Polyanthea sacra : ex universae sacrae scripturae utriusque testamenti figuris, symbolis, testimoniis, necnon e selectis patrum, aliorumque authorum, sententiis, eruditis interpretationibus, similitudinibus,rarisque historiis collecta, et copiosis, exquisitisque materiis moralibus de virtutibus et vitiis pro concionibus efformandis adornata atquead communem, facrorum praefertim oratorum, utiltarum in lucem edita

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De arte voluntatis, libri sex : in quibus platonicae, stoicae, & Christianae discipliné medulla digeritur, succo omni politioris philosophiae expresso ex Platone, Seneca, Epicteto, Dione, Chrysostome, Plotino, Iamblicho, & aliis. Quorum sensa subtiliora artificiosius ordinantur; nonnulla emendantur; plurima adducuntur noué, & arguté. Accedit ad calcem Historia panegyrica de tribis martyribus eiusdem Societatis, in Vrugai pro fide occisis

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Theatrum veritatis, et justitiae, sive, decisivi discursus per materias, seu titulos distincti : & ad veritatem editi in forensibus controversiis canonicis & civilibus, in quibus in urbe advocatus, pro una partium scripsit, vel consultus respondit : cum annotationibus, ac discursibus, qui antea in supplementis extabant, necnon aliquibus Sacrae Rotae Romanae recentissimis decisionibus, & summorum pontificum constitutionibus ad materias facientibus, suis locis optima adjectis

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Summa S. Thomae hodiernis academiarum moribus accommodata, sive, cursus theologiae : juxta mentem & in quantum licuit, juxta ordinem & litteram D. Thomae in sua Summa, insertis pro re nata digressionibus inhistoriam ecclesiasticam, ad usum scholarum thomisticarum

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Ordo divini officci recitandi sacrique peragendi a clero saeculari Dioeceseos Leonensis pro anno domini M.DCCCXCII.

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El apostolado y la acción seglar en pro de la causa católica.

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Officia votiva per annum pro singulis hebdomadae feriis a ss. D. N.Leone PP. XIII per decretum urbis et orbis

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Piisima erga Dei Genitricem devotio ad impetrandam gratiam pro articulo mortis et aliae, ut infra videri licet

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Breve reseña de la vida pública y hechos notables de los miembros del clero mejicano en pro del sostenimiento i progreso de la religion católica

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Sharing a River

A group of agents located along a river have quasi-linear preferences over water and money. We ask how the water should be allocated and what money transfers should be performed. We are interested in efficiency, stability (in the sense of the core), and fairness (in a sense to be defined). We first show that the cooperative game associated with our problem is convex : its core is therefore large and easily described. Next, we propose the following fairness requirement : no group of agents should enjoy a welfare higher than what it could achieve in the absence of the remaining agents. We prove that only one welfare vector in the core satisfies this condition : it is the marginal contribution vector corresponding to the ordering of the agents along the river. We discuss how it could be decentralized or implemented.

Information Sharing and the Stability of Cooperation in Research Joint Ventures.

The model studies information sharing and the stability of cooperation in cost reducing Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). In a four-stage game-theoretic framework, firms decide on participation in a RJV, information sharing, R&D expenditures, and output. An important feature of the model is that voluntary information sharing between cooperating firms increases information leakage from the RJV to outsiders. It is found that it is the spillover from the RJV to outsiders which determines the decision of insiders whether to share information, while it is the spillover affecting all firms which determines the level of information sharing within the RJV. RJVs representing a larger portion of firms in the industry are more likely to share information. It is also found that when sharing information is costless, firms never choose intermediate levels of information sharing : they share all the information or none at all. The size of the RJV is found to depend on three effects : a coordination effect, an information sharing effect, and a competition effect. Depending on the relative magnitudes of these effects, the size of the RJV may increase or decrease with spillovers. The effect of information sharing on the profitability of firms as well as on welfare is studied.

Non-Commitment and Savings in Dynamic Risk-Sharing Contracts

We characterize the solution to a model of consumption smoothing using financing under non-commitment and savings. We show that, under certain conditions, these two different instruments complement each other perfectly. If the rate of time preference is equal to the interest rate on savings, perfect smoothing can be achieved in finite time. We also show that, when random revenues are generated by periodic investments in capital through a concave production function, the level of smoothing achieved through financial contracts can influence the productive investment efficiency. As long as financial contracts cannot achieve perfect smoothing, productive investment will be used as a complementary smoothing device.

Coherent Cost-Sharing Rules

We reconsider the discrete version of the axiomatic cost-sharing model. We propose a condition of (informational) coherence requiring that not all informational refinements of a given problem be solved differently from the original problem. We prove that strictly coherent linear cost-sharing rules must be simple random-order rules.

Responsibility and Cross-Subsidization in Cost Sharing

We propose two axiomatic theories of cost sharing with the common premise that agents demand comparable -though perhaps different- commodities and are responsible for their own demand. Under partial responsibility the agents are not responsible for the asymmetries of the cost function: two agents consuming the same amount of output always pay the same price; this holds true under full responsibility only if the cost function is symmetric in all individual demands. If the cost function is additively separable, each agent pays her stand alone cost under full responsibility; this holds true under partial responsibility only if, in addition, the cost function is symmetric. By generalizing Moulin and Shenker’s (1999) Distributivity axiom to cost-sharing methods for heterogeneous goods, we identify in each of our two theories a different serial method. The subsidy-free serial method (Moulin, 1995) is essentially the only distributive method meeting Ranking and Dummy. The cross-subsidizing serial method (Sprumont, 1998) is the only distributive method satisfying Separability and Strong Ranking. Finally, we propose an alternative characterization of the latter method based on a strengthening of Distributivity.