The Political Economy of Constitutional Choice: A Study of the 2005 Kenyan Constitutional Referendum

Recent studies of the linkages between the wealth of nations and the institutions of governance suggest that concentrating political power in a monarchy or a ruling coalition impedes economic growth and, moreover, that while power-diffusing reforms can enhance the wellbeing of society in general, opposition by groups benefitting from the status quo is predictable. In November 2005, Kenyans rejected a proposed constitution that, despite promises made by their new chief executive, would not have lessened the powers of the presidency. Using a unique, constituency-level dataset on the referendum vote, we estimate a model of the demand for power diffusion and find that ethnic groups' voting decisions are influenced by their expected gains and losses from constitutional change. The results also highlights the importance of ethnic divisions in hindering the power-diffusion process, and thus establish a channel through which ethnic fragmentation adversely impacts economic development.

A Model of Rights

In this paper, we develop a simple model of the rights a government provides its citizenry. Rights are treated as public goods and taken as primitives in agents utility functions; each agent has preferences over the entire policy vector. We model the interaction among citi-zens and the government as a game in which an exogenous lobbying set makes contributions to the government to in uence policy formu-lation in the matter of rights. When examining contribution schedules comprising truthful Nash strategies, we find that members of the lob-bying set obtain rights closer to their most-preferred bundle, while the rights of non-lobbyers further diverge from their most-preferred bun-dle. Further, if the lobbying set comprises the entire population, the government s allocation of rights does not differ from the allocation achieved in the absence of contributions.

The Moderating Role of Electoral Pressure on Congressional Ideological Polarization: A Cross-Sectional Time-Series Analysis

Reelection and self-interest are recurring themes in the study of our congressional leaders. To date, many studies have already been done on the trends between elections, party affiliation, and voting behavior in Congress. However, because a plethora of data has been collected on both elections and congressional voting, the ability to draw a connection between the two provides a very reasonable prospect. This project analyzes whether voting shifts in congressional elections have an effect on congressional voting. Will a congressman become ideologically more polarized when his electoral margins increase? Essentially, this paper assumes that all congressmen are ideologically polarized, and it is elections which serve to reel congressmen back toward the ideological middle. The election and ideological data for this study, which spans from the 56th to the 107th Congress, finds statistically significant relationships between these two variables. In fact, congressman pay attention to election returns when voting in Congress. When broken down by party, Democrats are more exhibitive of this phenomenon, which suggest that Democrats may be more likely to intrinsically follow the popular model of representation. Meanwhile, it can be hypothesized that insignificant results for Republicans indicate that Republicans may follow a trustee model of representation.

Intergenerational Conflict and the Political Economy of School Spending

In this paper we use survey data to examine support among voters from different age cohorts for public school spending. The survey asked potential voters in California how they intended to vote on two initiatives, one a statewide initiative that would increase spending on public schools throughout the state and the other a local initiative that would increase spending only in the respondent's local school district. We find that older voters without children generally oppose increases in state spending but are much more willing to support local spending. We examine two explanations for this voting pattern, namely the capitalization of local spending into housing values and intergenerational altruism. Our results do not strongly favor one explanation over the other. Consequently, we conclude that both factors (capitalization and intergenerational altruism) probably play important roles in sustaining support among older voters for local school spending.

Characterizing Paretian Preferences

A characterization of a property of binary relations is of type M if it can be stated in terms of ordered M-tuples of alternatives. A characterization of finite type provides an easy test of whether preferences over a large set of alternatives possesses the property characterized. Unfortunately, there is no characterization of finite type for Pareto representability in R..2. A partial result along the same lines is obtained for Pareto representability in R..k, k .. 2.

A Median Voter Theorem for Postelection Politics

We analyze a model of 'postelection politics', in which (unlike in the more common Downsian models of 'preelection politics') politicians cannot make binding commitments prior to elections. The game begins with an incumbent politician in office, and voters adopt reelection strategies that are contingent on the policies implemented by the incumbent. We generalize previous models of this type by introducing heterogeneity in voters' ideological preferences, and analyze how voters' reelection strategies constrain the policies chosen by a rent-maximizing incumbent. We first show that virtually any policy (and any feasible level of rent for the incumbent) can be sustained in a Nash equilibrium. Then, we derive a 'median voter theorem': the ideal point of the median voter, and the minimum feasible level of rent, are the unique outcomes in any strong Nash equilibrium. We then introduce alternative refinements that are less restrictive. In particular, Ideologically Loyal Coalition-proof equilibrium also leads uniquely to the median outcome.

