971 resultados para Bureaux de vote
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Ce mémoire de recherche se concentrera sur un phénomène en particulier : le fossé urbain - rural. Le terme de « fossé » a été privilégié à celui de « clivage ». En effet, un clivage, tout comme un fossé, correspond à une opposition observable, entre deux groupes sociaux, lors des votations fédérales. Lorsque celui-ci est nommé « urbain - rural », il correspondant à une opposition entre les communes urbaines et rurales. Pour des raisons de clarté et d'exactitude le terme de fossé urbain - rural sera gardé pour rendre compte, au plus juste, de l'opposition entre les communes urbaines et rurales dans le but de rester fidèle à l'observation du comportement de vote. Cette recherche empirique a deux ordres d'intérêt : politologique et scientifique (méthodologique). L'intérêt politologique est de répondre à la question, peu traitée dans la littérature en sciences sociales et administratives, de savoir si le fossé urbain - rural est un phénomène d'actualité dans l'explication du comportement de vote en Suisse. Si tel est le cas, il permettra de déterminer pour quels facteurs, liés à la démocratie directe, il est pertinent.
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This thesis consists of four articles and an introductory section. The main research questions in all the articles are about proportionality and party success in Europe, at European, national or district levels. Proportionality in this thesis denotes the proximity of seat shares parties receive compared to their respective vote shares, after the electoral system’s allocation process. This proportionality can be measured through numerous indices that illustrate either the overall proportionality of an electoral system or a particular election. The correspondence of a single party’s seat shares to its vote shares can also be measured. The overall proportionality is essential in three of the articles (1, 2 and 4), where the system’s performance is studied by means of plots. In article 3, minority party success is measured by advantage-ratios that reveal single party’s winnings or losses in the votes to seat allocation process. The first article asks how proportional are the European parliamentary (EP) electoral systems, how do they compare with results gained from earlier studies and how do the EP electoral systems treat different sized parties. The reasons for different outcomes are looked for in explanations given by traditional electoral studies i.e. electoral system variables. The countries studied (EU15) apply electoral systems that vary in many important aspects, even though a certain amount of uniformity has been aspired to for decades. Since the electoral systems of the EP elections closely resemble the national elections, the same kinds of profiles emerge as in the national elections. The electoral systems indeed treat the parties differentially and six different profile types can be found. The counting method seems to somewhat determine the profile group, but the strongest variables determining the shape of a countries’ profile appears to be the average district magnitude and number of seats allocated to each country. The second article also focuses on overall proportionality performance of an electoral system, but here the focus is on the impact of electoral system changes. I have developed a new method of visualizing some previously used indices and some new indices for this purpose. The aim is to draw a comparable picture of these electoral systems’ changes and their effects. The cases, which illustrate this method, are four elections systems, where a change has occurred in one of the system variables, while the rest remained unchanged. The studied cases include the French, Greek and British European parliamentary systems and the Swedish national parliamentary system. The changed variables are electoral type (plurality changed to PR in the UK), magnitude (France splitting the nationwide district into eight smaller districts), legal threshold (Greece introducing a three percent threshold) and counting method (d’Hondt was changed to modified Sainte-Laguë in Sweden). The radar plots from elections after and before the changes are drawn for all country cases. When quantifying the change, the change in the plots area that is created has also been calculated. Using these radar plots we can observe that the change in electoral system type, magnitude, and also to some extent legal threshold had an effect on overall proportionality and accessibility for small parties, while the change between the two highest averages counting method had none. The third article studies the success minority parties have had in nine electoral systems in European heterogeneous countries. This article aims to add more motivation as to why we should care how different sized parties are treated by the electoral systems. Since many of the parties that aspire to represent minorities in European countries are small, the possibilities for small parties are highlighted. The theory of consociational (or power-sharing) democracy suggests that, in heterogeneous societies, a proportional electoral system will provide the fairest treatment of minority parties. The OSCE Lund Recommendations propose a number of electoral system features, which would improve minority representation. In this article some party variables, namely the unity of the minority parties and the geographical concentration of the minorities were included among possible explanations. The conclusions are that the central points affecting minority success were indeed these non-electoral system variables rather than the electoral system itself. Moreover, the size of the party was a major factor governing success in all the systems investigated; large parties benefited in all the studied electoral systems. In the fourth article the proportionality profiles are again applied, but this time to district level results in Finnish parliamentary elections. The level of proportionality distortion is also studied by way of indices. The average magnitudes during the studied periodrange from 7.5 to 26.2 in the Finnish electoral districts and this opens up unequal opportunities for parties in different districts and affects the shape of the profiles. The intra-country case allows the focus to be placed on the effect of district magnitude, since all other electoral systems are kept constant in an intra-country study. The time span in the study is from 1962 to 2007, i.e. the time that the districts have largely been the same geographically. The plots and indices tell the same story, district magnitude and electoral alliances matter. The district magnitude is connected to the overall proportionality of the electoral districts according to both indices, and the profiles are, as expected, also closer to perfect proportionality in large districts. Alliances have helped some small parties to gain a much higher seat share than their respective vote share and these successes affect some of the profiles. The profiles also show a consistent pattern of benefits for the small parties who ally with the larger parties.
