El proceso electoral de 1917 en la provincia de Buenos Aires y el triunfo de la U.C.R.

El 24 de abril de 1917 se dictó el decreto de intervención federal a la provincia de Buenos Aires. Producido este hecho, las diversas fuerzas políticas se prepararon para participar en las elecciones de gobernador y legisladores que habrían de realizarse en marzo de 1918, pero fue en el radicalismo donde el proceso habría de ser realmente complicado. Arribada la UCR al poder a través de la intervención y con claras perspectivas de llegar al gobierno, rápidamente se pudo contemplar que, dentro de la misma y sin llegar a la ruptura, se formaron dos líneas claramente contrapuestas que se denominaron provincialistas, origen en parte del antipersonalismo provincial, y los metropolitanos. Luego de un arduo proceso, con activa participación de Yrigoyen, se llegó a dar consenso a la fórmula Crotto-Monteverde, que habría de imponerse sobre los conservadores y socialistas, pero que dejó abierto el camino para las fuertes luchas intrapartidarias del radicalismo

La Nueva Ley Electoral y las representaciones sobre la juventud

Fil: Bonaparte, Adrián. Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación; Argentina.

Las elecciones en la provincia de Buenos Aires (1910-1918) y la reforma de la ley electoral de 1913

El 1º de febrero de 1912 fue promulgada la Ley Sáenz Peña que establecía, como una novedad para el sistema electoral nacional, el voto obligatorio y secreto. La provincia de Buenos Aires no adoptó tal cual dicha ley, luego de un largo debate, promulgó su propia ley electoral, que sirvió de instrumento al partido Conservador para mantenerse en el poder, hasta 1917 cuando el presidente Yrigoyen decretó la intervención federal. El objetivo del presente trabajo es ver cómo la ley bonaerense sirvió a los propósitos conservadores, y cómo, con la intervención, los radicales lograron imponerse en la provincia de Buenos Aires.

Microsociología de la(s) significacio(nes) política(s) : El discurso político mediático y la estrategia electoral. Un estudio de caso

Fil: Lacchini, Ana Julia. Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación; Argentina.

Opinión pública y comportamiento electoral : De las opiniones al voto

¿Los ciudadanos votan igual a como opinan? Este trabajo parte de observar que, tanto las teorizaciones acerca de la opinión pública, como los estudios del comportamiento electoral, generalmente suponen una igualdad o linealidad en la relación entre opinión y voto, lo que equivale a sostener que las personas se comportan tal cual a como opinan. En este sentido, las diferentes corrientes dentro del campo de estudios de la opinión pública y de las teorías que procuran comprender el comportamiento de voto, han tendido a equiparar ambos conceptos. Con el objetivo de explorar y cuestionar este supuesto, este trabajo se propone describir la relación opinión pública ? comportamiento electoral a través del desarrollo conceptual de la opinión pública y en el campo teórico de la investigación del voto, presentando las diferentes formas en que se fue dando la vinculación opinión-voto e indagando sobre los avances en perspectivas analíticas que logran poner de manifiesto que ambos conceptos no necesariamente se corresponden

Social cleavages and electoral support in Turkey -- toward convergence?

Studies on Western democracies have shown that deep-seated social cleavages stabilize the electoral behavior and thus reduce electoral volatility. But how do social cleavages affect a party system that is undergoing democratic consolidation, such as in Turkey? In this study, investigations were carried out on long- and short-term relationships between social cleavages (religiosity, ethnicity, and sectarism) and electoral volatility in Turkey during the 1961-2002 period. Cross-sectional multiple regressions were applied to electoral and demographic data at the provincial level. The results showed that in the long-term, social cleavages on the whole have increased volatility rather than reduced it. The cleavage-volatility relationship, however, has changed over time. Repeated elections have mitigated the volatile effect of social cleavages on the voting behavior, as political parties have become more representative of the existent social cleavages.

Frontiers of the New Economic Geography

This paper presents an overview of recent development in the new economic geography (NEG), and discusses possible directions of its future development. Since there already exist several surveys on this topic, we focus on the selected features of the NEG which are important yet have attracted insufficient attention, and also on the recent refinements and extensions of the framework.

Transport Development and the Evolution of Economic Geography

In this paper, based on the recent advances in the new economic geography (e.g., Fujita, Krugman and Venables [12]), we analyze impacts of transport costs on the spatial patterns of economic agglomeration. We first identify prototypes from the existing models, and explain the mechanism of how transport costs influence the balance between economic forces of agglomeration and dispersion. We then investigate the transformation of the agglomeration/dispersion patterns given gradually decreasing transport costs for different goods.