Tiebout Choice and the Voucher

This paper examines who is likely to gain and who is likely to lose under a universal voucher program. Following Epple and Romano (1998, 2003), and Nechyba (2000, 2003a), we focus on the idea that gains and losses under a universal voucher depend on two effects: changes in peer group composition and changes in housing values. We show that the direction and magnitude of each of these effects hinges critically on market structure, i.e., the amount of school choice that already exists in the public sector. In markets with little or no Tiebout choice, potential changes in peer group composition create an incentive for high-socioeconomic (SES) households to vote for the voucher and for low-SES households to vote against voucher. In contrast, in markets with significant Tiebout choice, potential changes in housing values create an incentive for high-SES households to vote against the voucher and for low-SES households to vote for the voucher. Using data on vote outcomes from California's 2000 voucher initiative, we find evidence consistent with those predictions.

How Decisive Is the Decisive Voter?

This paper examines whether the voter with the median income is decisive in local spending decisions. Previous tests have relied on cross-sectional data while we make use of a pair of California referenda to estimate a first difference specification. The referenda proposed to lower the required vote share for passing local educational bonding initiatives from 67 to 50 percent and 67 to 55 percent, respectively. The jurisdiction median income appears to accurately capture the expected outcomes of majority votes on public service spending, and voters rationally consider such future public service decisions when deciding how to vote on voting rules.

A Model of Endogenous Union Density and Membership

We develop a theoretical model of endogenously determined union density and union membership. A union is formed, continued, or dissolved by majority voting. Given the profitability, production technology, and labor and product market conditions, the union determines the reservation wage that is acceptable to the firm. Based on this reservation wage and other subjective factors, workers vote for or against the union. If the union is formed, the firm determines the employment level at the union wage.

Finite Characterizations and Paretian Preferences

A characterization of a property of binary relations is of finite type if it is stated in terms of ordered T-tuples of alternatives for some positive integer T. A characterization of finite type can be used to determine in polynomial time whether a binary relation over a finite set has the property characterized. Unfortunately, Pareto representability in R2 has no characterization of finite type (Knoblauch, 2002). This result is generalized below Rl, l larger than 2. The method of proof is applied to other properties of binary relations.

Na 1 Nachlass Max Horkheimer, 581 - Korrespondenzen mit Friedrich (Frederick) Pollock und Henryk Grossmann (p. VI 34, 199-464)

1 Brief von Edith Kriss an Margot von Mendelssohn, 13.10.1943; 1 Brief von Margot von Mendelssohn an Max Horkheimer, 23.01.1944; 1 Brief von Max Horkheimer an Henryk Grossman, 10.04.1944; 1 Brief von Nevitt Sanford an Max Horkheimer, 21.01.1944; 2 Briefe zwischen Richard C. Rothschild und Frederick Pollock, 1944; 1 Brief von Frederick Pollock an das Registrar for Voting in New York Country, [1944]; 1 Brief von Theodor W. Adorno an Frederick Pollock, 07.06.1944;

Application of cell line based genomic predictors to predict response to targeted therapies in breast cancer

Cancer cell lines can be treated with a drug and the molecular comparison of responders and non-responders may yield potential predictors that could be tested in the clinic. It is a bioinformatics challenge to apply the cell line-derived multivariable response predictors to patients who respond to therapy. Using the gene expression data from 23 breast cancer cell lines, I developed three predictors of dasatinib sensitivity by selecting differentially expressed genes and applying different classification algorithms. The performance of these predictors on independent cell lines with known dasatinib response was tested. The predictor based on weighted voting method has the best overall performance. It correctly predicted dasatinib sensitivity in 11 out of 12 (92%) breast and 17 out of 23 (74%) lung cancer cell lines. These predictors were then applied to the gene expression data from 133 breast cancer patients in an attempt to predict how the patients might respond to dasatinib therapy. Two predictors identified 13 patients in common to be dasatinib sensitive. Sixty two percent of these cases are triple negative (ER-negative, HER2-negative and PR-negative) and 76% are double negative. The result is consistent with the findings from other studies, which identified a target population for dasatinib treatment to be triple negative or basal breast cancer subtype. In conclusion, we think that the cell line-derived dasatinib classifiers can be applied to the human patients. ^

Campaign contributions to congressional candidates by the healthcare sector from 1990 to 2008

