Turkey votes: Part II - Erdoğan reloaded. EPC Commentary, 3 April 2014

On 30 March, Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) scooped a significant victory in local elections, taking almost 44 percent of the vote despite accusations of corruption, undermining the rule of law, fundamental rights and freedoms. While there have been claims of election fraud and the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), has demanded recounts in several cities including Istanbul and Ankara, it is clear that even allowing for some level of fraud the win was substantial and more than most people expected. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has reached a juncture. He has two choices: return to the path of democracy after a period of democratic back-sliding which included passing several controversial reforms such as a new internet law which led to the recent banning of Twitter and Youtube; or alternatively he can forge ahead with his much talked of revenge campaign against those he has accused of creating a “parallel state” and conspiring to remove him from power. Given that Erdoğan viewed this election as a referendum on his popularity and leadership there is a serious risk that he will do the latter; using the significant mandate given to him to do whatever he wants, including further cracking down on democracy.

The strength of the Christian Democrats, the weakness of the opposition. Germany before the parliamentary elections. OSW Commentary No. 114, 12.09.2013

The political campaign before Germany’s parliamentary elections to be held on 22 September has in all its glory reflected the trends visible during the last four years of the government of Chancellor Angela Merkel – the strength of the Christian Democrats, the weakness of the opposition and the increasing marginalisation of the coalition partner, the FDP. The CDU/CSU remains the most popular political choice in Germany, largely because Angela Merkel has consistently remained the most popular German politician. Everything indicates that the CDU/CSU will win the election, even though it has been running a passive campaign and the Chancellor herself has been avoiding confrontation, presenting herself as a kind of cross-party representative of the interests of all social groups. The Christian Democrats’ main competitors, the Social Democrats, have been unable to play to their strengths and present themselves as a serious alternative to the CDU/CSU. The Christian Democrats, despite their difficult cooperation with the liberal FDP, have declared their willingness to continue doing so during the next parliamentary term. If the numbers make that impossible, and the Social Democrats and the Greens have too few votes to be able to form a government, a grand coalition of the Christian Democrats and the SPD will be formed in Germany.

The Paradoxes of Moldovan Sports. An insight into the nature of the Transnistrian conflict. OSW Point of View, November 2011

Mutual relations in the area of sports, which in contemporary international contacts often not only reflect the true nature of political relations but sometimes even affect them, can be a valuable contribution to the analysis of this conflict’s nature. Why did the Transnistrian government, despite the use of anti-Moldovan rhetoric, agree to Transnistrian athletes representing Moldova during the Olympics and in other international competitions? Why does it accept the presence of sports teams from both banks of the Dniester playing in the same leagues? Why does Transnistria, despite being much smaller, predominate in many sports? How is it that Sheriff Tiraspol, the flagship football club of the business and political circles controlling Transnistria, managed to win the Moldovan championship ten times in a row and is the main source of players for Moldova’s national team? Does sport really ‘know no borders’ or perhaps the border on the Dniester is different than seems at first sight?

Russia and its Near Neighborhood: Competition and Conflict within the EU. Natolin Research Paper 04/May 2011

Russia in 2004 politely rejected the offer to become a participant in the European Neighbourhood Policy, preferring instead to pursue bilateral relations with the EU under the heading of ‘strategic partnership’. Five years later, its officials first reacted with concern to the ENP’s eastern dimension, the Eastern Partnership initiative. Quickly, however, having become convinced that the project would not amount to much, their concern gave way to indifference and derision. Furthermore, Russian representatives have failed to support idealistic or romantic notions of commonality in the area between Russia and the EU, shunned the terminology of ‘common European neighbourhood’ and replaced it in EU-Russian documents with the bland reference to ‘regions adjacent to the EU and Russian borders’. Internally, the term of the ‘near abroad’ was the official designation of the area in the Yeltsin era, and unofficially it is still in use today. As the terminological contortions suggest, Moscow officials consider the EU’s eastern neighbours as part of a Russian sphere of influence and interest. Assurances to the contrary notwithstanding, they look at the EU-Russia relationship as a ‘zero-sum game’ in which the gain of one party is the loss of the other. EU attempts to persuade the Russian power elite to regard cooperation in the common neighbourhood not as a competitive game but providing ‘win-win’ opportunities have been to no avail. In fact, conceptual approaches and practical policies conducted vis-à-vis the three Western CIS countries (Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova) and the southern Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) confirm that, from Moscow’s perspective, processes of democratisation, liberalisation and integration with Western institutions in that region are contrary to Russian interests. In each and every case, therefore, the area’s ‘frozen conflicts’ have not been regarded by the Kremlin as an opportunity to promote stability and prosperity in the countries concerned but as an instrument to prevent European choices in their domestic and foreign policy. The current ‘reset’ in Russia’s relations with the United States and the ‘modernisation partnership’ with the EU have as yet failed to produce an impact on Russia’s policies in ‘its’ neighbourhood. The EU is nevertheless well advised to maintain its course of attempting to engage that country constructively, including in the common neighbourhood. However, its leverage is small. For any reorientation to occur in Moscow towards perceptions and policies of mutual benefit in the region, much would depend on Russia’s internal development.

