Gathering support from rivals: the two rivals case


Autoria(s): Bannikova, Marina
Contribuinte(s)

Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia

Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública

Data(s)

2014

Resumo

Two voters must choose between two alternatives. Voters vote in a fixed linear order. If there is not unanimity for any alternative, the procedure is repeated. At every stage, each voter prefers the same alternative to the other, has utilities decreasing with stages, and has an impatience degree representing when it is worth voting for the non-preferred alternative now rather than waiting for the next stage and voting for the preferred alternative. Intuition suggests that the more patient voter will get his preferred alternative. I found that in the unique solution of the sequential voting procedure obtained by backward induction, the first voter get his preferred alternative at the first stage independently from his impatience rate. Keywords: sequential voting, impatience rate, multi-stage voting, unanimity

Formato

13 p.

Identificador

http://hdl.handle.net/2072/246960

Idioma(s)

eng

Publicador

Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia

Relação

Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2014-26

Direitos

info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/

Fonte

RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya)

Palavras-Chave #Vot #Decisió, Presa de #32 - Política #33 - Economia
Tipo

info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper