507 resultados para Livelihoods
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Hoy en día, ya no se puede pasar por alto la necesidad de una agricultura climáticamente más inteligente para los 500 millones de pequeños agricultores del mundo (Wheeler, 2013). Estos representan aproximadamente el 60 % de la agricultura mundial y proporcionan hasta el 80 % de los alimentos en los países en vías de desarrollo, los pequeños agricultores gestionan vastas extensiones de tierra y lamentablemente incluyen los grupos con mayor proporción de personas en estado de inseguridad alimentaria. El cambio climático está transformando el contexto para la agricultura en pequeña escala. Durante siglos, los pequeños agricultores desarrollaron la capacidad de adaptarse a los cambios ambientales y la variabilidad del clima, pero la velocidad y la intensidad del cambio climático está superando su capacidad de respuesta. Si no se cambia la manera que tenemos de lidiar con el cambio climático, tanto en acciones locales como globales, es muy probable que las personas rurales de entornos vulnerables tengan que adaptarse a un calentamiento global promedio de 4 °C por encima de los niveles preindustriales para el año 2100. Esta alza de las temperaturas aumentará aún más la incertidumbre y provocará desastres naturales como las sequías, la erosión del suelo, la pérdida de biodiversidad y la escasez agua sean mucho más frecuentes. Uno de los factores más importantes para los pequeños agricultores es que ya no pueden depender de los promedios históricos, por lo que es más difícil para ellos para planificar y gestionar la producción debido a los cambios en los patrones climáticos. Algunos de los principales cultivos de cereales (trigo, arroz, maíz, etc.) han alcanzado su umbral de tolerancia al calor y un aumento de la temperatura en torno a 1,5-2 °C podría ser muy perjudicial. Estos efectos a corto plazo podrían ser agravados por otros a medio y largo plazo, los que se refieren al impacto socioeconómico en términos de oportunidades y estabilidad política. El cambio climático está haciendo que el desarrollo de la pequeña agricultura resulte mucho más caro. A nivel de proyectos, los programas resistentes al clima tienen, normalmente, unos costos iniciales más altos, tanto de diseño como de implementación. Por ejemplo, es necesario incluir gastos adicionales en infraestructura, operación y mantenimiento; desarrollo de nuevas capacidades y el intercambio de conocimientos en torno al cambio climático. También se necesita mayor inversión para fortalecer las instituciones frente a los nuevos retos que propone el cambio climático, o generar información que pueda ser de escala reducida y con enfoques que beneficien a la comunidad, el cambio climático es global pero los efectos son locales. Es, por tanto, el momento de redefinir la relación entre agricultura y medio ambiente, ya que se hace cada vez más necesario buscar mejores y más eficientes maneras para responder al cambio climático. Es importante señalar que la respuesta al cambio climático no significa reinventar todo lo que se ha aprendido sobre el desarrollo, significa aplicar un esfuerzo renovado para hacer frente a los cambios en el trabajo de cooperación al desarrollo de una manera más sistemática y más amplia. Una respuesta coherente al cambio climático requiere que la comunidad internacional reconozca la necesidad de aumentar el apoyo financiero para la adaptación así como un mayor énfasis en proporcionar soluciones diseñadas para aumentar la resiliencia1 de los pequeños agricultores a las crisis relacionadas con el clima. Con el fin de responder a algunos de los desafíos mencionados anteriormente, esta investigación pretende contribuir a fortalecer las capacidades de los pequeños productores, aquellos que actualmente están la primera línea frente a los desafíos del cambio climático, promoviendo un desarrollo que tenga un impacto positivo en sus medios de vida. La tesis se compone de cuatro capítulos. El primero define y analiza el marco teórico de las interacciones entre el cambio climático y el impacto en los proyectos de desarrollo rural, especialmente los que tienen por objetivo mejorar la seguridad alimentaria de los pequeños productores. En ese mismo capítulo, se presenta una revisión global de la financiación climática, incluyendo la necesidad de asignar suficientes recursos para la adaptación. Con el fin de lograr una mayor eficacia e impacto en los proyectos de desarrollo, la investigación desarrolla una metodología para integrar actividades de adaptación al cambio climático, presentada en el segundo capítulo. Esta metodología fue implementada y validada durante el periodo 2012-14, trabajando directamente con diferentes equipos gubernamentales en diez proyectos del Fondo Internacional de Desarrollo Agrícola ). El tercero presenta, de manera detallada, la aplicación de la metodología a los estudios de caso de Bolivia y Nicaragua, así como un resumen de las principales conclusiones en la aplicación de los ocho países restantes. Finalmente, en el último capítulo se presentan las conclusiones y un esbozo de futuras líneas de investigación. Actualmente, el