Economic voting and electoral volatility in Turkish provinces

Two groups of questions were addressed in this paper: (1) Is voter punishment of the incumbent the primary factor in electoral volatility? Are there any other types of vote swings that underlie volatility? (2) In general, does a decline in economic growth destabilize voter behavior? If so, what kinds of vote swings does an economic downturn tend to generate? Provincial-level panel data analysis yielded the following results: (1) Changes in volatility is primarily due to vote swings from the incumbent to the opposition and also to and from left-wing and right-wing parties. (2) Lower economic growth increases electoral volatility. Economic decline induces vote swings not only from the government to the opposition but also from left-wing to right-wing parties. This is probably because right-wing parties seem more concerned with economic issues and are thus more popular than left-wing parties with lower-income voters.

Introduction New Challenges in New Economic Geography

2009年度調査研究報告書

Establishing electoral administration systems in new democracies

The difficulty of holding fair elections continues to be a critical problem in many newly democratized countries. The core of the problem is the electoral administration's lack of political autonomy and capability to regulate fraud. This paper seeks to identify the conditions for establishing an autonomous and capable electoral administration system. An electoral administration system has two main functions: to disclose the nature of elections and to prevent fraud. We argue in this paper that an autonomous and capable electoral administration system exists if the major political players have the incentive to disclose the information on the elections and to secure the ruler's credible commitment to fair elections. We examine this argument through comparative case studies of Korea and the Philippines. Despite similar historical and institutional settings, their election commissions exhibit contrasting features. The difference in the incentive structures of the major political players seems to have caused the divergence in the institutional evolution of the election commissions in the two countries.

The stakes of politics and electoral administration : a comparative study of Southeast Asian democracies

Elections play a crucial role in political stability in post-democratization, and electoral administrations are the key to the electoral process. However, not all newly democratized countries have established reliable electoral administration. New democracies in Southeast Asia, such as the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand, have independent election commissions which have different characteristics, especially in terms of neutrality. Based on three cases, this paper claims that the stakes of politics are the major determinant of the variations in neutrality. The high stakes of politics in Thailand brought about the partisan election commission, while the low stakes in Indonesia made the electoral system relatively neutral. Like Thailand, the high stakes of politics in the Philippines also cause political intervention in the electoral administration.

Partition, independence, and population geography in Bengal

This study quantitatively explores the changing population geography in Bengal, with a particular focus on Partition in India in 1947 and Independence of Bangladesh in 1971. Based on decadal census data from 1901 to 2001 at the district level, this paper explores how trends in regional population growth evolved with such historical events. Following Redding and Sturm (2008), Differences-in-Differences estimation is also employed. Estimation results show that there were different shocks on both sides and from both events. In West Bengal, the change in the regional population trends occurred in 1947 and remained similar thereafter. On the other hand, in East Bengal, the population growth became statistically significant after 1971. Further robustness checks show that the impacts were not uniform with respect to the distance from the border. Overall analyses show that the emergence of the international border in Bengal had asymmetric impacts on both sides.

Análisis de las propuestas de reforma del sistema electoral en España

En este estudio se analiza el sistema electoral español tratando de diagnosticar las causas de su falta de proporcionalidad entre votos y escaños. Se muestra que la causa principal de ello es la pequeña magnitud de las circunscripciones en España y se desmonta el mito de la barrera legal como impedimento para acceder al Congreso, señalando que es mucho más efectiva la barrera natural que aparece al tener España un número muy elevado de circunscripciones de baja magnitud. Posteriormente se analizan las distintas propuestas de reforma del sistema electoral encaminadas a aumentar su proporcionalidad extrapolándolas de los resultados electorales de las elecciones generales de 2015. También se analizan las dificultades para sacar adelante dichas propuestas, siendo la mayor de ellas que muchas de las propuestas exigen un cambio constitucional. Sin embargo, también se señala que algunas fórmulas que no exigen cambio constitucional pueden alcanzar incluso mayor proporcionalidad. Finalmente se comparan las distintas propuestas de reforma del sistema electoral y se advierte del peligro que conlleva una proporcionalidad muy elevada. Ésta, en general, da origen a un parlamento permanentemente fragmentado y puede generar una gran inestabilidad en los gobiernos.