Dialogue in the crisis of representation : realism and antirealism in the context of the conversation between theologians and quantum physicists in Göttingen 1949-1961

The aim of this study is to analyse the content of the interdisciplinary conversations in Göttingen between 1949 and 1961. The task is to compare models for describing reality presented by quantum physicists and theologians. Descriptions of reality indifferent disciplines are conditioned by the development of the concept of reality in philosophy, physics and theology. Our basic problem is stated in the question: How is it possible for the intramental image to match the external object?Cartesian knowledge presupposes clear and distinct ideas in the mind prior to observation resulting in a true correspondence between the observed object and the cogitative observing subject. The Kantian synthesis between rationalism and empiricism emphasises an extended character of representation. The human mind is not a passive receiver of external information, but is actively construing intramental representations of external reality in the epistemological process. Heidegger's aim was to reach a more primordial mode of understanding reality than what is possible in the Cartesian Subject-Object distinction. In Heidegger's philosophy, ontology as being-in-the-world is prior to knowledge concerning being. Ontology can be grasped only in the totality of being (Dasein), not only as an object of reflection and perception. According to Bohr, quantum mechanics introduces an irreducible loss in representation, which classically understood is a deficiency in knowledge. The conflicting aspects (particle and wave pictures) in our comprehension of physical reality, cannot be completely accommodated into an entire and coherent model of reality. What Bohr rejects is not realism, but the classical Einsteinian version of it. By the use of complementary descriptions, Bohr tries to save a fundamentally realistic position. The fundamental question in Barthian theology is the problem of God as an object of theological discourse. Dialectics is Barth¿s way to express knowledge of God avoiding a speculative theology and a human-centred religious self-consciousness. In Barthian theology, the human capacity for knowledge, independently of revelation, is insufficient to comprehend the being of God. Our knowledge of God is real knowledge in revelation and our words are made to correspond with the divine reality in an analogy of faith. The point of the Bultmannian demythologising programme was to claim the real existence of God beyond our faculties. We cannot simply define God as a human ideal of existence or a focus of values. The theological programme of Bultmann emphasised the notion that we can talk meaningfully of God only insofar as we have existential experience of his intervention. Common to all these twentieth century philosophical, physical and theological positions, is a form of anti-Cartesianism. Consequently, in regard to their epistemology, they can be labelled antirealist. This common insight also made it possible to find a common meeting point between the different disciplines. In this study, the different standpoints from all three areas and the conversations in Göttingen are analysed in the frameworkof realism/antirealism. One of the first tasks in the Göttingen conversations was to analyse the nature of the likeness between the complementary structures inquantum physics introduced by Niels Bohr and the dialectical forms in the Barthian doctrine of God. The reaction against epistemological Cartesianism, metaphysics of substance and deterministic description of reality was the common point of departure for theologians and physicists in the Göttingen discussions. In his complementarity, Bohr anticipated the crossing of traditional epistemic boundaries and the generalisation of epistemological strategies by introducing interpretative procedures across various disciplines.

The history of Lapland : wherein are shewed the original manners, habits, marriages, conjurations, &c. of that people : written by John Scheffer, professor of law and rhetoric at Upsal in Sweden.

Added engraved title page: The history of Lapland.

Venäjän informaatio-psykologinen sodankäyntitapa terrorismin torjunnassa ja viiden päivän sodassa

