Geothermal Electricity Generation in Colorado: Actual and Perceived Obstacles to Greater Implementation

The objective of this paper is to provide an analysis of the potential and obstacles to the development of geothermal energy resources in Colorado. Geothermal energy is the only renewable resource that can provide base-load electricity. While Colorado has significant geothermal energy potential, there are no such power plants. Layers of federal and state laws and regulations represent one barrier to further geothermal development. Transmission constraints represent another major barrier. High exploration and construction costs along with high-risk profiles for geothermal projects form another major barrier. Perceived barriers such as misunderstanding the impacts, risks, and benefits of geothermal energy hinder further development. Recommendations are provided to help overcome these obstacles.

Una clave humanista de mediados del siglo XV para el Humanismo de la Corona de Aragón desde fines del siglo XIV: Ferran Valentí y el Prólogo a su traducción de las Paradoxa de Cicerón

In this article I study the Preface by Ferran Valentí to his own translation into Catalan of Cicero’s Paradoxa. Ferran Valentí was a humanist from Majorca, author in Catalan language who earned a Low Degree at the University of Bologna and who declared himself a devoted “son and pupil” of humanist Leonardo Bruni. Valentí made an analysis of the humanistic Canon in mid-15th century, including troubadours, Dante, Lullius, Latin literature classics and several Catalan authors, such as Bernat Metge. This proves that humanism was a true trend in the Crown of Aragon from the 2nd half of the 14th Century on.

En estil de fictes paraules que tenen sentits no fictes: anàlisi de locucions i col·locacions en Joan Roís de Corella en el context del llenguatge literari de la Corona d’Aragó en el segle XV

Aquest article presenta una mostra dels resultats de l’anàlisi detallada de locucions, col·locacions i altres elements fraseològics i d’ordre de mots significatius quant a la caracterització del cabal de llenguatge literari de Joan Roís de Corella. Aquesta anàlisi es fa amb metodologia interdisciplinar de base de lingüistica de corpus i de diacronia lingüistica, i amb el concurs de les tecnologies de la informació i la comunicació (humanitats digitals), que s’apliquen a l’anàlisi de l’aportació lèxica i estilística d’un autor clau com és Roís de Corella a fide calibrar el grau de sintonia i, alhora, d’especificitat del seu llenguatge literari; en quin grau coincideix el seu llenguatge literari amb el d’altres grans clàssics culturals de la Corona d’Aragó, i en què basa, alhora, Roís de Corella la clau de la seua mestria estilística.

The effect of electricity tariffs over the operating costs of the Spanish wastewater treatments plants

Given the complex structure of electricity tariffs and their steady growth in Spanish, we've studied its effect over the operating costs of the wastewater treatment plants (WWTP), concluding that in the last three years the revisions of electricity rates have meant increases in electricity costs of 64.5% in the rate 3.1.A and 79.1% in the rate 6.1. This has caused the cost of electricity, which was the most important, has increased from a 44% of total operating costs in the year 2009, to more than a 56% in the year 2012.

Electricity infrastructure: more border crossings or a borderless Europe? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/05, February 2013

Being able to transport electricity seamlessly across borders is essential for achieving three major European Union energy policy goals: (1) enabling competition between national energy companies, (2) cost-effective roll-out of renewables,and (3) security of supply. However, neither the market design nor the framework for infrastructure investment proposed by the European Commission is adequate for enabling free flows of electricity within the EU.

Electricity without borders: a plan to make the internal market work. Bruegel Blueprint Series 20, 5 September 2013

The most straightforward European single energy market design would entail a European system operator regulated by a single European regulator. This would ensure the predictable development of rules for the entire EU, significantly reducing regulatory uncertainty for electricity sector investments. But such a first-best market design is unlikely to be politically realistic in the European context for three reasons. First, the necessary changes compared to the current situation are substantial and would produce significant redistributive effects. Second, a European solution would deprive member states of the ability to manage their energy systems nationally. And third, a single European solution might fall short of being well-tailored to consumers’ preferences, which differ substantially across the EU. To nevertheless reap significant benefits from an integrated European electricity market, we propose the following blueprint: First, we suggest adding a European system-management layer to complement national operation centres and help them to better exchange information about the status of the system, expected changes and planned modifications. The ultimate aim should be to transfer the day-to-day responsibility for the safe and economic operation of the system to the European control centre. To further increase efficiency, electricity prices should be allowed to differ between all network points between and within countries. This would enable throughput of electricity through national and international lines to be safely increased without any major investments in infrastructure. Second, to ensure the consistency of national network plans and to ensure that they contribute to providing the infrastructure for a functioning single market, the role of the European ten year network development plan (TYNDP) needs to be upgraded by obliging national regulators to only approve projects planned at European level unless they can prove that deviations are beneficial. This boosted role of the TYNDP would need to be underpinned by resolving the issues of conflicting interests and information asymmetry. Therefore, the network planning process should be opened to all affected stakeholders (generators, network owners and operators, consumers, residents and others) and enable the European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) to act as a welfare-maximising referee. An ultimate political decision by the European Parliament on the entire plan will open a negotiation process around selecting alternatives and agreeing compensation. This ensures that all stakeholders have an interest in guaranteeing a certain degree of balance of interest in the earlier stages. In fact, transparent planning, early stakeholder involvement and democratic legitimisation are well suited for minimising as much as possible local opposition to new lines. Third, sharing the cost of network investments in Europe is a critical issue. One reason is that so far even the most sophisticated models have been unable to identify the individual long-term net benefit in an uncertain environment. A workable compromise to finance new network investments would consist of three components: (i) all easily attributable cost should be levied on the responsible party; (ii) all network users that sit at nodes that are expected to receive more imports through a line extension should be obliged to pay a share of the line extension cost through their network charges; (iii) the rest of the cost is socialised to all consumers. Such a cost-distribution scheme will involve some intra-European redistribution from the well-developed countries (infrastructure-wise) to those that are catching up. However, such a scheme would perform this redistribution in a much more efficient way than the Connecting Europe Facility’s ad-hoc disbursements to politically chosen projects, because it would provide the infrastructure that is really needed.