tema de la sostenibilidad ambiental y el cambio climático está ganando terreno en la agenda de desarrollo. Es por ello que se alumbra esta investigación, para que a través de los resultados obtenidos y la implementación de la metodología propuesta, sirva como herramienta estratégica para la planificación y la gestión operativa a la hora de integrar iniciativas de adaptación en los proyectos de desarrollo rural. ABSTRACT The need for climate-smart agriculture for the world’s 500 million smallholder farms cannot be overlooked: they account for 60 per cent of global agriculture, provide up to 80 per cent of food in developing countries, manage vast areas of land and make up the largest share of the developing world’s undernourished. Climate change is transforming the context for smallholder agriculture. Over centuries smallholders have developed the capacity to adapt to environmental change and climate variability, but the speed and intensity of climate change is outpacing the speed of historically autonomous actions. In the absence of a profound step-change in local and global action on climate change, it is Increasingly likely that poor rural people would need to contend with an average global warming of 4 degrees above pre-industrial levels by 2100, if not sooner. Such substantial climatic change will further increase uncertainty and exacerbate weather –related disasters, droughts, biodiversity loss, and land and water scarcity. Perhaps most significantly for smallholder farmers, they can no longer rely on historical averages, making it harder for them to plan and manage production when planting seasons and weather patterns are shifting. The major cereal crops (wheat, rice, maize, etc.) are at their heat tolerance threshold and with a 1.5-2°C temperature increase could collapse. These “first-round” effects will be compounded by second-round socio-economic impacts in terms of economic opportunities and political stability. Climate change is making the development of smallholder agriculture more expensive. At project level, climate-resilient programmes typically have higher up-front design and implementation costs – e.g. infrastructure costs and initially increased asset management, operation and maintenance, more capacity-building and knowledge sharing, strengthening institutions, greater project development costs (downscaled data generation and community-based approaches), and greater costs from enhancing cross sectorial and stakeholders collaboration. Consequently it’s time to redefine the relationship between agriculture and environment as we need to look better and more efficient ways to respond to climate change. It is important to note that responding to climate change does not mean to throwing out or reinventing everything that has been learnt about development. It means a renewed effort to tackle wider and well-known development changes in a more systematic way. A coherent response to climate change requires acknowledge of the need to increase the financial support for adaptation and a continued emphasis on provided solutions designed to increase the resilience of smallholders and poor communities to shocks, which are weather related. In order to respond to some of the challenges mentioned before, this research aims to contribute to strengthen the capacities of the smallholders and to promote a development that will positively impact in the rural livelihoods of the most vulnerable smallholders farmers; those who currently are in the first line facing the challenges of climate change. The thesis has four chapters. Chapter one describes and analyses the theoretical framework of the interactions between climate change and the impact on rural development projects, especially those aimed at improving the food security of smallholders producers. In this chapter a comprehensive review of climate financing is presented, including the need to allocate sufficient resources for adaptation. In order to achieve greater effectiveness and impact on development projects, the research develops in the second chapter a methodology to integrate adaptation activities for climate change. This methodology was implemented and validated during the 2012-14 period, working directly with various government teams in ten projects of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). The third chapter presents in detail the application of the methodology to the case studies of Bolivia and Nicaragua, as well as a summary of the main conclusions of its implementation in the remaining eight countries. The final chapter exposes the main conclusions and future research topics. At a time when environmental sustainability and climate change issues are gaining more attention, the research and obtained results through the implementation of the model methodology proposed, can be considered a strategic tool for planning and operational management to integrate adaptation initiatives in rural development projects. The use of the proposed methodology will boost incentives to scale up climate resilience programmes and integrate adaptation to climate change into wider smallholder development programmes.
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At the height of the financial crisis, the Western welfare state prevented a repeat of the Great Depression. But there were also suggestions that social policy had contributed to the crisis, particularly by promoting households’ access to credit in pursuit of welfare goals. Others claim that it was the withdrawal of state welfare that led to the disaster. Against this background that motivated our interest, we propose a systematic way of assessing the relationship between financial market and public welfare provisions. We use structural vector auto-regression to establish the causal link and its direction. Two hypotheses about this relationship can be inferred from the literature. First, the notion that welfare states ‘decommodify’ livelihoods or that there is an equity-efficiency tradeoff would suggest that welfare states substitute to varying degrees for financial market offers of insurance and savings. By contrast, welfare states may support private interests selectively and/or help markets for households to function better; thus the nexus would be one of complementarity. Our empirical strategy is to spell out the causal mechanisms that can account for a substitutive or complementary relationship and then to see whether advanced econometric techniques find evidence for the existence of either of these mechanisms in six OECD countries. We find complementarity between public welfare (spending and tax subsidies) and life insurance markets for four out of our six countries, notably even for the United States. Substitution between welfare and finance is the more plausible interpretation for France and the Netherlands, which is surprising. Data availability constrains us from testing the implications for the welfare state contribution to the crisis directly but our findings suggest that the welfare state cannot generally be blamed for the financial crisis.
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The research team reviewed numerous several multi- sectoral entities and identified nine GGNs that became the subject of our case studies. The research team conducted semi-structured interviews with executives and staff from each of these GNNs and prepared a profile, including a description of the unique evolution of the organization, goals and objectives, organizational structure and governance arrangements for each GGN. The following list provides an overview of the nine GGNs profiled: 1. Every Woman Every Child is an unprecedented global effort that mobilizes and amplifies action by governments, multilaterals, the private sector, research centers, academia and civil society to address life-threatening health challenges facing women and children globally. 2. HERproject catalyzes global partnerships and local Networks to improve female workers’ general and reproductive health in eight emerging economies. 3. R4 Rural Resilience Initiative is a cutting-edge, strategic, large-scale partnership between the public and private sectors to innovate and develop better tools to help the world’s most vulnerable people build resilient livelihoods. 4. Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative is a coalition of governments, companies, civil society groups, investors and international organizations that aims to improve transparency and accountability in the extractives sector. 5. Global Network for Neglected Tropical Diseases works with international partners at the highest level of government, business and society to break down the logistical and financial barriers to delivering existing treatments for the seven most common neglected tropical diseases. 6. Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition is an alliance that supports public-private partnerships to increase access to the missing nutrients in diets necessary for people, communities and economies to be stronger and healthier. 7. Inter-Agency Network For Education in Emergencies is a global Network of individuals and representatives from NGOs, United Nations and donor agencies, governments, academic institutions, schools and affected populations working to ensure all persons have the right to a quality and safe education in emergencies and post- crisis recovery. 8. mHealth Alliance works with diverse partners to advance mobile-based or mobile-enhanced solutions that deliver health through research, advocacy, support for the development of interoperable solutions and sustainable deployment models. 9. The Rainforest Alliance is a global non-profit that focuses on environmental conservation and sustainable development and works through collaborative partnerships with various stakeholders.
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"Reprinted from the Unpopular review and Century magazine."
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The history of political and economic inequality in forest villages can shape how and why resource use conflicts arise during the evolution of national parks management. In the Philippine uplands, indigenous peoples and migrant settlers co-exist, compete over land and forest resources, and shape how managers preserve forests through national parks. This article examines how migrants have claimed lands and changed production and exchange relations among the indigenous Tagbanua to build on and benefit from otherwise coercive park management on Palawan Island, the Philippines. Migrant control over productive resources has influenced who, within each group, could sustain agriculture in the face of the state's dominant conservation narrative - valorizing migrant paddy rice and criminalizing Tagbanua swiddens. Upon settling, migrant farmers used new political and economic strengths to tap into provincial political networks in order to be hired at a national park. As a result, they were able to steer management to support paddy rice at the expense of swidden cultivation. While state conservation policy shapes how national parks impact upon local resource access and use, older political economic inequalities in forest villages build on such policies to influence how management affects the livelihoods of poor households.
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How many entrepreneurs start-up their business ventures conducting some or all of their trade in the informal economy? The aim of this paper is to answer this key question that has been seldom addressed using data from 600 face-to-face structured interviews conducted in Ukraine in late 2005 and early 2006. Analyzing the 331 entrepreneurs identified (i.e., individuals starting-up an enterprise in the past three years), just 10 percent operate on a wholly legitimate basis, while 39 percent have a license to trade and/or have registered their business but conduct a portion of their trade in the informal economy, and 51 percent operate unregistered enterprises and conduct all of their trade on an off-the-books basis. Given that some 90 percent of all business start-ups operate partially or wholly in the informal economy, and that 40 percent of all respondents depend on the informal economy as either their principal or secondary contributor to their livelihoods, the paper concludes by considering the wider implications of these findings both for further research and public policy.
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Tropical cyclones are considered as the most severe natural disasters in Bangladesh; they cause extensive damage, create losses in the country׳s economy, and affect social settings. The impact of natural disasters has been further intensified due to various vulnerability factors within the Bangladeshi community such as low income; shortages of food; lack of assets such as land and permanent housing; dense population, illiteracy. This study evaluates the vulnerability factors for cyclones in the community based in the Patuakhali region of south western Bangladesh. The bottom-up research approach was adopted for the study, whereby the local community was consulted for their viewpoints by using focus group interviews and semi-structured interviews. Different community groups and social categories including both men and women, from different age groups and livelihoods, participated in the study. The study revealed how the community׳s vulnerability to cyclones has been further aggravated by socio-economic factors such as social status, political influences and economic conditions. The majority of the community in Patuakhali has been “knowingly” vulnerable to cyclone disaster as a result of the lack of alternatives especially in terms of their livelihood patterns. The vulnerability of women, due to their lack of authority, domestic work, and fear of exposure within the society was also highlighted. The study revealed how vulnerability factors are interlinked with each other making them further difficult to manage. This calls for multi-faceted disaster risk reduction strategies that targets vulnerability factors deriving from different origins and root causes.
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Tropical cyclones are considered as the most severe natural disasters in Bangladesh; they cause extensive damage, create losses in the country[U+05F3]s economy, and affect social settings. The impact of natural disasters has been further intensified due to various vulnerability factors within the Bangladeshi community such as low income; shortages of food; lack of assets such as land and permanent housing; dense population, illiteracy. This study evaluates the vulnerability factors for cyclones in the community based in the Patuakhali region of south western Bangladesh. The bottom-up research approach was adopted for the study, whereby the local community was consulted for their viewpoints by using focus group interviews and semi-structured interviews. Different community groups and social categories including both men and women, from different age groups and livelihoods, participated in the study. The study revealed how the community[U+05F3]s vulnerability to cyclones has been further aggravated by socio-economic factors such as social status, political influences and economic conditions. The majority of the community in Patuakhali has been "knowingly" vulnerable to cyclone disaster as a result of the lack of alternatives especially in terms of their livelihood patterns. The vulnerability of women, due to their lack of authority, domestic work, and fear of exposure within the society was also highlighted. The study revealed how vulnerability factors are interlinked with each other making them further difficult to manage. This calls for multi-faceted disaster risk reduction strategies that targets vulnerability factors deriving from different origins and root causes. © 2014 Elsevier Ltd.
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Globalization is eroding the livelihoods of small farmers, a significant and vulnerable class, particularly in the developing world. The cost-price squeeze stemming from trade liberalization places farmers in a race to the bottom that leads to displacement, poverty, and environmental degradation. Scholars and activists have proposed that alternative trade initiatives offer a unique opportunity to reverse this trend by harnessing the power of the markets to reward producers of goods with embedded superior cultural, environmental, and social values. Alternative trade via certification schemes have become a de facto prescription for any location where there is a need to conciliate economic interest with conservation imperatives. Partnerships among commodity production farmers, elite manufacturers and wealthy northern consumers/activists do not necessarily have win-win outcomes. Paradoxically, the partnerships of farmers with external agencies have unexpected results. These partnerships develop into dependent relationships that become unsustainable in the absence of further transfers of capital. The institutions born of these partnerships are fragile. When these fledging institutions fail, farmers are left in the same situation that they were before the partnership, with only minor improvements to show after spending considerable amounts of social and financial capital. I hypothesize that these failures are born out of a belief in a universal understanding of sustainability. A discursive emphasis on consensus, equity and mutual benefit hides the fact that what for consumers it is a matter of choice, for producers is a matter of survival. The growth in consumers’ demand for certified products creates a race for farmers to meet these standards. My findings suggest that this race generates economically perverse effects. First, producers enter into a certification treadmill. Second, the local need for economic sustainability is ignored. Third, commodity based alternative trade schemes increase the exposure of communities to global shocks. I conclude by calling for a careful reassessment of sustainable development projects that promote certification schemes. The designers and implementers of these programs must include farmers’ agenda in the planning of these programs.
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For the first time in more than fifty years, the domestic and external conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are not primarily ideological in nature. Democracy continues to thrive and its promise still inspires hope. In contrast, the illegal production, consumption, and trading of drugs – and its links to criminal gangs and organizations – represent major challenges to the region, undermining several States’ already weak capacity to govern. While LAC macroeconomic stability has remained resilient, illegal economies fill the region, often offering what some States have not historically been able to provide – elements of human security, opportunities for social mobility, and basic survival. Areas controlled by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) are now found in Central America, Mexico, and the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, reflecting their competition for land routes and production areas. Cartels such as La Familia, Los Zetas, and Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC-Brazil), among others, operate like trade and financial enterprises that manage millions of dollars and resources, demonstrating significant business skills in adapting to changing circumstances. They are also merciless in their application of violence to preserve their lucrative enterprises. The El Salvador-Guatemala-Honduras triangle in Central America is now the most violent region in the world, surpassing regions in Africa that have been torn by civil strife for years. In Brazil’s favelas and Guatemala’s Petén region, the military is leaving the barracks again; not to rule, however, but to supplement and even replace the law enforcement capacity of weak and discredited police forces. This will challenge the military to apply lessons learned during the course of their experience in government, or from the civil wars that plagued the region for nearly 50 years during the Cold War. Will they be able to conduct themselves according to the professional ethics that have been inculcated over the past 20 years without incurring violations of human rights? Belief in their potential to do good is high according to many polls as the Armed Forces still enjoy a favorable perception in most societies, despite frequent involvement in corruption. Calling them to fight DTOs, however, may bring them too close to the illegal activities they are being asked to resist, or even rekindle the view that only a “strong hand” can resolve national troubles. The challenge of governance is occurring as contrasts within the region are becoming sharper. There is an increasing gap between nations positioned to surpass their “developing nation” status and those that are practically imploding as the judicial, political and enforcement institutions fall further into the quagmire of illicit activities. Several South American nations are advancing their political and economic development. Brazil in particular has realized macro-economic stability, made impressive gains in poverty reduction, and is on track to potentially become a significant oil producer. It is also an increasingly influential power, much closer to the heralded “emerging power” category that it aspired to for most of the 20th century. In contrast, several Central American States have become so structurally deficient, and have garnered such limited legitimacy, that their countries have devolved into patches of State controlled and non-State-controlled territory, becoming increasingly vulnerable to DTO entrenchment. In the Caribbean, the drug and human trafficking business also thrives. Small and larger countries are experiencing the growing impact of illicit economies and accompanying crime and violence. Among these, Guyana and Suriname face greater uncertainty, as they juggle both their internal affairs and their relations with Brazil and Venezuela. Cuba also faces new challenges as it continues focusing on internal rather than external affairs and attempts to ensure a stable leadership succession while simultaneously trying to reform its economy. Loosening the regime’s tight grip on the economy while continuing to curtail citizen’s civil rights will test the leadership’s ability to manage change and prevent a potential socio-economic crisis from turning into an existential threat. Cuba’s past ideological zest is now in the hands of Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, who continues his attempts to bring the region together under Venezuelan leadership ideologically based on a “Bolivarian” anti-U.S. banner, without much success. The environment and natural disasters will merit more attention in the coming years. Natural events will produce increasing scales of destruction as the States in the region fail to maintain and expand existing infrastructure to withstand such calamities and respond to their effects. Prospects for earthquakes, tsunamis, and hurricanes are high, particularly in the Caribbean. In addition, there are growing rates of deforestation in nearly every country, along with a potential increase in cross-sector competition for resources. The losers might be small farmers, due to their inability to produce quantities commensurate to larger conglomerates. Regulations that could mitigate these types of situations are lacking or openly violated with near impunity. Indigenous and other vulnerable populations, including African descendants, in several Andean countries, are particularly affected by the increasing extraction of natural resources taking place amongst their terrain. This has led to protests against extraction activities that negatively affect their livelihoods, and in the process, these historically underprivileged groups have transitioned from agenda-based organization to one that is bringing its claims and grievances to the national political agenda, becoming more politically engaged. Symptomatic of these social issues is the region’s chronically poor quality of education that has consistently failed to reduce inequality and prepare new generations for jobs in the competitive global economy, particularly the more vulnerable populations. Simultaneously, the educational deficit is also exacerbated by the erosion of access to information and freedom of the press. The international panorama is also in flux. New security entities are challenging the old establishment. The Union of South American Nations, The South American Defense Council, the socialist Bolivarian Alliance, and other entities seem to be defying the Organization of American States and its own defense mechanisms, and excluding the U.S. And the U.S.’s attention to areas in conflict, namely Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – rather than to the more stable Latin America and Caribbean – has left ample room for other actors to elbow in. China is now the top trading partner for Brazil. Russian and Iran are also finding new partnerships in the region, yet their links appear more politically inclined than those of China. Finally, the aforementioned increasing commercial ties by LAC States with China have accelerated a return to the preponderance of commodities as sources of income for their economies. The increased extraction of raw material for export will produce greater concern over the environmental impact that is created by the exploitation of natural resources. These expanded trade opportunities may prove counterproductive economically for countries in the region, particularly for Brazil and Chile, two countries whose economic policies have long sought diversification from dependence on commodities to the development of service and technology based industries.
