Environmental management problems, future generations and social decisions

The decisions of many individuals and social groups, taking according to well-defined objectives, are causing serious social and environmental problems, in spite of following the dictates of economic rationality. There are many examples of serious problems for which there are not yet appropriate solutions, such as management of scarce natural resources including aquifer water or the distribution of space among incompatible uses. In order to solve these problems, the paper first characterizes the resources and goods involved from an economic perspective. Then, for each case, the paper notes that there is a serious divergence between individual and collective interests and, where possible, it designs the procedure for solving the conflict of interests. With this procedure, the real opportunities for the application of economic theory are shown, and especially the theory on collective goods and externalities. The limitations of conventional economic analysis are shown and the opportunity to correct the shortfalls is examined. Many environmental problems, such as climate change, have an impact on different generations that do not participate in present decisions. The paper shows that for these cases, the solutions suggested by economic theory are not valid. Furthermore, conventional methods of economic valuation (which usually help decision-makers) are unable to account for the existence of different generations and tend to obviate long-term impacts. The paper analyzes how economic valuation methods could account for the costs and benefits enjoyed by present and future generations. The paper studies an appropriate consideration of preferences for future consumption and the incorporation of sustainability as a requirement in social decisions, which implies not only more efficiency but also a fairer distribution between generations than the one implied by conventional economic analysis.

Educació en valors i formació docent. La diversitat com a valor

La reflexió sobre la meva pràctica educativa m’ha portat a endinsar-me en el món de la diversitat i de l’educació en valors, i preguntar-me sobre la seva ubicació en la formació docent. L’enfocament d’aquestes qüestions s’ha realitzat des de l’òptica de la persona. Des d’ella s’han buscat uns eixos vertebradors mínims que haurien d’estar presents tant en tot plantejament educatiu concret, com en la legislació en matèria educativa i en els plans de formació del professorat. Aquests eixos vertebradors s’han articulat en una tipologia de valors formada pel valor de la persona, des del qual sorgeixen el valor de l’educació, els valors de la democràcia i el valor de la utopia. El que he realitzat en aquesta recerca ha estat analitzar la legislació educativa i els plans d’estudi de formació de mestres de les universitats de Catalunya a partir de quatre grups d’indicadors que pretenen l’estudi del seu marc contextual, del vocabulari utilitzat –concretament els termes “ètica”, “moral” i “valor”-, del tractament de la diversitat –a partir del territori i la classe social, l’ètnia, el gènere i les necessitats educatives especials-, i de l’enfocament de l’educació en valors –segons la tipologia anteriorment apuntada-.

Stock market volatility and learning

Introducing bounded rationality in a standard consumption-based asset pricing model with time separable preferences strongly improves empirical performance. Learning causes momentum and mean reversion of returns and thereby excess volatility, persistence of price-dividend ratios, long-horizon return predictability and a risk premium, as in the habit model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999), but for lower risk aversion. This is obtained, even though our learning scheme introduces just one free parameter and we only consider learning schemes that imply small deviations from full rationality. The findings are robust to the learning rule used and other model features. What is key is that agents forecast future stock prices using past information on prices.

La Mecánica de la imaginación escenográfica

La presente investigación pretende hacer una exploración de aquellos mecanismos que se accionan en la imaginación del escenógrafo y por medio de los cuales, se desarrollan las soluciones creativas en la producción de atmósferas sensoriales. Basando los estudios en el análisis temático de una obra planteada, en éste cazo “La señora en su balcón” de Elena Garro, así como también en el proceso que se realiza para la creación de una propuesta (El trabajo con las emociones, el análisis contextual tanto de la obra como del público a quien estará dirigida, los factores que intervienen al momento de formular una selección de aplicaciones efectivas que derivarán posteriormente en soluciones espaciales y finalmente la proyección de tres propuestas comparables para exponer su funcionamiento). Se mostrarán las potenciales capacidades de éste fenómeno efímero que es la mecánica de la imaginación escenográfica y su incursión en el campo de la causalidad.

A Model of Near-Rational Exuberance

We study how the use of judgement or “add-factors” in forecasting may disturb the set of equilibrium outcomes when agents learn using recursive methods. We isolate conditions under which new phenomena, which we call exuberance equilibria, can exist in a standard self-referential environment. Local indeterminacy is not a requirement for existence. We construct a simple asset pricing example and find that exuberance equilibria, when they exist, can be extremely volatile relative to fundamental equilibria.

Sex biased spatial strategies relying on the integration of multimodal cues in a rat model of schizophrenia: impairment in predicting future context?

Male and female Wistar rats were treated postnatally (PND 5-16) with BSO (l-buthionine-(S,R)-sulfoximine) to provide a rat model of schizophrenia based on transient glutathione deficit. In the watermaze, BSO-treated male rats perform very efficiently in conditions where a diversity of visual information is continuously available during orientation trajectories [1]. Our hypothesis is that the treatment impairs proactive strategies anticipating future sensory information, while supporting a tight visual adjustment on memorized snapshots, i.e. compensatory reactive strategies. To test this hypothesis, BSO rats' performance was assessed in two conditions using an 8-arm radial maze task: a semi-transparent maze with no available view on the environment from maze centre [2], and a modified 2-parallel maze known to induce a neglect of the parallel pair in normal rats [3-5]. Male rats, but not females, were affected by the BSO treatment. In the semi-transparent maze, BSO males expressed a higher error rate, especially in completing the maze after an interruption. In the 2-parallel maze shape, BSO males, unlike controls, expressed no neglect of the parallel arms. This second result was in accord with a reactive strategy using accurate memory images of the contextual environment instead of a representation based on integrating relative directions. These results are coherent with a treatment-induced deficit in proactive decision strategy based on multimodal cognitive maps, compensated by accurate reactive adaptations based on the memory of local configurations. Control females did not express an efficient proactive capacity in the semi-transparent maze, neither did they show the significant neglect of the parallel arms, which might have masked the BSO induced effect. Their reduced sensitivity to BSO treatment is discussed with regard to a sex biased basal cognitive style.