This study examines Russia’s Pattern of Information-Psychologic Warfare in Counter-terrorism and in the Five Day War. The first case of this comparative case study research examines an internal national security crisis, namely two of the most notorious terrorist strikes that took place firstly in The Moscow Dubrovka Theater in October 2002 and two years later in Beslan School 2004 in September. In the second case an external national security crisis, the Five Day War conducted in August 2008 between the Russian Federation and the state of Georgia will be analyzed. At the centre of this research report lays an idea: a war of information by using information as the target and as a weapon. Based on a comparative case study setting this study tries to understand how Russian pattern of information warfare manifests itself in the light of these two internal / external national security crises. Three hypotheses that guide this research report are: Russian pattern of information warfare has a long tradition which can be traced back to the Cold War era; it is possible to discern specifically Russian, partially divergent information warfare pattern; and finally by exploring the two recent internal / external national security crises, it becomes possible to sketch specifically Russian systematics. In this research report the main focus of interest is on the information-psychological dimension of the overall information warfare concept as part of the military science tradition. After such theoretical review the two empirical cases will be contextualized and chronologically introduced. Analysis will be sharpened on the parties’ actions especially from the information-psychological perspective. This will be done with the help of the developed Russia’s six action fields-model which has been divided into two main dimensions: political and military with three levels: strategic informa-tion-psychological level, and two tactical levels, namely information-technical and information-PSYOP. This creates six possible actions fields. As the empirical analysis will reveal, many of these six action fields have been used by Russia in its internal / external national security crises, which proves the study’s hypotheses: Russia has its own pattern of information psychologic warfare that is based on its historical tradition and as such it creates a base for Russian systematics.

The strategic use of military contractors : American commercial military service providers in Bosnia and Liberia, 1995-2009

Drawing from strategic theory, this study investigates the strategic roles of commercial companies providing military services, frequently referred to as private military companies. Theoretically, the thesis analyzes how states organize its military capabilities in order to be able to wield power within the international system while empirically, it examines the character and role of commercial companies that provide military training services to the United States Government and partner nations. The reason for this rather instrumental and functional, rather than critical, approach is that this work is written within the discipline known as War Studies. Strategic theory is used first to logically organize the empirical findings in two case studies and then to develop an analytical framework with which the strategic roles of companies providing military services can be investigated. The analysis has been conducted using both new and hitherto unknown sources in the shape of interviews as well as previously classified telegrams, but also draws on previous research and other secondary sources. The main findings are that commercial companies have five typical strategic roles: first, they cloak the state by substituting traditional uniformed troops; second, they act as trailblazers by securing US influence in new regions and by breaking new ground by contributing to the build-up of new partners; third, they act as scene setters by preparing the ground for military exit out of a theater of operations or by facilitating inter-operability between foreign militaries and the US military; fourth, they can be used to infiltrate the security structures of foreign countries; fifth and finally, they can be used to provide offensive capabilities by providing either kinetic or cyber warfare effects. Another finding is that military service contracting is an important part of the US strategic culture.

Dynamic optimization for the trajectory planning of robot manipulators in the presence of obstacles

This paper presents an approach to the solution of moving a robot manipulator with minimum cost along a specified geometric path in the presence of obstacles. The main idea is to express obstacle avoidance in terms of the distances between potentially colliding parts. The optimal traveling time and the minimum mechanical energy of the actuators are considered together to build a multiobjective function. A simple numerical example involving a Cartesian manipulator arm with two-degree-of-freedom is described.

A Design Methodology for the Compensation of Positioning Deviation in Gantry Manipulators

This work presents recent results concerning a design methodology used to estimate the positioning deviation for a gantry (Cartesian) manipulator, related mainly to structural elastic deformation of components during operational conditions. The case-study manipulator is classified as gantry type and its basic dimensions are 1,53m x 0,97m x 1,38m. The dimensions used for the calculation of effective workspace due to end-effector path displacement are: 1m x 0,5m x 0,5m. The manipulator is composed by four basic modules defined as module X, module Y, module Z and terminal arm, where is connected the end-effector. Each module controlled axis performs a linear-parabolic positioning movement. The planning path algorithm has the maximum velocity and the total distance as input parameters for a given task. The acceleration and deceleration times are the same. Denavit-Hartemberg parameterization method is used in the manipulator kinematics model. The gantry manipulator can be modeled as four rigid bodies with three degrees-of-freedom in translational movements, connected as an open kinematics chain. Dynamic analysis were performed considering inertial parameters specification such as component mass, inertia and center of gravity position of each module. These parameters are essential for a correct manipulator dynamic modelling, due to multiple possibilities of motion and manipulation of objects with different masses. The dynamic analysis consists of a mathematical modelling of the static and dynamic interactions among the modules. The computation of the structural deformations uses the finite element method (FEM).

