Processos de Reconhecimento, Mensuração e Contabilização do Rédito

O reconhecimento e mensuração do rédito tornaram-se cada vez mais complexos devido a factores como a concorrência internacional e a rápida evolução dos modelos empresariais. O rédito é a componente do rendimento proveniente da actividade operacional da empresa, daí ser de suprema importância determinar-se o momento em que o mesmo deve ser reconhecido bem como os critérios adequados para mensurá-lo. Neste trabalho debruçamo-nos sobre os processos de reconhecimento e mensuração do rédito. Este trabalho foi elaborado em duas partes, na primeira, efectuou-se uma revisão às normas de referência ao tratamento do rédito, com o objectivo de esclarecer algumas questões que suscitam grandes dúvidas, quer no meio académico, quer no meio profissional como é o exemplo do tratamento a dar ao rédito proveniente dos contratos de construção de imóveis numa empresa do ramo imobiliário. Na segunda parte do trabalho, elaborou-se um estudo de caso sobre a empresa TECNICIL Imobiliária, precisamente para verificar na prática o tratamento dado ao rédito proveniente dos acordos de construção levados a cabo por esta entidade. E desse estudo podemos concluir que a entidade não observa o tratamento prescrito pelas normas de referência, particularmente a IFRIC 15 – Acordos para Construção de Imóveis e IAS 18 – Rédito. There is no doubt that the financial system is an integral part of any society. Through their intermediary role, financial institutions receive funds from surplus agents and lend to deficit agents, with promises of future payment. Banks, with their primary activity being the financial intermediation, the credit is provided to customers in the form of funding or loans and a promise of payment on a date agreed between the parties. The discussion and implementation of the Basel Accord, Basel II in particular, has given a new form to that relationship banking/customer, setting out the rules regarding the granting of credit and risk management, establishing credit limits associated with the degree of risk of operations. Banking institutions got more and more concerned with credit and risk management, in all of their operations, using tools and methodologies that are designed to meet the needs of crediting processes. Banking institutions are creating departments of risk, putting the management of credit risk in the hands of trained professionals, acting under internationally uniform rules and standards.

Bundling and competition for slots: Sequential pricing

In this paper we study, as in Jeon-Menicucci (2009), competition between sellerswhen each of them sells a portfolio of distinct products to a buyer having limitedslots. This paper considers sequential pricing and complements our main paper (Jeon-Menicucci, 2009) that considers simultaneous pricing.First, Jeon-Menicucci (2009) find that under simultaneous individual pricing, equilibriumoften does not exist and hence the outcome is often inefficient. By contrast,equilibrium always exists under sequential individual pricing and we characterize it inthis paper. We find that each seller faces a trade-off between the number of slots heoccupies and surplus extraction per product, and there is no particular reason thatthis leads to an efficient allocation of slots.Second, Jeon-Menicucci (2009) find that when bundling is allowed, there alwaysexists an efficient equilibrium but inefficient equilibria can also exist due to purebundling (for physical products) or slotting contracts. Under sequential pricing,we find that all equilibria are efficient regardless of whether firms can use slottingcontracts, and both for digital goods and for physical goods. Therefore, sequentialpricing presents an even stronger case for laissez-faire in the matter of bundling thansimultaneous pricing.

The role of role uncertainty in modified dictator games

We compare behavior in modified dictator games with and without role uncertainty. Subjectschoose between a selfish action, a costly surplus creating action (altruistic behavior) and acostly surplus destroying action (spiteful behavior). While costly surplus creating actions are themost frequent under role uncertainty (64%), selfish actions become the most frequent withoutrole uncertainty (69%). Also, the frequency of surplus destroying choices is negligible with roleuncertainty (1%) but not so without it (11%). A classification of subjects into four differenttypes of interdependent preferences (Selfish, Social Welfare maximizing, Inequity Averse andCompetitive) shows that the use of role uncertainty overestimates the prevalence of SocialWelfare maximizing preferences in the subject population (from 74% with role uncertainty to21% without it) and underestimates Selfish and Inequity Averse preferences. An additionaltreatment, in which subjects undertake an understanding test before participating in theexperiment with role uncertainty, shows that the vast majority of subjects (93%) correctlyunderstand the payoff mechanism with role uncertainty, but yet surplus creating actions weremost frequent. Our results warn against the use of role uncertainty in experiments that aim tomeasure the prevalence of interdependent preferences.