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Organized crime and illegal economies generate multiple threats to states and societies. But although the negative effects of high levels of pervasive street and organized crime on human security are clear, the relationships between human security, crime, illicit economies, and law enforcement are highly complex. By sponsoring illicit economies in areas of state weakness where legal economic opportunities and public goods are seriously lacking, both belligerent and criminal groups frequently enhance some elements of human security of the marginalized populations who depend on illicit economies for basic livelihoods. Even criminal groups without a political ideology often have an important political impact on the lives of communities and on their allegiance to the State. Criminal groups also have political agendas. Both belligerent and criminal groups can develop political capital through their sponsorship of illicit economies. The extent of their political capital is dependent on several factors. Efforts to defeat belligerent groups by decreasing their financial flows through suppression of an illicit economy are rarely effective. Such measures, in turn, increase the political capital of anti-State groups. The effectiveness of anti-money laundering measures (AML) also remains low and is often highly contingent on specific vulnerabilities of the target. The design of AML measures has other effects, such as on the size of a country’s informal economy. Multifaceted anti-crime strategies that combine law enforcement approaches with targeted socio-economic policies and efforts to improve public goods provision, including access to justice, are likely to be more effective in suppressing crime than tough nailed-fist approaches. For anti-crime policies to be effective, they often require a substantial, but politically-difficult concentration of resources in target areas. In the absence of effective law enforcement capacity, legalization and decriminalization policies of illicit economies are unlikely on their own to substantially reduce levels of criminality or to eliminate organized crime. Effective police reform, for several decades largely elusive in Latin America, is one of the most urgently needed policy reforms in the region. Such efforts need to be coupled with fundamental judicial and correctional systems reforms. Yet, regional approaches cannot obliterate the so-called balloon effect. If demand persists, even under intense law enforcement pressures, illicit economies will relocate to areas of weakest law enforcement, but they will not be eliminated.
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The Peruvian economy depends for its growth on the export of natural resources and investment in the mining and hydrocarbon sectors. Peruvian governments and mining corporations have confronted anti-mining protests in different ways. While the current government has introduced policies of social inclusion to soften the negative effects of the operations of mining capital and policies of dialogue to engage social actors with the essence of governmental policies, mining companies use corporate social responsibility programs as a cover for the devastating effects of their operations on the environment and the livelihoods and habitats of the indigenous and peasant communities. Curiously, in the current context of the declining commodity prices and export volumes the Peruvian government strengthens its extractivist model of development. This article argues that whatever government that follows the rules of capital cannot but favor the corporations. It points out the main adversaries of the indigenous and peasant communities and the problems to transform the locally and/or regionally struggle into a nationwide battle for another development model.
