Non-State United States Support For The Contras During The Reagan Era

Under President Ronald Reagan, the White House pursued a complex foreign policy towards the Contras, rebels in trying to overthrow the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, in Nicaragua. In 1979, the leftist Sandinista government seized power in Nicaragua. The loss of the previous pro-United States Somoza military dictatorship deeply troubled the conservatives, for whom eradication of communism internationally was a top foreign policy goal. Consequently, the Reagan Administration sought to redress the policy of his predecessor, Jimmy Carter, and assume a hard line stance against leftist regimes in Central America. Reagan and the conservatives within his administration, therefore, supported the Contra through military arms, humanitarian aid, and financial contributions. This intervention in Nicaragua, however, failed to garner popular support from American citizens and Democrats. Consequently, between 1982 and 1984 Congress prohibited further funding to the Contras in a series of legislation called the Boland Amendments. These Amendments barred any military aid from reaching the Contras, including through intelligence agencies. Shortly after their passage, Central Intelligence Agency Director William Casey and influential members of Reagan¿s National Security Council (NSC) including National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane, NSC Aide Oliver North, and Deputy National Security Advisor John Poindexter cooperated to identify and exploit loopholes in the legislation. By recognizing the NSC as a non-intelligence body, these masterminds orchestrated a scheme in which third parties, including foreign countries and private donors, contributed both financially and through arms donations to sustain the Contras independently of Congressional oversight. This thesis explores the mechanism and process of soliciting donations from private individuals, recognizing the forces and actors that created a situation for covert action to continue without detection. Oliver North, the main actor of the state, worked within his role as an NSC bureaucrat to network with influential politicians and private individuals to execute the orders of his superiors and shape foreign policy. Although Reagan articulated his desire for the Contras to remain a military presence in Nicaragua, he delegated the details of policy to his subordinates, which allowed this scheme to flourish. Second, this thesis explores the individual donors, analyzing their role as private citizens in sustaining and encouraging the policy of the Reagan Administration. The Contra movement found non-state support from followers of the New Right, demonstrated through financial and organizational assistance, that allowed the Reagan Administration¿s statistically unpopular policy in Nicaragua to continue. I interpret these donors as politically involved, but politically philanthropic, individuals, donating to their charity of choice to further the principles of American freedom internationally in a Cold War environment. The thesis then proceeds to assess the balance of power between the executive and other political actors in shaping policy, concluding that the executive cannot act alone in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy.

Representing Afghanistan: The United States and Democracy's Imposition

There is an ongoing mission in Afghanistan; a mission driven by external political forces. At its core this mission hopes to establish peace, to protect the populace, and to install democracy. Each of these goals has remained just that, a goal, for the past eight years as the American and international mission in Afghanistan has enjoyed varied levels of commitment. Currently, the stagnant progress in Afghanistan has led the international community to become increasingly concerned about the viability of a future Afghan state. Most of these questions take root in the question over whether or not an Afghan state can function without the auspices of international terrorism. Inevitably, the normative question of what exactly that government should be arises from this base concern. In formulating a response to this question, the consensus of western society has been to install representative democracy. This answer has been a recurring theme in the post Cold War era as states such as Bosnia and Somalia bear witness to the ill effects of external democratic imposition. I hypothesize that the current mold of externally driven state-building is unlikely to result in what western actors seek it to establish: representative democracy. By primarily examining the current situation in Afghanistan, I claim that external installation of representative democracy is modally flawed in that its process mandates choice. Representative democracy by definition constitutes a government reflective of its people, or electorate. Thus, freedom of choice is necessary for a functional representative democracy. From this, one can deduce that because an essential function of democracy is choice, its implementation lies with the presence of choice. State-building is an imposition that eliminates that necessary ingredient. The two stand as polar opposites that cannot effectively collaborate. Security, governing capacity, and development have all been targeted as measurements of success in Afghanistan. The three factors are generally seen as mutually constitutive; so improved security is seen as improving governing capacity. Thus, the recent resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan and a deteriorating security environment moving forward has demonstrated the inability of the Afghan government to govern. The primary reason for the Afghan government’s deficiencies is its lack of legitimacy among its constituency. Even the use of the term ‘constituency’ must be qualified because the Afghan government has often oscillated between serving the people within its territorial borders and the international community. The existence of the Afghan state is so dependent on foreign aid and intervention that it has lost policy-making and enforcing power. This is evident by the inability of Afghanistan to engage in basic sovereign state activities as maintaining a national budget, conducting elections, providing for its own national security, and deterring criminality. The Afghan state is nothing more than a shell of a government, and indicative of the failings that external state-building has with establishing democracy.