Exporting the Internal Market – Panacea or Nemesis for the European Neighbourhood Policy? Lessons from the Energy Community. EU Diplomacy Paper No. 2, 2014

Over the last decades, a constant feature of the relations between the European Union (EU) and the countries in its neighbourhood has been the export of European law. Achieved through bilateral or multilateral agreements, the export of law has led to the ‘juridification’ of external policy. The energy sector is in the vanguard of this development. European energy law has been made applicable to third countries through the European Economic Area (EEA) and, most important for the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the Energy Community. Bilateral agreements of relevance for energy include the (draft) Association Agreement with Ukraine which was rejected in November 2013 and came on the agenda again following a revolution in the country. Geopolitics has played and continues to play an eminent role in this respect. What does that mean for the export of European law to neighbouring countries? This paper argues that the export of European (energy) law does not only remain possible but is preferable to purely diplomatic relations between the EU and its neighbours if certain conditions are fulfilled. Based on the experience in the EEA and the Energy Community, multilateral integration agreements can be successful if they offer a well-designed institutional and procedural architecture based on mutual commitments, extend the benefits of the internal market to the participating third countries and create ‘win-win’ situations in satisfying also the participating third countries' vital interests in return for undergoing the hardship of economic reforms.

British business and the Euro. ACES Cases No. 2008.2

During the Maastricht Treaty negotiations, the United Kingdom obtained an opt-out option on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). When Tony Blair came to power, he promised there would be a referendum on the euro if the government decided it was in the national interest to join. Many believed Tony Blair intended to call and try to win a referendum on the euro. Therefore, in the late 1990s, the debate over the euro raged in Britain, filling the pages of the tabloids and the minds of many Britons. In this paper based on empirical research conducted in London in 2005-06, I investigate whether the business sector had a clear preference on the issue of British membership in the EMU and tried to influence the government‟s decision. I use Jeffry Frieden's model of interest group preferences regarding exchange-rate policies to develop hypotheses regarding the position of the business sector on the euro. Research findings reveal that the business sector was divided on the issue of euro membership exactly as Frieden's model predicts. However, the intensity of business preferences decreased overtime. By the end of Tony Blair's second term, the business sector had become neutral on the issue of the euro.

Russian nationalists on the Kremlin’s policy in Ukraine. OSW Commentary No. 156|24.12.2014