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In most democracies voting Advice Applications (VAAs) advising citizens which candidate or party they should vote for become more and more popular. It is therefore crucial to know more about the functioning and the effects of such tools. After some general remarks about the spread of these tools and their possible effects gathered so far in various studies, this paper presents the latest results from a research conducted in the course of the 2011 Swiss national elections. They confirm that VAAs can lead to better informed voters and are likely to have a positive impact on electoral turnout. Additionally it can be shown that the Swiss VAA smartvote made voters change their voting intention and that they voted for a different party. This was particularly advantageous for the Green Liberal Party. At the moment, only a minority of voters rely on the voting recommendation by smartvote. This might change dramatically with the introduction of e-voting. Once people can vote electronically, there are hardly any possibilities to prevent voters from transferring their selection of candidates based on the recommendation given by a VAA into the official electronic ballot paper. If this is possible, e-voting will become more popular than postal voting.
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Two voters must choose between two alternatives. Voters vote in a fixed linear order. If there is not unanimity for any alternative, the procedure is repeated. At every stage, each voter prefers the same alternative to the other, has utilities decreasing with stages, and has an impatience degree representing when it is worth voting for the non-preferred alternative now rather than waiting for the next stage and voting for the preferred alternative. Intuition suggests that the more patient voter will get his preferred alternative. I found that in the unique solution of the sequential voting procedure obtained by backward induction, the first voter get his preferred alternative at the first stage independently from his impatience rate. Keywords: sequential voting, impatience rate, multi-stage voting, unanimity
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1867/10 (SER3,T1).
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1868 (SER3,T3).
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Etat de collection : 3e s., t. 1 (1867, oct.-déc.) ; t. 3 (1868, juil.-déc.) ; t. 5 (1869, juil.-déc.) ; t. 7 (1870, juil.-août)
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1869/07/03 (A18,SER3,T5)-1869/09/25.
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1870/07/02 (A19,SER3,T7)-1870/08/27.
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A relação entre direito e moral é a clef de voûte do problema da justificação do direito. De fato, a ocupação filosófica com a justificação do direito porta conexão com a moral, como, por exemplo, em Kant, Dworkin, Alexy, Rawls. Pretende-se apresentar o papel desempenhado pela ética discursiva na fundamentação do direito proposta por Habermas. Apesar de Habermas dispor de uma moral cognitivista e ter apresentado uma fundamentação para o princípio de universalização próprio para a mesma, tal princípio parece ter desaparecido do empreendimento tardio de fundamentação da correção jurídica. Tal acusação é endereçada a Habermas exemplarmente por Apel, Kettner e Heck. Pretende-se sustentar, no presente trabalho, especialmente contra Apel, que a moral discursiva não desaparece do empreendimento de fundamentação do direito, sendo apenas redefinido o papel que ela desempenha nesta tarefa, embora em um sentido mais forte do que Habermas pretende reconhecer. De fato, Habermas parece atribuir à moral um papel negativo na justificação do direito. Pretende-se defender que os direitos morais não cumprem uma função somente negativa no procedimento de justificação do direito, por mais importante que seja tal função assim concebida, seja porque tais direitos passam, de alguma forma, a compor a forma jurídica e mesmo os direitos básicos, seja porque a própria tese da complementaridade parece exigir que o direito positive a moral.
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1846/10 (A6,N10).
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1845/05 (A5,N5).
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1845/02 (A5,N2).
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1846/07 (A6,N7).
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1846/02 (A6,N2).
