Joined-up government in Ireland:From un-strategic choices to patriotic imperatives

Over the last decade, joined-up government has assumed a prominent place in the study and practice of public management. In this article, drawing on the Irish case we adopt an institutionalist approach to the issue of joining-up government and bureaucratic reform. We explore how the period of sustained and rapid economic growth in Ireland during the 1990s was also characterised by a fragmentation of the public service and proliferation of agencies. Subsequently, as a consequence of the sharp contraction in public spending brought about by the global financial crisis, we find an accelerated process of public sector recentralisation, retrenchment and de-agencification. Much of this is occurring in an unplanned manner but under the generic banner of 'joining up' government. We identify the drivers behind these dynamics and how they have manifested themselves, as well as the changes to politicaladministrative relationships brought about by new initiatives, the power imbalances they expose, and ultimately their consequences on public service delivery. © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.

Stressed Web Environments as Strategic Games: Risk Profiles and Weltanschauung

We consider the behaviour of a set of services in a stressed web environment where performance patterns may be difficult to predict. In stressed environments the performances of some providers may degrade while the performances of others, with elastic resources, may improve. The allocation of web-based providers to users (brokering) is modelled by a strategic non-cooperative angel-daemon game with risk profiles. A risk profile specifies a bound on the number of unreliable service providers within an environment without identifying the names of these providers. Risk profiles offer a means of analysing the behaviour of broker agents which allocate service providers to users. A Nash equilibrium is a fixed point of such a game in which no user can locally improve their choice of provider – thus, a Nash equilibrium is a viable solution to the provider/user allocation problem. Angel daemon games provide a means of reasoning about stressed environments and offer the possibility of designing brokers using risk profiles and Nash equilibria.

Equal Security: Europe and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 1968-1976

SALT threatened to institutionalize a bipolar world order. NWS and NNWS alike feared that the US and SU will prioritize global security principles such as systemic stability and conflict stability to Atlantic and European security. Endangered was Europe’s security and position in the future world order. Parity in strategic weapons invalidated the US nuclear umbrella. An ABM deployment and a non-transfer regime threatened Europe’s nuclear defence options. The danger of a Limited War or a denuclearization of Central Europe led to a European co-ordination on nuclear arms control to assure the preservation of the West and the future of Europe.

The impact of union presence and strategic human resource management on employee voice in multinational enterprises in Australia

In this article, we examine the use and character of employee voice mechanisms of foreign-owned multinational enterprises operating in Australia, as well as the influence of a strategic human resource management approach and union presence. Findings indicate that foreign-owned multinational enterprises are high-level users of the full range of employee voice mechanisms, with the exceptions of use of employee suggestion schemes, trade union recognition and the use of joint consultation committees across all sites. Using logistic regression analysis, findings show that trade union presence, a strategic human resource management approach, greenfield site and country of origin impact the employee voice approach adopted. High trade union presence is associated with an indirect employee voice approach. A low trade union presence is associated with a direct or a minimalist approach to employee voice. Moreover, a strategic human resource management approach is associated with both direct and dualistic approaches to employee voice. Implications are drawn for theory and practice. © Australian Labour and Employment Relations Association (ALERA) SAGE Publications Ltd, Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore and Washington DC.

Partial Cooperation in Strategic Decision Situations

We consider a normal form game in which there is a single exogenously given coalition of cooperating players that can write a binding agreement on pre-selected actions. These collective actions typically represent a certain number of dimensions in the players’ strategy space. The actions represented by the other dimensions of the strategy space remain under the complete, individual control of the players.
We consider a standard extension of the Nash equilibrium concept denoted as a partial cooperative equilibrium as well as an equilibrium concept in which the coalition of cooperators has a leadership position. Existence results are developed for these new equilibrium concepts. We identify conditions on these partial cooperative games under which the various equilibrium concepts are equivalent.
We apply this game theoretic framework to existing models of multi-market oligopolies and international pollution abatement. In a multi-market oligopoly typically a merger paradox emerges in the partial cooperative equilibrium, which vanishes if the cartel of collaborators exploits its leadership position. Our application to international pollution abatement treaties shows that cooperation by a sufficiently large group of countries results in a Pareto improvement over the standard tragedy of the commons outcome described by the Nash equilibrium.