1000 resultados para Equilibrium Problem
Resumo:
Economics is the science of want and scarcity. We show that want andscarcity, operating within a simple exchange institution (double auction),are sufficient for an economy consisting of multiple inter--related marketsto attain competitive equilibrium (CE). We generalize Gode and Sunder's(1993a, 1993b) single--market finding to multi--market economies, andexplore the role of the scarcity constraint in convergence of economies to CE.When the scarcity constraint is relaxed by allowing arbitrageurs in multiple markets to enter speculative trades, prices still converge to CE,but allocative efficiency of the economy drops. \\Optimization by individual agents, often used to derive competitive equilibria,are unnecessary for an actual economy to approximately attain such equilibria.From the failure of humans to optimize in complex tasks, one need not concludethat the equilibria derived from the competitive model are descriptivelyirrelevant. We show that even in complex economic systems, such equilibriacan be attained under a range of surprisingly weak assumptions about agentbehavior.
Resumo:
Donors often rely on local intermediaries to deliver benefits to target beneficiaries. Each selected recipient observes if the intermediary under-delivers to them, so they serve as natural monitors. However, they may withhold complaints when feeling unentitled or grateful to the intermediary for selecting them. Furthermore, the intermediary may distort selection (e.g. by picking richer recipients who feel less entitled) to reduce complaints. We design an experimental game representing the donor s problem. In one treatment, the intermediary selects recipients. In the other, selection is random - as by an uninformed donor. In our data, random selection dominates delegation of the selection task to the intermediary. Selection distortions are similar, but intermediaries embezzle more when they have selection power and (correctly) expect fewer complaints.
Resumo:
We address the performance optimization problem in a single-stationmulticlass queueing network with changeover times by means of theachievable region approach. This approach seeks to obtainperformance bounds and scheduling policies from the solution of amathematical program over a relaxation of the system's performanceregion. Relaxed formulations (including linear, convex, nonconvexand positive semidefinite constraints) of this region are developedby formulating equilibrium relations satisfied by the system, withthe help of Palm calculus. Our contributions include: (1) newconstraints formulating equilibrium relations on server dynamics;(2) a flow conservation interpretation of the constraintspreviously derived by the potential function method; (3) newpositive semidefinite constraints; (4) new work decomposition lawsfor single-station multiclass queueing networks, which yield newconvex constraints; (5) a unified buffer occupancy method ofperformance analysis obtained from the constraints; (6) heuristicscheduling policies from the solution of the relaxations.
Resumo:
This paper examines competition in the standard one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections, but where one candidate (A) enjoys an advantage over the other candidate (D). Voters' preferences are Euclidean, but any voter will vote for candidate A over candidate D unless D is closer to her ideal point by some fixed distance \delta. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, and its distribution is commonly known by both candidates. The candidates simultaneously choose locations to maximize the probability of victory. Pure strategy equilibria often fails to exist in this model, except under special conditions about \delta and the distribution of the median ideal point. We solve for the essentially unique symmetric mixed equilibrium, show that candidate A adopts more moderate policies than candidate D, and obtain some comparative statics results about the probability of victory and the expected distance between the two candidates' policies.
Resumo:
We address the problem of scheduling a multi-station multiclassqueueing network (MQNET) with server changeover times to minimizesteady-state mean job holding costs. We present new lower boundson the best achievable cost that emerge as the values ofmathematical programming problems (linear, semidefinite, andconvex) over relaxed formulations of the system's achievableperformance region. The constraints on achievable performancedefining these formulations are obtained by formulatingsystem's equilibrium relations. Our contributions include: (1) aflow conservation interpretation and closed formulae for theconstraints previously derived by the potential function method;(2) new work decomposition laws for MQNETs; (3) new constraints(linear, convex, and semidefinite) on the performance region offirst and second moments of queue lengths for MQNETs; (4) a fastbound for a MQNET with N customer classes computed in N steps; (5)two heuristic scheduling policies: a priority-index policy, anda policy extracted from the solution of a linear programmingrelaxation.