The credit ratings game

The spectacular failure of top-rated structured finance products has broughtrenewed attention to the conflicts of interest of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs). We modelboth the CRA conflict of understating credit risk to attract more business, and the issuerconflict of purchasing only the most favorable ratings (issuer shopping), and examine theeffectiveness of a number of proposed regulatory solutions of CRAs. We find that CRAs aremore prone to inflate ratings when there is a larger fraction of naive investors in the marketwho take ratings at face value, or when CRA expected reputation costs are lower. To theextent that in booms the fraction of naive investors is higher, and the reputation risk forCRAs of getting caught understating credit risk is lower, our model predicts that CRAs aremore likely to understate credit risk in booms than in recessions. We also show that, due toissuer shopping, competition among CRAs in a duopoly is less efficient (conditional on thesame equilibrium CRA rating policy) than having a monopoly CRA, in terms of both totalex-ante surplus and investor surplus. Allowing tranching decreases total surplus further.We argue that regulatory intervention requiring upfront payments for rating services (beforeCRAs propose a rating to the issuer) combined with mandatory disclosure of any ratingproduced by CRAs can substantially mitigate the con.icts of interest of both CRAs andissuers.

Spinning welfare: The gains from process innovation in cotton and car production

Economists and economic historians want to know how much better life is today than in the past.Fifty years ago economic historians found surprisingly small gains from 19th century US railroads,while more recently economists have found relatively large gains from electricity, computers and cellphones. In each case the implicit or explicit assumption is that researchers were measuring the valueof a new good to society. In this paper we use the same techniques to find the value to society ofmaking existing goods cheaper. Henry Ford did not invent the car, and the inventors of mechanisedcotton spinning in the industrial revolution invented no new product. But both made existing productsdramatically cheaper, bringing them into the reach of many more consumers. That in turn haspotentially large welfare effects. We find that the consumer surplus of Henry Ford s production linewas around 2% by 1923, 15 years after Ford began to implement the moving assembly line, while themechanisation of cotton spinning was worth around 6% by 1820, 34 years after its initial invention.Both are large: of the same order of magnitude as consumer expenditure on these items, and as largeor larger than the value of the internet to consumers. On the social savings measure traditionally usedby economic historians, these process innovations were worth 15% and 18% respectively, makingthem more important than railroads. Our results remind us that process innovations can be at least asimportant for welfare and productivity as the invention of new products.

A Problemática dos Impostos Diferidos na revalorização dos activos fixos tangíveis

A nível da contabilidade tem-se assistido, nos últimos tempos, esforços no sentido de uma “ Harmonização Global” como forma de acompanhar o fenómeno da globalização, não obstante, existem temas, como o dos Impostos diferidos, que não reúnem consenso entre autores. Os impostos diferidos aparecem como o elo de ligação entre a contabilidade e a fiscalidade, no que se refere as divergências de tratamento destas duas áreas em relação a certas operações, sendo uma delas a revalorização de activos. A revalorização dos activos, na medida em que aumenta a base contabilística dos activos, dá origem a impostos diferidos caso a base fiscal não for ajustada. Assim sendo, há que contabilizar o efeito fiscal decorrente dessa revalorização, em consonância com contabilização do excedente de revalorização. A questão dos impostos diferidos aparece na medida em que o imposto sobre o rendimento passa a ser contabilizado através do método dos efeitos fiscais, em detrimento do método tradicional, o método do imposto a pagar. O método dos efeitos fiscais, assim como o tradicional, apresenta desvantagem, mas é o que melhor permite a apresentação de uma imagem mais verdadeira e apropriada sobre as operações das empresas. A revalorização dos activos fixos tangíveis é uma das operações que tem um tratamento mais adequado utilizado o método dos efeitos fiscais. Em Cabo verde, a revalorização de activos fixos tangíveis é aceite para finalidade de tributação, se for pedida a devida autorização para a sua realização às Finanças. Partindo de um estudo de caso onde não foi efectuado a autorização pelas finanças para efectuar a revalorização dos activos fixos tangíveis, demonstramos que existem impactos significativos nas demonstrações financeiras da empresa em estudo, na sua posição financeira e no seu desempenho, por via da contabilização do imposto diferidoIn level of accounting we have witnessed, in recent times, efforts in the sense of "Global Harmonization" as a means of keep up with the phenomenon of globalization, nevertheless there are themes such as the deferred taxes, which do not congregate consensus among authors. Deferred taxes appear as the link between accounting and taxation, in respect a differences of treatment of these two areas to certain transactions, one of this is the revaluation tangible fixed assets. The revaluation of the tangible fixed assets increases the accounting base of assets and originates a deferred tax if the tax base is not adjusted. Therefore, we must account for the tax effect arising from this revaluation, in line with the accounting revaluation surplus. The issue of deferred taxes appears in consequences of accounting for income tax is accounted by the method of tax effects, over the traditional method, the method of tax payable. The method of tax effects, as well as the traditional method presents disadvantage, but it is the better in allows the presentation of true and fair view of the company's operations. The revaluation of tangible fixed assets is one of the operations that utilized the tax effects, have appropriate treatment. In Cape Verde, the revaluation of tangible fixed assets is accepted for tax purposes, if requested permission for its accomplishment to Finance. Based on a case study which has not been authorized by the finance to effect the revaluation of tangible fixed assets, we demonstrate that there are significant impacts on the financial statements of the company under study in its financial position and performance, through accounting deferred tax.

International commodity prices, growth and the outbreak of Civil War in Sub-Saharan Africa

To learn more about the effect of economic conditions oncivil war, we examine whether Sub-Saharan civil wars aremore likely to start following downturns in the internationalprice of countries main export commodities. The data showa robust effect of commodity price downturns on the outbreakof civil wars. We also find that Sub-Saharan countries aremore likely to see civil wars following economic downturnsin their main OECD export destinations.

The role of institutions in the contractual process

Human beings increase their productivity by specializingtheir resources and exchanging their products. Theorganization of exchange is costly, however, becausespecialized activities need coordination and incentiveshave to be aligned. This work first describes how theseexchanges are organized in an institutional environment.It then focuses on the dual effect of this environment-as with any other specialized resource, institutions maybe used for expropriation purposes. They enjoyspecialization advantages in safeguarding exchange butthey also make possible new forms of opportunism,causing new costs of exchange. Three perverse tendenciesare identified:In the legal field, there is a surplus ofmandatory rules and, at the same time, a deficit in default rules. Second, courts activity is biased againstthe quasi-judicial role of the parties and the market. Third, Market enforcement is based on reputationalassets that are badly exposed to opportunism.

The benefits of limited feedback in organizations

In most firms, managers periodically assess workers' performance. Evidence suggeststhat managers withhold information during these reviews, and some observersargue that this necessarily reduces surplus. This paper assesses the validity of thisargument when workers have career concerns. Disclosure has two effects: it exposesthe worker to uncertainty about future effort levels, but allows him to use current effortto influence his employer's beliefs about future effort. The surplus-maximizingdisclosure policy reveals output realizations in the center of the distribution, butnot in the tails. Thus, it is efficient for firms to reveal some but not all performanceinformation.

On the drivers of commodity co-movement: Evidence from biofuels

We use the recent introduction of biofuels to study the effect of industry factors on the relationshipsbetween wholesale commodity prices. Correlations between agricultural products and oilare strongest in the 2005-09 period, coinciding with the boom of biofuels, and remain substantialuntil 2011. We disentangle three possible drivers for the linkage: substitution, energy costs, andfinancialization. The timing and magnitude of the biofuels-to-oil relationships are different to thoseof other commodities, and far higher than can be justified by costs and financialization. Substitutionand costs drive the monthly correlations of long-term futures, and each of the three contributeequally to the daily co-movement of the short-term ones. The findings survive many robustnesschecks and appear in the stock market.