Building organizational creativity – a multitheory and multilevel approach for understanding and stimulating organizational creativity

Organizational creativity is increasingly important for organizations aiming to survive and thrive in complex and unexpectedly changing environments. It is precondition of innovation and a driver of an organization’s performance success. Whereas innovation research increasingly promotes high-involvement and participatory innovation, the models of organizational creativity are still mainly based on an individual-creativity view. Likewise, the definitions of organizational creativity and innovation are somewhat equal, and they are used as interchangeable constructs, while on the other hand they are seen as different constructs. Creativity is seen as generation of novel and useful ideas, whereas innovation is seen as the implementation of these ideas. The research streams of innovation and organizational creativity seem to be advancing somewhat separately, although together they could provide many synergy advantages. Thereby, this study addresses three main research gaps. First, as the knowledge and knowing is being increasingly expertized and distributed in organizations, the conceptualization of organizational creativity needs to face that perspective, rather than relying on the individual-creativity view. Thus, the conceptualization of organizational creativity needs clarification, especially as an organizational-level phenomenon (i.e., creativity by an organization). Second, approaches to consciously build organizational creativity to increase the capacity of an organization to demonstrate novelty in its knowledgeable actions are rare. The current creativity techniques are mainly based on individual-creativity views, and they mainly focus on the occasional problem-solving cases among a limited number of individuals, whereas, the development of collective creativity and creativity by the organization lacks approaches. Third, in terms of organizational creativity as a collective phenomenon, the engagement, contributions, and participation of organizational members into activities of common meaning creation are more important than the individualcreativity skills. Therefore, the development approaches to foster creativity as social, emerging, embodied, and collective creativity are needed to complement the current creativity techniques. To address these gaps, the study takes a multiparadigm perspective to face the following three objectives. The first objective of this study is to clarify and extend the conceptualization of organizational creativity. The second is to study the development of organizational creativity. The third is to explore how an improvisational theater based approach fosters organizational creativity. The study consists of two parts comprising the introductory part (part I) and six publications (part II). Each publication addresses the research questions of the thesis through detailed subquestions. The study makes three main contributions to the research of organizational creativity. First, it contributes toward the conceptualization of organizational creativity by extending the current view of organizational creativity. This study views organizational creativity as a multilevel construct constituting both of individual and collective (group and organizational) creativity. In contrast to current views of organizational creativity, this study bases on organizational (collective) knowledge that is based on and demonstrated through the knowledgeable actions of an organization as a whole. The study defines organizational creativity as an overall ability of an organization to demonstrate novelty in its knowledgeable actions (through what it does and how it does what it does).Second, this study contributes toward the development of organizational creativity as multi-level phenomena, introducing developmental approaches that face two or more of these levels simultaneously. More specifically, the study presents the cross-level approaches to building organizational creativity, by using an approach based in improvisational theater and considering assessment of organizational renewal capability. Third, the study contributes on development of organizational creativity using an improvisational theater based approach as twofold meaning. First, it fosters individual and collective creativity simultaneously and builds space for creativity to occur. Second, it models collective and distributed creativity processes, thereby, contributing to the conceptualization of organizational creativity.