Stakeholder groups with special interests as donors to finance congressional campaigns have been a controversial issue in the United Sates. While previous studies concentrated on whether a connection existed between the campaign contributions provided by stakeholder groups and the voting behavior of congressional members, there is little evidence to show the trend of allocation of their campaign contributions to their favorite candidates during the elections. This issue has become increasingly important in the health sector since the health care reform bill was passed in early 2010.^ This study examined the long-term trend of campaign contributions offered by various top healthcare stakeholder groups to particular political parties (i.e. Democrat and Republican). The main focus of this paper was to observe and describe the financial donations provided by these healthcare stakeholder groups in the congressional election cycles from 1990 to 2008 in order to obtain an overview of their patterns of campaign contributions. Their contributing behaviors were characterized based on the campaign finance data collected by the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP). Specifically, I answered the questions: (1) to which political party did specific healthcare stakeholder groups give money and (2) what was the pattern of their campaign contributions from 1990 to 2008?^ The findings of my study revealed that the healthcare stakeholder groups had different political party preferences and partisanship orientations regarding the Democratic or Republican Party. These differences were obvious throughout the election cycles from 1990 to 2008 and their distinct patterns of financial contribution were evident across industries in the health sector as well. Among all the healthcare stakeholder groups in this study, physicians were the top contributors in the congressional election. The pharmaceutical industry was the only group where the majority of contribution funds were allocated to Republicans in every election period studied. This study found that no interest group has succeeded in electing the preferred congressional candidate by giving the majority of its financial support to the winning party in every election. Chiropractors, hospitals/nursing homes, and health services/HMOs performed better than other healthcare stakeholder groups by supporting the electoral winner 8 out of 9 election cycles.^

More Is Not Always Better: An Experimental Individual-Level Validation of the Randomized Response Technique and the Crosswise Model

Social desirability and the fear of sanctions can deter survey respondents from responding truthfully to sensitive questions. Self-reports on norm breaking behavior such as shoplifting, non-voting, or tax evasion may therefore be subject to considerable misreporting. To mitigate such misreporting, various indirect techniques for asking sensitive questions, such as the randomized response technique (RRT), have been proposed in the literature. In our study, we evaluate the viability of several variants of the RRT, including the recently proposed crosswise-model RRT, by comparing respondents’ self-reports on cheating in dice games to actual cheating behavior, thereby distinguishing between false negatives (underreporting) and false positives (overreporting). The study has been implemented as an online survey on Amazon Mechanical Turk (N = 6,505). Our results indicate that the forced-response RRT and the unrelated-question RRT, as implemented in our survey, fail to reduce the level of misreporting compared to conventional direct questioning. For the crosswise-model RRT, we do observe a reduction of false negatives (that is, an increase in the proportion of cheaters who admit having cheated). At the same time, however, there is an increase in false positives (that is, an increase in non-cheaters who falsely admit having cheated). Overall, our findings suggest that none of the implemented sensitive questions techniques substantially outperforms direct questioning. Furthermore, our study demonstrates the importance of distinguishing false negatives and false positives when evaluating the validity of sensitive question techniques.

Fiscal Federalism and Tax Equalization: The potential for progressive local taxes

We construct an empirically informed computational model of fiscal federalism, testing whether horizontal or vertical equalization can solve the fiscal externality problem in an environment in which heterogeneous agents can move and vote. The model expands on the literature by considering the case of progressive local taxation. Although the consequences of progressive taxation under fiscal federalism are well understood, they have not been studied in a context with tax equalization, despite widespread implementation. The model also expands on the literature by comparing the standard median voter model with a realistic alternative voting mechanism. We find that fiscal federalism with progressive taxation naturally leads to segregation as well as inefficient and inequitable public goods provision while the alternative voting mechanism generates more efficient, though less equitable, public goods provision. Equalization policy, under both types of voting, is largely undermined by micro-actors' choices. For this reason, the model also does not find the anticipated effects of vertical equalization discouraging public goods spending among wealthy jurisdictions and horizontal encouraging it among poor jurisdictions. Finally, we identify two optimal scenarios, superior to both complete centralization and complete devolution. These scenarios are not only Pareto optimal, but also conform to a Rawlsian view of justice, offering the best possible outcome for the worst-off. Despite offering the best possible outcomes, both scenarios still entail significant economic segregation and inequitable public goods provision. Under the optimal scenarios agents shift the bulk of revenue collection to the federal government, with few jurisdictions maintaining a small local tax.