A Brief History of Affordable Housing Cooperatives in the United States

For over 75 years housing cooperatives have been a source of affordable housing. Currently, the 376,000 dwelling units of affordable cooperatives is equivalent to seventeen percent of the rent reduction units owned by publichousing authorities. Understanding that affordable cooperatives have been developed under varying historical circumstances provides insights on how they could play a role in the future supply of affordable housing. The history of affordable co-ops starts during the 1920s and after World War II with the ethnic, union, and New York government financed co-ops. Through the 1960s and the early 1970s cooperatives were financed by various federal direct assistance programs. Since the late 1970s co-ops have been sponsored by nonprofit organizations and by federal and municipal government privatization programs. A workable institutional structure for affordable cooperatives has developed as a result of this historical evolution.

Policy implications of public health workforce development for disaster preparedness in the United States

Public health efforts were initiated in the United States with legislative actions for enhancing food safety and ensuring pure drinking water. Some additional policy initiatives during the early 20th century helped organize and coordinate relief efforts for victims of natural disasters. By 1950's the federal government expanded its role for providing better health and safety to the communities, and its disaster relief activities became more structured. A rise in terrorism related incidents during the late 1990's prompted new proactive policy directions. The traditional policy and program efforts for rescue, recovery, and relief measures changed focus to include disaster preparedness and countermeasures against terrorism.^ The study took a holistic approach by analyzing all major disaster related policies and programs, in regard to their structure, process, and outcome. Study determined that United States has a strong disaster preparedness agenda and appropriate programs are in place with adequate policy support, and the country is prepared to meet all possible security challenges that may arise in the future. The man-made disaster of September 11th gave a major thrust to improve security and enhance preparedness of the country. These new efforts required large additional funding from the federal government. Most existing preparedness programs at the local and national levels are run with federal funds which is insufficient in some cases. This discrepancy arises from the fact that federal funding for disaster preparedness programs at present are not allocated by the level of risks to individual states or according to the risks that can be assigned to critical infrastructures across the country. However, the increased role of the federal government in public health affairs of the states is unusual, and opposed to the spirit of our constitution where sovereignty is equally divided between the federal government and the states. There is also shortage of manpower in public health to engage in disaster preparedness activities, despite some remarkable progress following the September 11th disaster.^ Study found that there was a significant improvement in knowledge and limited number of studies showed improvement of skills, increase in confidence and improvement in message-mapping. Among healthcare and allied healthcare professionals, short-term training on disaster preparedness increased knowledge and improved personal protective equipment use with some limited improvement in confidence and skills. However, due to the heterogeneity of these studies, the results and interpretation of this systematic review may be interpreted with caution.^

Bioterrorism preparedness at a hospital level in the Southwest Region of the United States -- A systematic review

Since the tragic events of September, 11 2001 the United States bioterrorism and disaster preparedness has made significant progress; yet, numerous research studies of nationwide hospital emergency response have found alarming shortcomings in surge capacity and training level of health care personnel in responding to bioterrorism incidents. The primary goals of this research were to assess hospital preparedness towards the threat of bioterrorist agents in the Southwest Region of the United States and provide recommendations for its improvement. Since little formal research has been published on the hospital preparedness of Oklahoma, Arizona, Texas and New Mexico, this research study specifically focused on the measurable factors affecting the respective states' resources and level of preparedness, such as funding, surge capacity and preparedness certification status.^ Over 300 citations of peer-reviewed articles and 17 Web sites were reviewed, of which 57 reports met inclusion criteria. The results of the systematic review highlighted key gaps in the existing literature and the key targets for future research, as well as identified strengths and weaknesses of the hospital preparedness in the Southwest states compared to the national average. ^ Based on the conducted research, currently, the Southwest states hospital systems are unable fully meet presidential preparedness mandates for emergency and disaster care: the staffed beds to 1,000 population value fluctuated around 1,5 across the states; funding for the hospital preparedness lags behind hospital costs by millions of dollars; and public health-hospital partnership in bioterrorism preparedness is quite weak as evident in lack of joint exercises and training. However, significant steps towards it are being made, including on-going hospital preparedness certification by the Joint Commission of Health Organization. Variations in preparedness levels among states signify that geographic location might determine a hospital level of bioterrorism preparedness as well, tending to favor bigger states such as Texas.^ Suggested recommendations on improvement of the hospital bioterrorism preparedness are consistent with the existing literature and include establishment and maintenance of solid partnerships between hospitals and public health agencies, conduction of joint exercises and drills for the health care personnel and key partners, improved state and federal funding specific to bioterrorism preparedness objectives, as well as on-going training of the clinical personnel on recognition of the bioterrorism agents.^

Opinions filed by the commissioners acting under the VII. article of the Treaty of Amity Commerce and Navigation between Great Britain and the United States of America : manuscript, 1797-1799

Opinions concerning the 7th article of the treaty.