Näyttelijän taide venäläisessä elokuvassa 1907-1919

Väitöskirjan aihe on, kuinka elokuvanäyttelijän taide ja sitä koskeva ajattelu kehittyivät Venäjällä yksityisen elokuvatuotannon vuosina 1907–1919. Tutkimus kuuluu kulttuurihistorian alaan. Sen näkökulma on elokuvan esteettinen historia, ja tutkimus liittyy ns. revisionistisen elokuvahistorian pyrkimykseen arvioida uudelleen näytelmäelokuvan varhaisvaiheita. Analyysi kohdistuu esteettiseen aikalaisajatteluun sekä elokuvatuotannon käytäntöihin ja prosesseihin. Lähteinä on käytetty elokuvanäyttelemistä koskevaa julkista keskustelua, elokuvantekijöiden jättämää muistietoa ja ajalta säilyneitä elokuvia. Käsittely jakautuu kolmeen väljän kronologisesti järjestettyyn lukuun. Luku 2 keskittyy venäläisen fiktioelokuvan varhaisvuosiin 1910-luvun taitteen molemmin puolin. Luku 3 käsittelee pitkän näytelmäelokuvan läpimurrosta alkunsa saanutta keskustelua psykologisesta elokuvasta. Luku 4 etenee maailmansodan vuosina nouseen kuvallisen, ohjaajakeskeisen elokuvakäsityksen kautta kohti varhaisen neuvostoelokuvan ajatusta näyttelijästä ”mallina”. Väitöskirjassa esitetään, että käsitys näyttelemisestä, ja sitä myötä elokuvasta yleensä, kävi tutkittuna ajanjaksona läpi kehämäisen kehityksen, jossa vuorottelivat käsitykset elokuvasta modernina ja elokuvasta traditiona. Tutkimus problematisoi myöhempää elokuvakäsitystä, jonka mukaan elokuvaestetiikan perusyksikkö on otos. Toisin kuin myöhempinä vuosikymmeninä 1910-luvulla näytteleminen oli avainkysymys, jonka kautta lähestyttiin elokuvan olemusta itseään. Venäjällä ajatukset elokuvanäyttelemisestä kehittyivät vuorovaikutuksessa saman ajan teatteriestetiikan kanssa, joskin elokuva miellettiin jo varhain erilliseksi taidemuodoksi. Tsaarinajan elokuvan vaikutusvaltaisimmaksi esteettiseksi ohjelmaksi muodostui psykologinen elokuva, jonka inspiraationa toimi osittain Konstantin Stanislavskin samaan aikaan kehittämä näyttelijäntyön järjestelmä. Elävä näyttelijä ja näyttelijän ”kokeminen” nähtiin ratkaisuna elokuvavälineen keskeisenä ongelmana pidettyyn mekaanisuuteen. Ajan studiokäytännöissä psykologinen lähestymistapa puolestaan merkitsi usein vastausten etsimistä teollisen elokuvatuotannon olosuhteista syntyneisiin ongelmiin.

Stiffness based trajectory planning and feedforward based vibration suppression control of parallel robot machines

