Iowa Law Enforcement Academy Performance Plan, FY 2009

Agency Performance Plan, Iowa Law Enforcement Academy

Moral hazard and non-exclusive contracts

This paper studies equilibria for economies characterized by moral hazard(hidden action), in which the set of contracts marketed in equilibrium isdetermined by the interaction of financial intermediaries.The crucial aspect of the environment that we study is thatintermediaries are restricted to trade non-exclusive contracts: theagents' contractual relationships with competing intermediaries cannot bemonitored (or are not contractible upon). We fully characterize equilibrium allocations and contracts. In thisset-up equilibrium allocations are clearly incentive constrainedinefficient. A robust property of equilibria with non-exclusivity isthat the contracts issued in equilibrium do not implement the optimalaction. Moreover we prove that, whenever equilibrium contracts doimplement the optimal action, intermediaries make positive profits andequilibrium allocations are third best inefficient (where the definitionof third best efficiency accounts for constraints which capture thenon-exclusivity of contracts).

Iowa Law Enforcement Academy, Strategic Plan, 2007

This report outlines the strategic plan for Iowa Law Enforcement Academy, goals and mission.

Financing constraints and fixed-term employment contracts

This paper studies the interactions between financing constraints and theemployment decisions of firms when both fixed-term and permanent employmentcontracts are available. We first develop a dynamic model that shows theeffects of financing constraints and firing costs on employment decisions. Oncecalibrated, the model shows that financially constrained firms tend to use moreintensely fixed term workers, and to make them absorb a larger fraction of thetotal employment volatility than financially unconstrained firms do. We testand confirm the predictions of the model on a unique panel data of Italian manufacturingfirms with detailed information about the type of workers employedby the firms and about firm financing constraints.

Iowa Department of Transportation Office of Contracts Letting Summary - Fiscal 2008

Report of the letting activity of the Iowa Department of Transportation's Office of Contracts required by Iowa Code Section 307.12(15).

Fick's law adapted to cationic diffusion in a semi-infinite solid: application to spinel megacrystals

In alkaline lavas, the chemical zoning of megacrystals of spinel is due to the cationic exchange between the latter and the host lava. The application of Fick's law to cationic diffusion profiles allows to calculate the time these crystals have stayed in the lava. Those which are in a chemical equilibrium were in contact with the lava during 20 to 30 days, whereas megacrystals lacking this equilibrium were in contact only for 3 or 4 days. The duration of the rise of an ultrabasic nodule in the volcanic chimney was calculated by applying Stokes' law.

Dynamic optimal law enforcement with learning

We incorporate the process of enforcement learning by assuming that the agency's current marginal cost is a decreasing function of its past experience of detecting and convicting. The agency accumulates data and information (on criminals, on opportunities of crime) enhancing the ability to apprehend in the future at a lower marginal cost.We focus on the impact of enforcement learning on optimal stationary compliance rules. In particular, we show that the optimal stationary fine could be less-than-maximal and the optimal stationary probability of detection could be higher-than-otherwise.

Optimal law enforcement under asymmetric information

In this paper, we focus on the problem created by asymmetric informationabout the enforcer's (agent's) costs associated to enforcement expenditure. This adverse selection problem affects optimal law enforcement because a low cost enforcer may conceal its information by imitating a high cost enforcer, and must then be given a compensation to be induced to reveal its true costs. The government faces a trade-off between minimizing the enforcer's compensation and maximizing the net surplus of harmful acts. As a consequence, the probability of apprehension and punishment is usually reduced leading to more offenses being committed. We show that asymmetry of information does not affect law enforcement as long as raising public funds is costless. The consideration of costly raising of public funds permits to establish the positive correlation between asymmetry of information between government and enforcers andthe crime rate.

Audit report on the Webster County Metropolitan Law Enforcement Telecommunications Board for the year ended June 30, 2008

Audit report on the Webster County Metropolitan Law Enforcement Telecommunications Board for the year ended June 30, 2008

Report on the Iowa Law Enforcement Academy for the year ended June 30, 2008

Report on the Iowa Law Enforcement Academy for the year ended June 30, 2008

Department Law Enforcement Academy, FY 2007

These Facts sheets have been developed to provide a multitude of information about executive branch agencies/departments on a single sheet of paper. The Facts provides general information, contact information, workforce data, leave & benefits information, and affirmative action data. This is the most recent update of information for the fiscal year 2007.

Department Law Enforcement Academy, FY 2008

These Facts sheets have been developed to provide a multitude of information about executive branch agencies/departments on a single sheet of paper. The Facts provides general information, contact information, workforce data, leave & benefits information, and affirmative action data. This is the most recent update of information for the fiscal year 2007.

Department Law Enforcement Academy, FY 2008

These Facts sheets have been developed to provide a multitude of information about executive branch agencies/departments on a single sheet of paper. The Facts provides general information, contact information, workforce data, leave & benefits information, and affirmative action data. This is the most recent update of information for the fiscal year 2007.