On the Day of National Unity, celebrated in Russia every 4 November, members of nationalist movements organise a so-called Russian March in Moscow. In 2014 the nationalists took part in three competing marches, which illustrated the divisions present in these circles. The reason for these divisions is a difference of opinions on the policy pursued by Russia towards Ukraine. The pro-Russian, Russia-inspired protests in south-eastern Ukraine organised under the slogan of ‘defending’ the Russians living there (the ‘Russian Spring’) and the annexation of Crimea were received enthusiastically by the nationalists and contributed to a consolidation of these circles around the Kremlin which lasted for several months. In spite of this, opinions on the Russian government’s current policy towards the so-called Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics have been varied. The most radical groups have demanded that military support be offered, and that the ‘confederation’ of these republics, the so-called ‘Novorossiya’, should be officially recognised. They consider the Kremlin’s policy to have been too soft, and see the signing of the peace agreements in Minsk as a betrayal of the interests of the Russians. For the remaining representatives of nationalist circles, who are not so numerous and are less visible in the public sphere, finding a solution for Russia’s domestic problems remains a priority. Some of them oppose the very notion of Russia’s involvement in the conflict. Since the beginning of the ‘Russian Spring’, the Kremlin has fostered active attitudes among the nationalists and solicited their support, hoping to win a valuable ally. This has boosted hopes in these circles that their political position may be strengthened. The involvement in the fighting in Ukraine has led to a radicalisation of attitudes among the nationalists, and demonstrated that this group is ideologically motivated and has considerable potential for mobilisation. Moreover, the ‘Great Russian’ and anti-Western slogans some of them have propagated are reflected in views displayed by average Russians, who have been influenced by the patriotic enthusiasm which followed the annexation of Crimea. Due to all this, from among all the actors active on the opposition side, it is the nationalists – and not the representatives of the liberal and pro-Western opposition – that have the best prospects for access to the political stage in Russia. It cannot be ruled out that a further strengthening of the radical groups might also be boosted by the possible growing social frustration caused by the economic crisis, which additionally increases the risk of political destabilisation.

Prime Minister Fico’s Russian card. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER NUMBER 175/01.07.2015

Since the beginning of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, the position of Slovakia’s left-wing government towards Russia has been ambiguous. Bratislava has accepted the EU sanctions targeting Russia and the plan for strengthening NATO’s eastern flank. At the same time, however, Prime Minister Robert Fico’s government has maintained close political relations with the Kremlin. It has called for the intensification of Slovak-Russian economic relations and has repeatedly criticised the sanctions, speaking in tandem with Russian propaganda in so doing. Slovakia’s Prime Minister is hoping that by playing the role of one of the leaders in the EU and NATO who are most willing to cooperate with Russia, he will gain economic benefits and win votes in next spring’s upcoming parliamentary elections. Despite numerous pro-Russian gestures, Slovakia has been limiting the number of areas in which Moscow could exert pressure on Bratislava. As it strives to become independent of Russia, Slovakia has ensured possible alternative fuel supplies for itself. Moreover, it has been gradually replacing Russian-made military equipment with equipment made in the West. The Slovak government does intend to develop the country’s cooperation with Russia, including in strategic areas involving supplies and transit of oil and gas, as well as supplies of nuclear fuel. Nevertheless, it has been making efforts to gain easy access to an alternative source of supplies in each of these areas. Beset by crises, Russia has ever fewer economic cooperation opportunities to offer Slovakia, and Slovak businesses operating on the Russian market have to take into account the growing risk of insolvency of local contractors. To a great extent, therefore, Slovak-Russian relations have been reduced to rhetorical statements confirming the desire for closer cooperation, and to visions of joint projects accompanied by an ever shorter list of feasible cooperation initiatives.

In the shadow of history. Romanian-Moldovan relations. OSW Studies 53, September 2015

Romania and Moldova have developed very strong ties, resulting mainly from many years of common history (including joint statehood), language and cultural heritage. On the one hand, this closeness fosters bilateral relations, but on the other hand it places a serious burden upon them. This is because Moldovan statehood and identity has in some way been built in opposition to Romanian statehood and identity. Part of Moldovan society (especially the Russian-speaking minority) fears closer cooperation with Bucharest, seeing it as threatening a loss of independence and the declaration of unification with its western neighbour. Historic sentiment is also reflected in Bucharest’s policy towards Moldova. Officially, relations with Chisinau are considered as exceptional, and representatives of the Romanian political class are full of declarations of assistance and support for their eastern neighbour, appealing to the national, cultural and linguistic community. In practice, however, Romanian policy towards Moldova (and hence also the two countries’ bilateral relations) is most often shaped not by sentiment but by political pragmatism, resulting among others from a desire to win the support of the Romanian electorate.