The dissertation proposes two control strategies, which include the trajectory planning and vibration suppression, for a kinematic redundant serial-parallel robot machine, with the aim of attaining the satisfactory machining performance. For a given prescribed trajectory of the robot's end-effector in the Cartesian space, a set of trajectories in the robot's joint space are generated based on the best stiffness performance of the robot along the prescribed trajectory. To construct the required system-wide analytical stiffness model for the serial-parallel robot machine, a variant of the virtual joint method (VJM) is proposed in the dissertation. The modified method is an evolution of Gosselin's lumped model that can account for the deformations of a flexible link in more directions. The effectiveness of this VJM variant is validated by comparing the computed stiffness results of a flexible link with the those of a matrix structural analysis (MSA) method. The comparison shows that the numerical results from both methods on an individual flexible beam are almost identical, which, in some sense, provides mutual validation. The most prominent advantage of the presented VJM variant compared with the MSA method is that it can be applied in a flexible structure system with complicated kinematics formed in terms of flexible serial links and joints. Moreover, by combining the VJM variant and the virtual work principle, a systemwide analytical stiffness model can be easily obtained for mechanisms with both serial kinematics and parallel kinematics. In the dissertation, a system-wide stiffness model of a kinematic redundant serial-parallel robot machine is constructed based on integration of the VJM variant and the virtual work principle. Numerical results of its stiffness performance are reported. For a kinematic redundant robot, to generate a set of feasible joints' trajectories for a prescribed trajectory of its end-effector, its system-wide stiffness performance is taken as the constraint in the joints trajectory planning in the dissertation. For a prescribed location of the end-effector, the robot permits an infinite number of inverse solutions, which consequently yields infinite kinds of stiffness performance. Therefore, a differential evolution (DE) algorithm in which the positions of redundant joints in the kinematics are taken as input variables was employed to search for the best stiffness performance of the robot. Numerical results of the generated joint trajectories are given for a kinematic redundant serial-parallel robot machine, IWR (Intersector Welding/Cutting Robot), when a particular trajectory of its end-effector has been prescribed. The numerical results show that the joint trajectories generated based on the stiffness optimization are feasible for realization in the control system since they are acceptably smooth. The results imply that the stiffness performance of the robot machine deviates smoothly with respect to the kinematic configuration in the adjacent domain of its best stiffness performance. To suppress the vibration of the robot machine due to varying cutting force during the machining process, this dissertation proposed a feedforward control strategy, which is constructed based on the derived inverse dynamics model of target system. The effectiveness of applying such a feedforward control in the vibration suppression has been validated in a parallel manipulator in the software environment. The experimental study of such a feedforward control has also been included in the dissertation. The difficulties of modelling the actual system due to the unknown components in its dynamics is noticed. As a solution, a back propagation (BP) neural network is proposed for identification of the unknown components of the dynamics model of the target system. To train such a BP neural network, a modified Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm that can utilize an experimental input-output data set of the entire dynamic system is introduced in the dissertation. Validation of the BP neural network and the modified Levenberg- Marquardt algorithm is done, respectively, by a sinusoidal output approximation, a second order system parameters estimation, and a friction model estimation of a parallel manipulator, which represent three different application aspects of this method.

Differential effects of aging on spatial contrast sensitivity to linear and polar sine-wave gratings

Changes in visual function beyond high-contrast acuity are known to take place during normal aging. We determined whether sensitivity to linear sine-wave gratings and to an elementary stimulus preferentially processed in extrastriate areas could be distinctively affected by aging. We measured spatial contrast sensitivity twice for concentric polar (Bessel) and vertical linear gratings of 0.6, 2.5, 5, and 20 cycles per degree (cpd) in two age groups (20-30 and 60-70 years). All participants were free of identifiable ocular disease and had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. Participants were more sensitive to Cartesian than to polar gratings in all frequencies tested, and the younger adult group was more sensitive to all stimuli tested. Significant differences between sensitivities of the two groups were found for linear (only 20 cpd; P<0.01) and polar gratings (all frequencies tested; P<0.01). The young adult group was significantly more sensitive to linear than to circular gratings in the 20 cpd frequency. The older adult group was significantly more sensitive to linear than to circular gratings in all spatial frequencies, except in the 20 cpd frequency. The results suggest that sensitivity to the two kinds of stimuli is affected differently by aging. We suggest that neural changes in the aging brain are important determinants of this difference and discuss the results according to current models of human aging.

A complexidade e o construtivismo na economia

Complexity and constructivism in economics. This paper attempts to show and summarize the concept of rules, order and complexity introduced around the mid-twentieth century by Friedrich August von Hayek. It also attempts to create a current parallel between those concepts and the field of complexity economics. At the time of his writings, the author sought to present arguments against the Cartesian rationality. Nowadays, the concepts presented by him could also serve as arguments against the way of thought used in mainstream microeconomics. A debate can now be seen between the mainstream microeconomics and the authors of the complexity theory applied to the economy, which can be understood as explanations guided by generic assumptions versus natural explanations guided in a computational approach.

A new map of Denmark, Norway, Sweden & Moscovy, shewing their present general divisions, cheif, cities or towns, rivers, mountains, &c.: dedicated to his highness William Duke of Glocester

0-meridiaani Lontoo: Koordinaattiasteikko: W15°-E85°, N74°30'-48°.

Kierkegaard : the temporality of becoming a self

Introduction In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze compares and contrasts Kierkegaard's and Nietzsche's ideas of repetition. He argues that neither of them really give a representation of repetition. Repetition for them is a sort of selective task: the way in which they determine what is ethical and eternal. With Nietzsche, it is a theater of un belie f. ..... Nietzsche's leading idea is to found the repetition in the etemal return at once on the death of God and the dissolution of the self But it is a quite different alliance in the theater of faith: Kierkegaard dreams of alliance between a God and a self rediscovered. I Repetition plays a theatrical role in their thinking. It allows them to dramatically stage the interplay of various personnae. Deleuze does give a positive account ofKierkegaard's "repetition"; however, he does not think that Kierkegaard works out a philosophical model, or a representation of what repetition is. It is true that in the book Repetition, Constantin Constantius does not clearly and fully work out the concept of repetition, but in Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard gives a full explanation of the self and its temporality which can be connected with repetition. When Sickness Unto Death is interpreted according to key passages from Repetition and The Concept of Anxiety, a clear philosophical concept of repetition can be established. In my opinion, Kierkegaard's philosophy is about the task of becoming a self, and I will be attempting to show that he does have a model of the temporality of self-becoming. In Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard explains his notions of despair with reference to sin, self, self-becoming, faith, and repetition. Despair is a sickness of the spirit, of the self, and accordingly can take three forms: in despair not to be conscious of having a self (not despair in the strict sense); in despair not to will to be oneself; in despair to will to be oneself2 In relation to this definition, he defines a self as "a relation that relates itself to itself and in relating itself to itself relates to another.''3 Thus, a person is a threefold relationship, and any break in that relationship is despair. Despair takes three forms corresponding to the three aspects of a self s relation to itself Kierkegaard says that a selfis like a house with a basement, a first floor, and a second floor.4 This model of the house, and the concept of the stages on life's way that it illustrates, is central to Kierkegaard's philosophy. This thesis will show how he unpacks this model in many of his writings with different concepts being developed in different texts. His method is to work with the same model in different ways throughout his authorship. He assigns many of the texts to different pseudonyms, but in this thesis we will treat the model and the related concepts as being Kierkegaard's and not only the pseudonyms. This is justified as our thesis will show this modelremains the same throughout Kierkegaard's work, though it is treated in different ways by different pseudonyms. According to Kierkegaard, many people live in only the basement for their entire lives, that is, as aesthetes ("in despair not to be conscious of having a self'). They live in despair of not being conscious of having a self They live in a merely horizontal relation. They want to get what they desire. When they go to the first floor, so to speak, they reflect on themselves and only then do they begin to get a self In this stage, one acquires an ideology of the required and overcomes the strict commands of the desired. The ethical is primarily an obedience to the required whereas the aesthetic is an obedience to desire. In his work Fear and Trembling (Copenhagen: 1843), Johannes de Silentio makes several observations concerning this point. In this book, the author several times allows the desired ideality of esthetics to be shipwrecked on the required ideality of ethics, in order through these collisions to bring to light the religious ideality as the ideality that precisely is the ideality of actuality, and therefore just as desirable as that of esthetics and not as impossible as the ideality of ethics. This is accomplished in such a way that the religious ideality breaks forth in the dialectical leap and in the positive mood - "Behold all things have become new" as well as in the negative mood that is the passion of the absurd to which the concept "repetition" corresponds.s Here one begins to become responsible because one seeks the required ideality; however, the required ideality and the desired ideality become inadequate to the ethical individual. Neither of them satisfy him ("in despair not to will to be oneself'). Then he moves up to the second floor: that is, the mystical region, or the sphere of religiousness (A) ("despair to will to be oneself). Kiericegaard's model of a house, which is connected with the above definition ofdespair, shows us how the self arises through these various stages, and shows the stages of despair as well. On the second floor, we become mystics, or Knights of Infinite Resignation. We are still in despair because we despair ofthe basement and the first floor, however, we can be fiill, free persons only ifwe live on all the floors at the same time. This is a sort of paradoxical fourth stage consisting of all three floors; this is the sphere of true religiousness (religiousness (B)). It is distinguished from religiousness (A) because we can go back and live on all the floors. It is not that there are four floors, but in the fourth stage, we live paradoxically on three at once. Kierkegaard uses this house analogy in order to explain how we become a self through these stages, and to show the various stages of despair. Consequently, I will be explaining self-becoming in relation to despair. It will also be necessary to explain it in relation to faith, for faith is precisely the overcoming of despair. After explaining the becoming of the self in relation to despair and faith, I will then explain its temporality and thereby its repetition. What Kierkegaard calls a formula, Deleuze calls a representation. Unfortunately, Deleuze does not acknowledge Kierkegaard's formula for repetition. As we shall see, Kierkegaard clearly gives a formula for despair, faith, and selfbecoming. When viewed properly, these formulae yield a formula for repetition because when one hasfaith, the basement, firstfloor, and secondfloor become new as one becomes oneself The self is not bound in the eternity ofthe first floor (ethical) or the temporality of the basement (aesthete). I shall now examine the two forms of conscious despair in such a way as to point out also a rise in the consciousness of the nature of despair and in the consciousness that one's state is despair, or, what amounts to the same thing and is the salient point, a rise in the consciousness of the self The opposite to being in despair is to have faith. Therefore, the formula set forth above, which describes a state in which there is not despair at all, is entirely correct, and this formula is also the formula for faMi in ^elating itself to itself and in willing to be itself, the self rests transparently in the power that established it.