Moody choice

If choices depend on the decision maker's mood, is the attempt to derive any consistency in choice doomed? In this paper we argue that, even with full unpredictability of mood, the way choices from a menu relate to choices from another menu exhibits some structure. We present two alternative models of 'moody choice' and show that, in either of them, not all choice patterns are possible. Indeed, we characterise both models in terms of consistency requirements of the observed choice data.

A Salience Theory of Choice Errors

We study a psychologically based foundation for choice errors. The decision maker applies a preference ranking after forming a 'consideration set' prior to choosing an alternative. Membership of the consideration set is determined both by the alternative specific salience and by the rationality of the agent (his general propensity to consider all alternatives). The model turns out to include a logit formulation as a special case. In general, it has a rich set of implications both for exogenous parameters and for a situation in which alternatives can a¤ect their own salience (salience games). Such implications are relevant to assess the link between 'revealed' preferences and 'true' preferences: for example, less rational agents may paradoxically express their preference through choice more truthfully than more rational agents.

Finite Horizon Learning

Incorporating adaptive learning into macroeconomics requires assumptions about how agents incorporate their forecasts into their decision-making. We develop a theory of bounded rationality that we call finite-horizon learning. This approach generalizes the two existing benchmarks in the literature: Eulerequation learning, which assumes that consumption decisions are made to satisfy the one-step-ahead perceived Euler equation; and infinite-horizon learning, in which consumption today is determined optimally from an infinite-horizon optimization problem with given beliefs. In our approach, agents hold a finite forecasting/planning horizon. We find for the Ramsey model that the unique rational expectations equilibrium is E-stable at all horizons. However, transitional dynamics can differ significantly depending upon the horizon.

Stochastic Choice and Consideration Sets

We model a boundedly rational agent who suffers from limited attention. The agent considers each feasible alternative with a given (unobservable) probability, the attention parameter, and then chooses the alternative that maximises a preference relation within the set of considered alternatives. We show that this random choice rule is the only one for which the impact of removing an alternative on the choice probability of any other alternative is asymmetric and menu independent. Both the preference relation and the attention parameters are identi fied uniquely by stochastic choice data.

Efficient Nash Equilibrium under Adverse Selection

This paper revisits the problem of adverse selection in the insurance market of Rothschild and Stiglitz [28]. We propose a simple extension of the game-theoretic structure in Hellwig [14] under which Nash-type strategic interaction between the informed customers and the uninformed firms results always in a particular separating equilibrium. The equilibrium allocation is unique and Pareto-efficient in the interim sense subject to incentive-compatibility and individual rationality. In fact, it is the unique neutral optimum in the sense of Myerson [22].

How private is private information? The ability to spot deception in an economic game

We provide experimental evidence on the ability to detect deceit in a buyer-seller game with asymmetric information. Sellers have private information about the buyer's valuation of a good and sometimes have incentives to mislead buyers. We examine if buyers can spot deception in face-to-face encounters. We vary (1) whether or not the buyer can interrogate the seller, and (2) the contextual richness of the situation. We find that the buyers' prediction accuracy is above chance levels, and that interrogation and contextual richness are important factors determining the accuracy. These results show that there are circumstances in which part of the information asymmetry is eliminated by people's ability to spot deception.

Imperfect Attention and Menu Evaluation

We model the choice behaviour of an agent who suffers from imperfect attention. We define inattention axiomatically through preference over menus and endowed alternatives: an agent is inattentive if it is better to be endowed with an alternative a than to be allowed to pick a from a menu in which a is is the best alternative. This property and vNM rationality on the domain of menus and alternatives imply that the agent notices each alternative with a given menu-dependent probability (attention parameter) and maximises a menu independent utility function over the alternatives he notices. Preference for flexibility restricts the model to menu independent attention parameters as in Manzini and Mariotti [19]. Our theory explains anomalies (e.g. the attraction and compromise effect) that the Random Utility Model cannot accommodate.

Competing for Attention: Is the Showiest also the Best?

We introduce attention games. Alternatives ranked by quality (producers, politicians, sexual partners...) desire to be chosen and compete for the imperfect attention of a chooser by investing in their own salience. We prove that if alternatives can control the attention they get, then ”the showiest is the best”: the equilibrium ordering of salience (weakly) reproduces the quality ranking and the best alternative is the one that gets picked most often. This result also holds under more general conditions. However, if those conditions fail, then even the worst alternative can be picked most often.

Decision making in a human population living sustainably

The Tiwi people of northern Australia have managed natural resources continuously for 6000-8000 years. Tiwi management objectives and outcomes may reflect how they gather information about the environment. We qualitatively analyzed Tiwi documents and management techniques to examine the relation between the social and physical environment of decision makers and their decision-making strategies. We hypothesized that principles of bounded rationality, namely, the use of efficient rules to navigate complex decision problems, explain how Tiwi managers use simple decision strategies (i.e., heuristics) to make robust decisions. Tiwi natural resource managers reduced complexity in decision making through a process that gathers incomplete and uncertain information to quickly guide decisions toward effective outcomes. They used management feedback to validate decisions through an information loop that resulted in long-term sustainability of environmental use. We examined the Tiwi decision-making processes relative to management of barramundi (Lates calcarifer) fisheries and contrasted their management with the state government's management of barramundi. Decisions that enhanced the status of individual people and their attainment of aspiration levels resulted in reliable resource availability for Tiwi consumers. Different decision processes adopted by the state for management of barramundi may not secure similarly sustainable outcomes.