Europe's refugee/migrant crisis: can 'illiberal' Turkey save 'liberal Europe' while helping Syrian refugees? EPC Policy Brief, 19 February 2016

Turkish democracy today has lost much of its shine. As the Turkish government continues to backtrack on reforms and infringe on basic freedoms, the country is beginning to look more and more like an ‘illiberal democracy’ at best. Ironically, as one of the most important destination and transit countries for Syrian refugees, it is also still uniquely positioned to help the EU deal with the current refugee crisis. In November 2015, the EU and Turkey signed a Joint Action Plan to better manage the situation, but both parties have fallen short of their promises. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, one of the biggest supporters of closer EU-Turkey cooperation, had hoped that this would allow for the refugees to be admitted into Europe in a more controlled and orderly manner. But it seems she is standing alone in a Europe that is becoming increasingly more hostile towards newcomers, drifting further and further from the liberal values it stands for. In this Policy Brief, Kemal Kirişci discusses the ways in which Turkey, Germany and the EU in general could all benefit from closer cooperation on this issue: “With the right frame of mind and will, the current ‘illiberal Turkey’ could indeed help ‘liberal Europe’. In the long run this would be a ‘win-win’ for Germany, Turkey, and the EU – but most importantly, for the Syrian refugees.”

TTIP and Public Procurement: Going beyond the tip of the iceberg. CEPS Policy Brief No. 339, March 2016

Trade negotiations involving international public procurement rules are on the rise, stimulating a growing interest in having a clear picture of the economic stakes involved, including the current level of international openness. A recent paper published by the European Centre for International Political Economy (Messerlin, 2016) made an attempt to provide a range of estimates for the EU and the US and found relatively low rates of import penetration. This analytical approach, however, looked only at the ‘tip of the procurement iceberg’, as the data used covered primarily only one modality of international procurement (direct cross-border), which is not the main avenue for international government procurement. Other modalities, such as procurement from foreign subsidiaries established in Europe, account for much more. Such an approach therefore ignores the main modalities through which foreign firms win EU contracts. Once these other main procurement modalities are taken into account, EU openness in procurement is much higher. Comparable data across all modalities do not yet exist for the US, but we do have clear evidence that the US has introduced the largest number of protectionist procurement measures since 2008 affecting all modalities for international procurement. Against this background, this Policy Brief makes four basic points: i. Public procurement is a key area of trade negotiations, and TTIP is no exception to this rule. ii. The existing levels of openness in procurement markets need to be assessed across all three main procurement modalities and not based only on direct cross-border procurement, which is not the main procurement avenue. According to this comprehensive metric, the EU market already has a high foreign participation rate, including by US companies. iii. Unfortunately, similar data do not exist for the US market. But there is growing evidence of discriminatory measures introduced in recent years, which impede the ability of EU firms to compete on a level-playing field in US procurement markets. iv. The importance of procurement as a key negotiating area requires better data and a greater analytical engagement.

The Electoral Verdict and After: The Road Ahead for India. Asia Policy Brief 2014/04, June 2014

The convincing victory of the BJP in the 2014 Indian general elections came as a surprise to many. Most opinion polls, which had predicted a win for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) that it leads, had not anticipated the scale of the party’s victory. The BJP alone won 282 seats and the NDA 336 out of 543 seats in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of Parliament. Two things stand out in the verdict. This is the first time in 30 years that a party won a majority on its own; this is also the worst-ever showing by India’s grand old party, the Indian National Congress, which won a mere 44 seats, 70 less than its previous all-time low in 1999.

The Migration Crisis: A Stress Test for European Values. European Policy Brief No. 38, September 2015

Confronted by the current refugee crisis, most Member States are turning inwards. But migration will continue to rise in the future. Given that migration is an unstoppable trend, the EU has everything to win from turning this crisis into an opportunity for its own citizens and economy, for the refugees and migrants it hosts and for their countries of origin. The manner in which the EU addresses this challenge will truly prove if it can live up to its founding principles of human dignity, solidarity, freedom, democracy and equality. This policy brief summarises European measures taken in the last few months and proposes four key actions to create a well-framed European migration policy: effectively implementing the principle of solidarity and fair-sharing of responsibility between Member States; creating more legal entry and integration channels; addressing the root causes of migration; and broadcasting a constructive and positive narrative on migration.