Costly search and design

Firms compete by choosing both a price and a design from a family of designs thatcan be represented as demand rotations. Consumers engage in costly sequential searchamong firms. Each time a consumer pays a search cost he observes a new offering. Anoffering consists of a price quote and a new good, where goods might vary in the extentto which they are good matches for the consumer. In equilibrium, only two design-styles arise: either the most niche where consumers are likely to either love or loathethe product, or the broadest where consumers are likely to have similar valuations. Inequilibrium, different firms may simultaneously offer both design-styles. We performcomparative statics on the equilibrium and show that a fall in search costs can lead tohigher industry prices and profits and lower consumer surplus. Our analysis is relatedto discussions of how the internet has led to the prevalence of niche goods and the"long tail" phenomenon.

How enforcement institutions affect markets

In an experiment we study market outcomes under alternative incentive structures for third-party enforcers. Our transactions resemble an anonymous credit market where lenders can give loans and borrowers can repay them. When borrowers default, judges are free to enforce repayment but are themselves paid differently in each of three treatments. First, paying judges according to lenders votes maximizes surplus and the equality of earnings. In contrast, paying judges according to borrowers votes triggers insufficient enforcement, destroying the market and producing the lowest surplus and the most unequal distribution of earnings. Lastly, judges paid the average earnings of borrowers and lenders achieve results close to those based on lender voting. We employ a steps-of-reasoning argument to interpret the performances of different institutions. When voting and enforcement rights are allocated to different classes of actors, the difficulty of their task changes, and arguably as a consequence they focus on high or low surplus equilibria.

Business cycles, unemployment insurance and the calibration of matching models

This paper theoretically and empirically documents a puzzle that arises when an RBC economy with a job matching function is used to model unemployment. The standard model can generate sufficiently large cyclical fluctuations in unemployment, or a sufficiently small response of unemployment to labor market policies, but it cannot do both. Variable search and separation, finite UI benefit duration, efficiency wages, and capital all fail to resolve this puzzle. However, either sticky wages or match-specific productivity shocks can improve the model's performance by making the firm's flow of surplus more procyclical, which makes hiring more procyclical too.

A retail benchmarking approach to efficient two-way access pricing

We study a retail benchmarking approach to determine access prices for interconnected networks. Instead of considering fixed access charges as in the existing literature, we study access pricing rules that determine the access price that network i pays to network j as a linear function of the marginal costs and the retail prices set by both networks. In the case of competition in linear prices, we show that there is a unique linear rule that implements the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium, independently of the underlying demand conditions. In the case of competition in two-part tariffs, we consider a class of access pricing rules, similar to the optimal one under linear prices but based on average retail prices. We show that firms choose the variable price equal to the marginal cost under this class of rules. Therefore, the regulator (or the competition authority) can choose one among the rules to pursue additional objectives such as consumer surplus, network coverage or investment: for instance, we show that both static and dynamic e±ciency can be achieved at the same time.

Optimal law enforcement under asymmetric information

In this paper, we focus on the problem created by asymmetric informationabout the enforcer's (agent's) costs associated to enforcement expenditure. This adverse selection problem affects optimal law enforcement because a low cost enforcer may conceal its information by imitating a high cost enforcer, and must then be given a compensation to be induced to reveal its true costs. The government faces a trade-off between minimizing the enforcer's compensation and maximizing the net surplus of harmful acts. As a consequence, the probability of apprehension and punishment is usually reduced leading to more offenses being committed. We show that asymmetry of information does not affect law enforcement as long as raising public funds is costless. The consideration of costly raising of public funds permits to establish the positive correlation between asymmetry of information between government and enforcers andthe crime rate.