The politics of temporary work deregulation in Europe: solving the French puzzle

Temporary work has expanded in the last three decades with adverse implications for inequalities. Because temporary workers are a constituency that is unlikely to impose political costs, governments often choose to reduce temporary work regulations. While most European countries have indeed implemented such reforms, France went in the opposite direction, despite having both rigid labour markets and high unemployment. My argument to solve this puzzle is that where replaceability is high, workers in permanent and temporary contracts have overlapping interests, and governments choose to regulate temporary work to protect permanent workers. In turn, replaceability is higher where permanent workers’ skills are general and wage coordination is low. Logistic regression analysis of the determinants of replaceability — and how this affects governments’ reforms of temporary work regulations — supports my argument. Process tracing of French reforms also confirm that the left has tightened temporary work regulations to compensate for the high replaceability.

Regulating vertical relations in the presence of retailer differentiation costs

We discuss public policy towards vertical relations, comparing different types of contracts between a manufacturer and a maximum of two retailers. Together with (potential) price competition between the retailers, we study the role of a (sunk) differentiation cost paid by them in order to relax competition in the retail market and broaden the market potential of the distributed product. This non-price competition element in the downstream market is responsible for our conclusion that, unlike in standard policy guidelines and previous theoretical analysis, restrictions in intra-brand competition may deserve a permissive treatment even in the absence of inter-brand competition, if retailer differentiation is costly.

Administrative costs of regulation and foreign direct investment: evidence from Standard Cost Model implementation in non-OECD countries

In recent years both developed and developing countries have experienced an increasing number of government initiatives dedicated to reducing the administrative costs (AC) imposed on businesses by regulation. We use a bi-linear fixed-effects model to analyze the extent to which government initiatives to reduce AC through the Standard Cost Model (SCM) attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) among 32 developing countries. Controlling for standard determinants of the SCM, we find that the SCM in most cases leads to higher FDI and that the benefits are more significant where the SCM has been implemented for a longer period.

Interregional migration 'wage premia': the case of creative and science and technology graduates in the UK

We analyze the migration behavior of graduates from UK universities with a focus on the salary benefits they receive from the migration process. We focus on sequential interregional migration and specifically examine the case of Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) and Creative subject graduates. Our analysis differs from previous studies in that it accounts explicitly for migrant selectivity through propensity score matching, and it also classifies graduates into different migration behavior categories. Graduates were classified according to their sequential migration behavior first from their pre-university domicile to university and then from university to first job post-graduation. Our results show that ‘repeat migration’, as expected, is associated with the highest wage premium (around 15%). Other migration behaviors are also advantageous although this varies across different types of graduates. Creative graduates, for instance, do not benefit much from migration behaviors other than repeat migration. STEM graduates, on the contrary, benefit from both late migration and staying in the university area to work.

Transaction costs, information technologies and the choice of marketplace among farmers in Northern Ghana

Using a transactions costs framework, we examine the impact of information and communication technologies (mobile phones and radios) use on market participation in developing country agricultural markets using a novel transaction-level data set of Ghanaian farmers. Our analysis of the choice of markets by farmers suggests that market information from a broader range of markets may not always induce farmers to sell in more distant markets; instead farmers may use broader market information to enhance their bargaining power in closer markets. Finally, we find weak evidence on the impact of using mobile phones in attracting farm gate buyers.

Distraction control processes in free recall: benefits and costs to performance

How is semantic memory influenced by individual differences under conditions of distraction? This question was addressed by observing how visual target words—drawn from a single category—were recalled whilst ignoring spoken distracter words that were either members of the same, or members of a different (single) category. Working memory capacity (WMC) was related to disruption only with synchronous, not asynchronous, presentation and distraction was greater when the words were presented synchronously. Subsequent experiments found greater negative priming of distracters amongst individuals with higher WMC but this may be dependent on targets and distracters being comparable category exemplars. With less dominant category members as distracters, target recall was impaired – relative to control – only amongst individuals with low WMC. The results highlight the role of cognitive control resources in target-distracter selection and the individual-specific cost implications of such cognitive control.

Two-way communication costs and the boundaries of the firm

Casson and Wadeson (International Journal of the Economics of Business, 1998, 5, pp. 5-27) have modelled the dialogue, or conversation, which customers have with their suppliers in order to convey their requirements, while taking production implications into account. They showed that this has important implications for the positioning of the boundaries of the firm. Unfortunately, their model has the restriction that communication is only costly in the direction of customer to supplier. This paper extends their model by introducing two-way communication costs. It shows that the level of communication cost in the direction of supplier to customer is a key additional factor in determining the nature of the dialogue that takes place. It also shows that this has important additional implications for the positioning of the boundaries of the firm. Custom computer software development is used as an example of an application of the theory.

