optimal, but also conform to a Rawlsian view of justice, offering the best possible outcome for the worst-off. Despite offering the best possible outcomes, both scenarios still entail significant economic segregation and inequitable public goods provision. Under the optimal scenarios agents shift the bulk of revenue collection to the federal government, with few jurisdictions maintaining a small local tax.

Social cleavages and electoral support in Turkey -- toward convergence?

Studies on Western democracies have shown that deep-seated social cleavages stabilize the electoral behavior and thus reduce electoral volatility. But how do social cleavages affect a party system that is undergoing democratic consolidation, such as in Turkey? In this study, investigations were carried out on long- and short-term relationships between social cleavages (religiosity, ethnicity, and sectarism) and electoral volatility in Turkey during the 1961-2002 period. Cross-sectional multiple regressions were applied to electoral and demographic data at the provincial level. The results showed that in the long-term, social cleavages on the whole have increased volatility rather than reduced it. The cleavage-volatility relationship, however, has changed over time. Repeated elections have mitigated the volatile effect of social cleavages on the voting behavior, as political parties have become more representative of the existent social cleavages.

Election Studies in India

The election system is the pillar of Indian democracy. The system consists of various levels of elections to the Lok Sabha (the House of Representatives of the Union), State Legislative Assemblies, and Panchayati Raj Institutions (local self-governing bodies under State Governments). This article includes a review of studies related to the elections of Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies conducted up to the present time. Studies are divided into those based on aggregate data and those based on survey data of the individual electorate. This division has the advantage of providing data that may be used in different analytical areas. Voter turnout and votes polled by party are the two main variables to be explained. This review article thus shows what has been explained in voting behaviour in India up to the present time.

Ethnicity and Elections under Authoritarianism: The Case of Kazakhstan

Despite the ethnicisation of power since independence in 1991, Kazakhstan has managed to maintain political stability without experiencing large-scale mobilisation to oppose Kazakh domination. This paper examines government strategy to avoid ethnic voting in an attempt to explain why ethnic divisions were rarely reflected in the struggle for power in the republic. While the arbitrary use of legal provisions considerably limited participation in elections by ethnic leaders, powerful pro-president parties that exhibited a cross-ethnic character were created to curtail ethnically based movements. The control strategy in elections aimed not simply at ethnicising the parliament in favour of Kazakhs, but at having loyal Russians and other minorities represented in the legislature through nomination by the president and catch-all pro-regime parties, or through the presidential consultative body—Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan. This well-controlled representation of minorities served not only to placate non-Kazakhs but also to provide legitimacy for the Kazakh-dominated leadership by projecting the image of cross-ethnic support for the president and some degree of power-sharing.