Austria’s thrilling elections will have far-reaching impact on political developments in the EU. EPIN Commentary No. 32, May 2016

After a passionate two-day election, Alexander Van Der Bellen (supported by the Greens) narrowly defeated his far-right wing opponent, Norbert Hofer (Freedom Party of Austria or FPÖ), thereby becoming Austria’s new President (50.3% vs 49.7%). Notably, the ecologist candidate only managed to win thanks to the postal votes counted on the day after the polls closed, whereas anti-EU Hofer was still leading by some 144,000 votes on the previous evening. Such a narrow defeat is likely to have long-term implications for Austrian and European politics.

¿Qué se entiende por fútbol infantil? Críticas al modelo de enseñanza

Esta investigación está basada en el funcionamiento de las ligas de Fútbol Infantil en la ciudad de La Plata, con niños de edades comprendidas entre los 6 a 12 años, entendiendo al Fútbol Infantil como un deporte de ligas altamente competitivas sin tener en cuenta los intereses de los niños en función de la edad, o los contextos políticos y socioeconómicos en los cuales esos niños se desarrollan. El principal punto de observación fue conocer cómo se comportan los chicos en distintas situaciones que se plantean; realizarle críticas a ese Fútbol Infantil, tratando de explicar también lo que se entiende como fútbol dentro de la escuela. Para desarrollar este trabajo decidimos realizar observaciones en distintos clubes de las ligas de Fútbol Infantil de la ciudad de La Plata. Las mismas fueron realizadas durante el año 2013 para el Eje Fútbol de la materia Educación Física 2, correspondiente al segundo año del Profesorado Universitario en Educación Física de la Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación de la Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Luego utilizamos esas observaciones como insumo para el Trabajo Final de Promoción de la materia Educación Física 2. Del análisis de las observaciones realizadas tomamos para su desarrollo los siguientes aspectos: 1) relación entre el sujeto, sus compañeros, entrenadores y público; 2) aspectos psicológicos de los niños (dentro de un partido de Fútbol Infantil); 3) relación de los niños con los elementos del juego; 4) relación con las reglas. Nuestra investigación es de carácter cualitativo ya que decidimos darle un enfoque en el que se puedan describir las características y la particularidad que tienen las ligas infantiles de fútbol en la ciudad de La Plata 1 . La recolección de datos se realizó en distintos clubes pertenecientes a las ligas 2 . Hicimos distintas observaciones y encuestas a los padres y dirigentes. Además, se tuvieron en cuenta para el análisis las referencias bibliográficas obligatorias de la cátedra, a sugerencia de los docentes. Este tema obtuvo nuestra atención ya que consideramos que el funcionamiento de las ligas no parece ser el adecuado. Por ende el propósito de nuestro trabajo es demostrar esta afirmación por medio de diferentes situaciones que surgieron en las observaciones. También se observó que los adultos tratan como profesionales a los niños, deseando que sus hijos ganen a cualquier costo. Teniendo en cuenta lo planteado anteriormente, entenderíamos a la escuela como uno de los sitios principales donde se pueden practicar varios deportes, entre ellos el fútbol, ya que es masiva la concurrencia de niños de diferentes condiciones socioeconómicas. Una de las críticas que le podríamos dar a esta institución es que no se enseña este deporte ya que se da por sobreentendido que puede ser aprendido en diferentes espacios (plazas, clubes, colonias, etc.) debido a su popularidad y atracción. En el caso de la escuela, la enseñanza está a cargo de profesionales que tienen en cuenta el contexto económico, social y cultural de cada niño; a diferencia de un mero entrenador no profesional que, a pesar de sus conocimientos sobre el deporte, no tiene en cuenta las cuestiones antes mencionadas, que a nuestro entender son de vital importancia. Estas son las cuestiones que se observan según nuestro estudio en las ligas y con las cuales disentimos. Para finalizar consideramos que otros ítems podrían ser desarrollados pero son objeto de investigaciones futuras o de otras disciplinas, como por ejemplo la relación entre padres y niños al tratar que los mismos lleguen a ser profesionales cuando en realidad todavía se encuentran en una etapa de desarrollo, o por qué existe el prejuicio de que lo popular no necesita estudio o preparación dentro de la escuela