Communication costs and the boundaries of the firm

Much has been written about where the boundaries of the firm are drawn, but little about what occurs at the boundaries themselves. When a firm subcontracts, does it inform its suppliers fully of what it requires, or is it willing to accept what they have available? In practice firms often engage in a dialogue, or conversation, with their suppliers, in which at first they set out their general requirements, and only when the supplier reports back on how these can be met are their more specific requirements set out. This paper models such conversations as a rational response to communication costs. The model is used to examine the impact of new information technology, such as CAD/CAM, on the conduct of subcontracting. It can also be used to examine its impact on the marketing activities of firms. The technique of analysis, which is based on the economic theory of teams, has more general applications too. It can be used to model all the forms of dialogue involved in the processes of coordination both within and between firms.

Risks, costs and labour markets: explaining cross-national patterns of far right party success in European Parliament elections

What is the impact of the economy on cross national variation in far right-wing party support? This paper tests several hypotheses from existing literature on the results of the last three EP elections in all EU member states. We conceptualise the economy affects support because unemployment heightens the risks and costs that the population faces, but this is crucially mediated by labour market institutions. Findings from multiple regression analyses indicate that unemployment, real GDP growth, debt and deficits have no statistically significant effect on far right-wing party support at the national level. By contrast, labour markets influence costs and risks: where unemployment benefits and dismissal regulations are high, unemployment has no effect, but where either one of them is low, unemployment leads to higher far right-wing party support. This explains why unemployment has not led to far right-wing party support in some European countries that experienced the 2008 Eurozone crisis.

Mobile phones and radios: effects on transactions costs and market participation for households in Northern Ghana

The literature on agricultural markets suggests that transactions costs are the main obstacles preventing households from participating in agricultural markets. We examine the impact of the recent massive penetration of information communication technologies (ICTs), particularly mobile phones and radios, in developing countries to investigate the role of information in economic transactions and participation in food crop markets. To fully capture market participation behaviours, the current theoretical framework on market participation and transactions costs is extended to include those households that sell and buy in the same time period. We correct for endogeneity and selectivity throughout our models. We used a novel dataset of 393 households in northern Ghana with detailed information on market transactions and ICTs usage. Results show that receiving market information via mobile phones has a positive and significant impact on market participation, with a greater impact for households with a surplus of food crops. We find that radios have a larger impact on the quantity traded. This may reflect the nature of mobile phones in reducing searching costs, whereas radios provide an updated and regular flow of information which affects the pattern of crops consumed and sold. We also emphasise that the most significant factor is how ICTs are used, rather than their ownership.

Marine protected areas in artisanal fisheries: a spatial bio-economic model based on observations in Costa Rica and Tanzania

In many lower-income countries, the establishment of marine protected areas (MPAs) involves significant opportunity costs for artisanal fishers, reflected in changes in how they allocate their labor in response to the MPA. The resource economics literature rarely addresses such labor allocation decisions of artisanal fishers and how, in turn, these contribute to the impact of MPAs on fish stocks, yield, and income. This paper develops a spatial bio-economic model of a fishery adjacent to a village of people who allocate their labor between fishing and on-shore wage opportunities to establish a spatial Nash equilibrium at a steady state fish stock in response to various locations for no-take zone MPAs and managed access MPAs. Villagers’ fishing location decisions are based on distance costs, fishing returns, and wages. Here, the MPA location determines its impact on fish stocks, fish yield, and villager income due to distance costs, congestion, and fish dispersal. Incorporating wage labor opportunities into the framework allows examination of the MPA’s impact on rural incomes, with results determining that win-wins between yield and stocks occur in very different MPA locations than do win-wins between income and stocks. Similarly, villagers in a high-wage setting face a lower burden from MPAs than do those in low-wage settings. Motivated by issues of central importance in Tanzania and Costa Rica, we impose various policies on this fishery – location specific no-take zones, increasing on-shore wages, and restricting MPA access to a subset of villagers – to analyze the impact of an MPA on fish stocks and rural incomes in such settings.

Recovering the counterfactual wage distribution with selective return migration

This paper recovers the distribution of wages for Mexican-born workers living in the U.S. if no return migration of Mexican-born workers occurred. Because migrants self-select in the decision to return, the overarching problem addressed by this study is the use of an estimator that also accounts for selection on unobservables. I find that Mexican returnees are middle- to high-wage earners at all levels of educational attainment. Taking into account self-selection in return migration, wages would be approximately 7.7% higher at the median and 4.5% higher at the mean. Owing to positive self-selection, the immigrant-native wage gap would, therefore, partially close if there was no return migration.

Coordination, inclusiveness and wage inequality between median and bottom income workers

What explains cross-national variation in wage inequality? Research in comparative political economy stresses the importance of the welfare state and wage coordination in reducing not only disposable income inequality but also gross earnings inequality. However, the cross-national variation in gross earnings inequality between median and low income workers is at odds with this conventional wisdom: the German coordinated market economy is now more unequal in this type of inequality than the UK, a liberal market economy. To solve this puzzle, I argue that non-inclusive coordination benefits median but not bottom income workers and is as a result associated with higher – rather than lower - wage inequality. I find support for this argument using a large N quantitative analysis of wage inequality in a panel of Western European countries. Results are robust to the inclusion of numerous controls, country fixed effects, and also hold with a sample of OECD countries. Taken together these findings force us to reconsider the relationship between coordination and wage inequality at the bottom of the income distribution.