Global Justice, Basic Goods and the Sufficiency Threshold Claim

This paper deals with a prevailing assumption that basic goods are accessory to claims of justice. Against such an assumption, the paper advances the idea that basic goods (the core of what I wish to call the sufficiency threshold) are fundamental as a matter of justice. The paper then addresses the question as to what is the elemental justifiability of a social minimum and how that relates to theories of justice, particularly to emerging theories of global justice. The arguments against the aforementioned assumption call upon the strengths of a general theory of justice already in place, namely, John Rawls’s theory of justice and the enriching response and criticism thereof—particularly David Miller’s theory of justice.

Exploitation as a Path to Development: Sweatshop Labour, Micro-Unfairness, and the Non-Worseness Claim

Sweatshop labour is sometimes defended from critics by arguments that stress the voluntariness of the worker’s choice, and the fact that sweatshops provide a source of income where no other similar source exists. The idea is if it is exploitation—as their opponents charge—it is mutually beneficial and consensual exploitation. This defence appeals to the non-worseness claim (NWC), which says that if exploitation is better for the exploited party than neglect, it cannot be seriously wrong. The NWC renders otherwise exploitative—and therefore morally wrong—transactions permissible, making the exploitation of the global poor a justifiable path to development. In this paper, I argue that the use of NWC for the case of sweatshops is misleading. After reviewing and strengthening the exploitation claims made concerning sweatshops, most importantly by refuting certain allegations that a micro-unfairness account of exploitation cannot evaluate sweatshop labour as exploitative, I then argue that even if this practice may seem permissible due to benefits otherwise unavailable to the global poor, there remains a duty to address the background conditions that make this form of wrong-doing possible, which the NWC cannot accommodate. I argue that the NWC denies this by unreasonably limiting its scope and is therefore incomplete, and ultimately unconvincing.

The Andhra Pradesh Microfinance Crisis and American Payday Lending: Two Studies in Vulnerability

Microcredit, a non-profit lending approach that is often championed as a source of women’s inclusion and empowerment, has in the past decade been followed by microfinance, a forprofit sibling of a different temperament. Microfinance in India is now in turmoil, precipitated by legislation in the state of Andhra Pradesh, which has encouraged withholding of payment, which in turn has frozen the market. This paper considers one precipitating condition of the crisis: the remarkable, new, and developing burden of formal economic debt that poor women in the state have only recently come to hold – debt that now surpasses one year’s family income, on average. The development of this lending sector follows upon innovation in lending to the poor of the global north over the past two decades, and the practices show noteworthy parallels. Both lending schemes have produced similar disproportionate burdens upon some low-status individuals within their respective economic orders, and both may exploit a vulnerability that is born of aspiration and produces great dysfunction for borrowers. This paper introduces the two lending schemes, sketches the parallels, and introduces the claim that ethical finance arrangements for the poor require attention to vulnerability, an under-utilized category in both liberal ethical theory and in finance.

A Tangled Web? Asking the Gender Question in the Multilateral Development Banks’ Law and Justice Policies in India

Over the course of the last two decades, IFIs (most prominently the World Bank) have begun acknowledging the centrality of human development as an essential element of the economic development process if the growth aimed at is to be holistic and sustainable. Strikingly, there is no agreement on the manner in which this approach is to be achieved, especially in the field of gender and development. This paper focuses on the issue of whether the Multilateral Development Banks’ policies have truly attempted at implementing their stated model of gender mainstreaming through their programmes and projects in India, with a specific focus on the legal sector, since that sector has both instrumental and intrinsic value for gender rights advocates. This article will aim at reviewing their approach towards rule of law projects and the manner in which gender equality norms have or have not been addressed within that framework; it will end with recommendations as to the necessary issues which gender programmes must address within the rule of law framework in order to achieve the Millennium Development Goal of gender equity.

Maxims of Action in a Financial Co-operative: Epistemological and Theoretical Issues

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An Ethical Analysis of Neoliberal Capitalism: Alternative Perspectives from Development Ethics

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Sen and Nussbaum: Agency and Capability- Expansion1

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The interest rates and performance of MFIs in the MENA region: is there a moral issue?

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The Gandarela Mountain Range and the “resistance space” against iron ore mining threat: a focus on the contrapositions

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Return and Volatility performance comparison of Ethical and Non-ethical publicly-listed financial services companies

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Influencia de las creencias religiosas cristianas en la decisión de realizar suicidio asistido al final de la vida

El suicidio asistido como una posible opción al final de la vida, es una idea que hasta ahora está siendo considerada, ya que existen argumentaciones a favor y en contra que han generado controvertidos debates a su alrededor. Algunos de los argumentos en contra están basados en los principios de las instituciones religiosas de orden cristiano, las cuales defienden el valor sagrado de la vida de las personas y la aceptación del sufrimiento como un acto de amor profundo y sumisión a los mandatos de Dios, el creador. Mientras del lado contrario, se encuentran quienes defienden el procedimiento, impulsando la autonomía y la autodeterminación que cada persona tiene sobre su vida. La revisión de la literatura realizada no sólo permite ampliar los argumentos de estas dos posiciones, sino que también permite conocer la historia del suicidio asistido, la posición que este procedimiento tiene en diferentes países del mundo, incluyendo a Colombia, y finalmente se presentan las contribuciones de la psicología entorno al procedimiento en discusión.

Obfuscation and Strict Online Anonymity

I consider the case for genuinely anonymous web searching. Big data seems to have it in for privacy. The story is well known, particularly since the dawn of the web. Vastly more personal information, monumental and quotidian, is gathered than in the pre-digital days. Once gathered it can be aggregated and analyzed to produce rich portraits, which in turn permit unnerving prediction of our future behavior. The new information can then be shared widely, limiting prospects and threatening autonomy. How should we respond? Following Nissenbaum (2011) and Brunton and Nissenbaum (2011 and 2013), I will argue that the proposed solutions—consent, anonymity as conventionally practiced, corporate best practices, and law—fail to protect us against routine surveillance of our online behavior. Brunton and Nissenbaum rightly maintain that, given the power imbalance between data holders and data subjects, obfuscation of one’s online activities is justified. Obfuscation works by generating “misleading, false, or ambiguous data with the intention of confusing an adversary or simply adding to the time or cost of separating good data from bad,” thus decreasing the value of the data collected (Brunton and Nissenbaum, 2011). The phenomenon is as old as the hills. Natural selection evidently blundered upon the tactic long ago. Take a savory butterfly whose markings mimic those of a toxic cousin. From the point of view of a would-be predator the data conveyed by the pattern is ambiguous. Is the bug lunch or potential last meal? In the light of the steep costs of a mistake, the savvy predator goes hungry. Online obfuscation works similarly, attempting for instance to disguise the surfer’s identity (Tor) or the nature of her queries (Howe and Nissenbaum 2009). Yet online obfuscation comes with significant social costs. First, it implies free riding. If I’ve installed an effective obfuscating program, I’m enjoying the benefits of an apparently free internet without paying the costs of surveillance, which are shifted entirely onto non-obfuscators. Second, it permits sketchy actors, from child pornographers to fraudsters, to operate with near impunity. Third, online merchants could plausibly claim that, when we shop online, surveillance is the price we pay for convenience. If we don’t like it, we should take our business to the local brick-and-mortar and pay with cash. Brunton and Nissenbaum have not fully addressed the last two costs. Nevertheless, I think the strict defender of online anonymity can meet these objections. Regarding the third, the future doesn’t bode well for offline shopping. Consider music and books. Intrepid shoppers can still find most of what they want in a book or record store. Soon, though, this will probably not be the case. And then there are those who, for perfectly good reasons, are sensitive about doing some of their shopping in person, perhaps because of their weight or sexual tastes. I argue that consumers should not have to pay the price of surveillance every time they want to buy that catchy new hit, that New York Times bestseller, or a sex toy.