Description of Mr. Samuel DeVeaux Woodruff's property on Ontario Street

Handwritten description of Mr. Samuel DeVeaux Woodruff’s property on Ontario Street which was sent by E. Gardiner to the Railway Company. This is a 1 page handwritten document. The land consisted of parts of Lots 20 and 21 in the 5th Concession of Grantham, June 26, 1901.

Calculations Regarding S.D. Woodruff's Property on Ontario Street

Calculations regarding S.D. Woodruff’s property on Ontario Street. 1 page of rough penciled calculations, n.d.

Description of Edward Dell’s property in Willoughby

Description of Edward Dell’s property in Willoughby which consists of part of Lot no.9. This includes a hand-drawn map and 1 ½ page handwritten description. The edges of this document are slightly burned. This does not affect the text, n.d.

Notice of sale regarding the late Ezekiel Cudney’s property including the dwelling, barn and fruit trees

Notice of sale regarding the late Ezekiel Cudney’s property including the dwelling, barn and fruit trees. The land contains 39 acres of parts of Lots 9 and 10 on the Welland River in the Township of Willoughby. The notice states that you must apply to S.D. Woodruff of St. Catharines. This is handwritten on a small piece of paper, Dec. 5, 1892.

List of instruments which are the property of Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway in the possession of F. Laler

List of instruments which are the property of Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway in the possession of F. Laler. This document is signed by S.D. Woodruff, Dec. 4, 1856.

Memorandum of S.D. Woodruff’s property on Ontario Street

Memorandum (1 page, handwritten) of S.D. Woodruff’s property on Ontario Street, Jul. 25, 1901.

Letter of agreement to Welland D. Woodruff to pay Hamilton K. Woodruff $27, 500 for the property known as DeVeaux Hall

Letter of agreement to Welland D. Woodruff to pay Hamilton K. Woodruff $27, 500 for the property known as DeVeaux Hall.

Insurance policy made to Henry Nelles of Grimsby covering a property in Grimsby, Upper Canada

Insurance policy made to Henry Nelles of Grimsby covering a property in Grimsby, Upper Canada from the Phoenix Fire Office of Montreal, July 15, 1831.

Natural-Resource Exploitation with Costly Enforcement of Property Rights

This paper proposes a model of natural-resource exploitation when private ownership requires costly enforcement activities. For a given wage rate, it is shown how enforcement costs can increase with labor's average productivity on a resource site. As a result, it is never optimal for the site owner to produce at the point where marginal productivity equals the wage rate. It may even be optimal to exploit at a point exhibiting negative marginal returns. An important parameter in the analysis is the prevailing wage rate. When wages are low, further decreases in the wage rates can reduce the returns from resource exploitation. At sufficiently low wages, positive returns can be rendered impossible to achieve and the site is abandoned to a free-access exploitation. The analysis provides some clues as to why property rights may be more difficult to delineate in less developed countries. It proposes a different framework from which to address normative issues such as the desirability of free trade with endogenous enforcement costs, the optimality of private decisions to enforce property rights, the effect of income distribution on property rights enforceability, etc.

On Limits to the Use of Linear Markov Strategies in Common Property Natural Resource Games

We derive conditions that must be satisfied by the primitives of the problem in order for an equilibrium in linear Markov strategies to exist in some common property natural resource differential games. These conditions impose restrictions on the admissible form of the natural growth function, given a benefit function, or on the admissible form of the benefit function, given a natural growth function.

Private Storage of Common Property

This paper examines a characteristic of common property problems unmodeled in the published literature: Extracted common reserves are aften stored privately rather than immediately. We examine the positive and normative effects of such storage.