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This research starts from the presupposition that Cartilha do Silêncio(1997), a novel by the Brazilian writer Francisco Dantas, has a double articulated shift. One of the moves is towards the modern experience, with the idea that modernity is filled with contraries, as remarked by Nietzsche; the other is linked to the livelihoods ashore on traditional experiences, which encompasses the notion of memory as individual and collective ownership. The aim here is to analyze such perspective, social and critical issues within the characters' life stories that regards the calling of past as clear example that tradition is not gone, though modern life presents its own signs. Such dynamics gives to the plot a paradoxal feature. This work is mainly grounded on Marshall Berman' s thoughts in All That Is Solid Melts Into Air: The Experience of Modernity (1982) as well as on Antoine Compagnon'sFive Paradoxes of Modernity (1994). Assuming that Francisco Dantas' Novel is set as a split narrative, outcome of social memory originated on individual experiences aside social process and patriarchal family, this research brings into play the concept of memory by Jacques Le Goff in History and Memory (1992) along EcléaBosi's study in Memória e Sociedade: lembranças de velhos (1979). Keen to check how Cartilha do silêncio adjoins modern livelihoods with aesthetics order, the method articulates text and context, literary and social life, according to Antonio Candido'sLiteratura e Sociedade (1965). Thus, after reading the novel, it is possible to notice how the identity of the characters are built throughout the plot and it is also kept against settling on its social context during the transition from patriarchal tradition to modernity, creating a taut mood between both registries.
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The environment affects our health, livelihoods, and the social and political institutions within which we interact. Indeed, nearly a quarter of the global disease burden is attributed to environmental factors, and many of these factors are exacerbated by global climate change. Thus, the central research question of this dissertation is: How do people cope with and adapt to uncertainty, complexity, and change of environmental and health conditions? Specifically, I ask how institutional factors, risk aversion, and behaviors affect environmental health outcomes. I further assess the role of social capital in climate adaptation, and specifically compare individual and collective adaptation. I then analyze how policy develops accounting for both adaptation to the effects of climate and mitigation of climate-changing emissions. In order to empirically test the relationships between these variables at multiple levels, I combine multiple methods, including semi-structured interviews, surveys, and field experiments, along with health and water quality data. This dissertation uses the case of Ethiopia, Africa’s second-most populous nation, which has a large rural population and is considered very vulnerable to climate change. My fieldwork included interviews and institutional data collection at the national level, and a three-year study (2012-2014) of approximately 400 households in 20 villages in the Ethiopian Rift Valley. I evaluate the theoretical relationships between households, communities, and government in the process of adaptation to environmental stresses. Through my analyses, I demonstrate that water source choice varies by individual risk aversion and institutional context, which ultimately has implications for environmental health outcomes. I show that qualitative measures of trust predict cooperation in adaptation, consistent with social capital theory, but that measures of trust are negatively related with private adaptation by the individual. Finally, I describe how Ethiopia had some unique characteristics, significantly reinforced by international actors, that led to the development of an extensive climate policy, and yet with some challenges remaining for implementation. These results suggest a potential for adaptation through the interactions among individuals, communities, and government in the search for transformative processes when confronting environmental threats and climate change.
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Transnational governance has been advanced as a viable option for regulating commodities produced in emerging economies—where incapable or unwilling states may undersupply institutions requisite for overseeing supply chains consistent with the quality, safety, environmental, or social standards demanded by the global marketplace. Producers from these jurisdictions, otherwise left with few venues for securing market access and price premiums, ostensibly benefit from whatever pathways transnational actors offer to minimize barriers to entry—including voluntary certification for compliance with a panoply of public and private rules, such as those promulgated by NGOs like the Fair Trade Federation or multinational retailers like Wal-Mart. Yet, such transnational “sustainability” governance may neither be effective nor desirable. Regulatory schemes, like third-party certification, often privilege the interests of primary architects and beneficiaries—private business associations, governments, NGOs, and consumers in the global North—over regulatory targets—producers in the global South. Rather than engaging with the international marketplace via imported and externally-driven schemes, some producer groups are instead challenging existing rules and innovating homegrown institutions. These alternatives to commercialization adopt some institutional characteristics of their transnational counterparts yet deliver benefits in a manner more aligned with the needs of producers. Drawing on original empirical cases from Nicaragua and Mexico, this dissertation examines the role of domestic institutional alternatives to transnational governance in enhancing market access, environmental quality and rural livelihoods within producer communities. Unlike the more technocratic and expert-driven approaches characteristic of mainstream governance efforts, these local regulatory institutions build upon the social capital, indigenous identity, “ancestral” knowledge, and human assets of producer communities as new sources of power and legitimacy in governing agricultural commodities.