From inference to affordance : the problem of visual depth-perception in the optical writings of Descartes, Berkeley, and Gibson

This thesis explores the debate and issues regarding the status of visual ;,iferellces in the optical writings of Rene Descartes, George Berkeley and James 1. Gibson. It gathers arguments from across their works and synthesizes an account of visual depthperception that accurately reflects the larger, metaphysical implications of their philosophical theories. Chapters 1 and 2 address the Cartesian and Berkelean theories of depth-perception, respectively. For Descartes and Berkeley the debate can be put in the following way: How is it possible that we experience objects as appearing outside of us, at various distances, if objects appear inside of us, in the representations of the individual's mind? Thus, the Descartes-Berkeley component of the debate takes place exclusively within a representationalist setting. Representational theories of depthperception are rooted in the scientific discovery that objects project a merely twodimensional patchwork of forms on the retina. I call this the "flat image" problem. This poses the problem of depth in terms of a difference between two- and three-dimensional orders (i.e., a gap to be bridged by one inferential procedure or another). Chapter 3 addresses Gibson's ecological response to the debate. Gibson argues that the perceiver cannot be flattened out into a passive, two-dimensional sensory surface. Perception is possible precisely because the body and the environment already have depth. Accordingly, the problem cannot be reduced to a gap between two- and threedimensional givens, a gap crossed with a projective geometry. The crucial difference is not one of a dimensional degree. Chapter 3 explores this theme and attempts to excavate the empirical and philosophical suppositions that lead Descartes and Berkeley to their respective theories of indirect perception. Gibson argues that the notion of visual inference, which is necessary to substantiate representational theories of indirect perception, is highly problematic. To elucidate this point, the thesis steps into the representationalist tradition, in order to show that problems that arise within it demand a tum toward Gibson's information-based doctrine of ecological specificity (which is to say, the theory of direct perception). Chapter 3 concludes with a careful examination of Gibsonian affordallces as the sole objects of direct perceptual experience. The final section provides an account of affordances that locates the moving, perceiving body at the heart of the experience of depth; an experience which emerges in the dynamical structures that cross the body and the world.

Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.