Resumo:
In this paper, I analyze the ownership dynamics of N strategic risk-averse corporate insiders facing a moral hazard problem. A solution for the equilibrium share price and the dynamics of the aggregate insider stake is obtained in two cases: when agents can crediblycommit to an optimal ownership policy and when they cannot commit (time-consistent case). Inthe latter case, the aggregate stake gradually adjusts towards the competitive allocation. The speed of adjustment increases with N when outside investors are risk-averse, and does not depend on it when investors are risk-neutral. Predictions of the model are consistent with recent empirical findings.
Resumo:
This paper presents a simple Optimised Search Heuristic for the Job Shop Scheduling problem that combines a GRASP heuristic with a branch-and-bound algorithm. The proposed method is compared with similar approaches and leads to better results in terms of solution quality and computing times.
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We present new metaheuristics for solving real crew scheduling problemsin a public transportation bus company. Since the crews of thesecompanies are drivers, we will designate the problem by the bus-driverscheduling problem. Crew scheduling problems are well known and severalmathematical programming based techniques have been proposed to solvethem, in particular using the set-covering formulation. However, inpractice, there exists the need for improvement in terms of computationalefficiency and capacity of solving large-scale instances. Moreover, thereal bus-driver scheduling problems that we consider can present variantaspects of the set covering, as for example a different objectivefunction, implying that alternative solutions methods have to bedeveloped. We propose metaheuristics based on the following approaches:GRASP (greedy randomized adaptive search procedure), tabu search andgenetic algorithms. These metaheuristics also present some innovationfeatures based on and genetic algorithms. These metaheuristics alsopresent some innovation features based on the structure of the crewscheduling problem, that guide the search efficiently and able them tofind good solutions. Some of these new features can also be applied inthe development of heuristics to other combinatorial optimizationproblems. A summary of computational results with real-data problems ispresented.
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We consider a procurement problem in which the procurement agent is supposed to allocate the realization of a project according to a competitive mechanism that values bids in terms of the proposed price and quality. Potential bidders have private information about their production costs. Since the procurement agent is also in charge of verifying delivered quality, in exchange for a bribe, he can allow an arbitrary firm to be awarded the realization of the project and to produce a quality level lower than the announced. We compute the equilibrium level of corruption and we study the impact on corruption of the competitiveness of the environment, and in particular of: i) an increase in the number of potential suppliers of the good or service to be procured, ii) competitive (rather than collusive) behavior of procurement agents, and iii) an increase of competition in the market for procurement agents. We identify the effects that influence the equilibrium level of corruption and show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, corruption may well be increasing in competition.
Resumo:
We study the effects of nominal debt on the optimal sequential choice of monetary policy. When the stock of debt is nominal, the incentive to generate unanticipated inflation increases the cost of the outstanding debt even if no unanticipated inflation episodes occur in equilibrium. Without full commitment, the optimal sequential policy is to deplete the outstanding stock of debt progressively until these extra costs disappear. Nominal debt is therefore a burden on monetary policy, not only because it must be serviced, but also because it creates a time inconsistency problem that distorts interest rates. The introduction of alternative forms of taxation may lessen this burden, if there is enough commtiment to fiscal policy. If there is full commitment to an optimal fiscal policy, then the resulting monetary policy is the Friedman rule of zero nominal interest rates.
Resumo:
This article builds on the recent policy diffusion literature and attempts to overcome one of its major problems, namely the lack of a coherent theoretical framework. The literature defines policy diffusion as a process where policy choices are interdependent, and identifies several diffusion mechanisms that specify the link between the policy choices of the various actors. As these mechanisms are grounded in different theories, theoretical accounts of diffusion currently have little internal coherence. In this article we put forward an expected-utility model of policy change that is able to subsume all the diffusion mechanisms. We argue that the expected utility of a policy depends on both its effectiveness and the payoffs it yields, and we show that the various diffusion mechanisms operate by altering these two parameters. Each mechanism affects one of the two parameters, and does so in distinct ways. To account for aggregate patterns of diffusion, we embed our model in a simple threshold model of diffusion. Given the high complexity of the process that results, strong analytical conclusions on aggregate patterns cannot be drawn without more extensive analysis which is beyond the scope of this article. However, preliminary considerations indicate that a wide range of diffusion processes may exist and that convergence is only one possible outcome.