Incomplete information games of conflict and collective action

My thesis consists of three essays that investigate strategic interactions between individuals engaging in risky collective action in uncertain environments. The first essay analyzes a broad class of incomplete information coordination games with a wide range of applications in economics and politics. The second essay draws from the general model developed in the first essay to study decisions by individuals of whether to engage in protest/revolution/coup/strike. The final essay explicitly integrates state response to the analysis. The first essay, Coordination Games with Strategic Delegation of Pivotality, exhaustively analyzes a class of binary action, two-player coordination games in which players receive stochastic payoffs only if both players take a ``stochastic-coordination action''. Players receive conditionally-independent noisy private signals about the normally distributed stochastic payoffs. With this structure, each player can exploit the information contained in the other player's action only when he takes the “pivotalizing action”. This feature has two consequences: (1) When the fear of miscoordination is not too large, in order to utilize the other player's information, each player takes the “pivotalizing action” more often than he would based solely on his private information, and (2) best responses feature both strategic complementarities and strategic substitutes, implying that the game is not supermodular nor a typical global game. This class of games has applications in a wide range of economic and political phenomena, including war and peace, protest/revolution/coup/ strike, interest groups lobbying, international trade, and adoption of a new technology. My second essay, Collective Action with Uncertain Payoffs, studies the decision problem of citizens who must decide whether to submit to the status quo or mount a revolution. If they coordinate, they can overthrow the status quo. Otherwise, the status quo is preserved and participants in a failed revolution are punished. Citizens face two types of uncertainty. (a) non-strategic: they are uncertain about the relative payoffs of the status quo and revolution, (b) strategic: they are uncertain about each other's assessments of the relative payoff. I draw on the existing literature and historical evidence to argue that the uncertainty in the payoffs of status quo and revolution is intrinsic in politics. Several counter-intuitive findings emerge: (1) Better communication between citizens can lower the likelihood of revolution. In fact, when the punishment for failed protest is not too harsh and citizens' private knowledge is accurate, then further communication reduces incentives to revolt. (2) Increasing strategic uncertainty can increase the likelihood of revolution attempts, and even the likelihood of successful revolution. In particular, revolt may be more likely when citizens privately obtain information than when they receive information from a common media source. (3) Two dilemmas arise concerning the intensity and frequency of punishment (repression), and the frequency of protest. Punishment Dilemma 1: harsher punishments may increase the probability that punishment is materialized. That is, as the state increases the punishment for dissent, it might also have to punish more dissidents. It is only when the punishment is sufficiently harsh, that harsher punishment reduces the frequency of its application. Punishment Dilemma 1 leads to Punishment Dilemma 2: the frequencies of repression and protest can be positively or negatively correlated depending on the intensity of repression. My third essay, The Repression Puzzle, investigates the relationship between the intensity of grievances and the likelihood of repression. First, I make the observation that the occurrence of state repression is a puzzle. If repression is to succeed, dissidents should not rebel. If it is to fail, the state should concede in order to save the costs of unsuccessful repression. I then propose an explanation for the “repression puzzle” that hinges on information asymmetries between the state and dissidents about the costs of repression to the state, and hence the likelihood of its application by the state. I present a formal model that combines the insights of grievance-based and political process theories to investigate the consequences of this information asymmetry for the dissidents' contentious actions and for the relationship between the magnitude of grievances (formulated here as the extent of inequality) and the likelihood of repression. The main contribution of the paper is to show that this relationship is non-monotone. That is, as the magnitude of grievances increases, the likelihood of repression might decrease. I investigate the relationship between inequality and the likelihood of repression in all country-years from 1981 to 1999. To mitigate specification problem, I estimate the probability of repression using a generalized additive model with thin-plate splines (GAM-TPS). This technique allows for flexible relationship between inequality, the proxy for the costs of repression and revolutions (income per capita), and the likelihood of repression. The empirical evidence support my prediction that the relationship between the magnitude of grievances and the likelihood of repression is non-monotone.

One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation

In elections, majority divisions pave the way to focal manipulations and coordination failures, which can lead to the victory of the wrong candidate. This paper shows how this flaw can be addressed if voter preferences over candidates are sensitive to information. We consider two potential sources of divisions: majority voters may have similar preferences but opposite information about the candidates, or opposite preferences. We show that when information is the source of majority divisions, Approval Voting features a unique equilibrium with full information and coordination equivalence. That is, it produces the same outcome as if both information and coordination problems could be resolved. Other electoral systems, such as Plurality and Two-Round elections, do not satisfy this equivalence. The second source of division is opposite preferences. Whenever the fraction of voters with such preferences is not too large, Approval Voting still satisfies full information and coordination equivalence.

A Phylogenetic Classification of the Video-Game Industry’s Business Model Ecosystem

Part 8: Business Strategies Alignment

Phylogeographic Triangulation: Using Predator-Prey-Parasite Interactions to Infer Population History from Partial Genetic Information

Phylogeographic studies, which infer population history and dispersal movements from intra-specific spatial genetic variation, require expensive and time-consuming analyses that are not always feasible, especially in the case of rare or endangered species. On the other hand, comparative phylogeography of species involved in close biotic interactions may show congruent patterns depending on the specificity of the relationship. Consequently, the phylogeography of a parasite that needs two hosts to complete its life cycle should reflect population history traits of both hosts. Population movements evidenced by the parasite’s phylogeography that are not reflected in the phylogeography of one of these hosts may thus be attributed to the other host. Using the wild rabbit (Oryctolagus cuniculus) and a parasitic tapeworm (Taenia pisiformis) as an example, we propose comparing the phylogeography of easily available organisms such as game species and their specific heteroxenous parasites to infer population movements of definitive host/predator species, independently of performing genetic analyses on the latter. This may be an interesting approach for indirectly studying the history of species whose phylogeography is difficult to analyse directly.

Geographical and environmental correlates of big and small game in Andalusia (southern Spain)

In Andalusia, southern Spain, each game estate applies its own rules and presents its results in annual hunting reports, which have been mandatory for Spanish game estates since 1989. We used the information about hunting yields, included in 32134 annual hunting reports produced during the period 1993/94 to 2001/02 by 6049 game estates, to determine the current distribution of hunting yields of big and small game species in Andalusia. Using generalised linear models and a geographic information system, we determined the most favourable municipalities to big and small game, respectively, and delimited potential areas to attain good hunting yields for big and small game at a 1-km2 resolution. Municipalities and areas favourable to big game are mainly located in the Sierra Morena and the westernmost fringe of the Betic Range, while those favourable to small game occupy the upper Guadalquivir River valley. There is a clear segregation between big and small game species according to the physiography and land uses of the territory. Big game species are typical of Mediterranean woodland areas, while the most emblematic small game species prefer agricultural areas. Our results provide a territorial ordination of hunting yields in southern Spain and have several potential applications in strategic planning for hunting activities and biodiversity conservation in Andalusia that can be extrapolated to other regions.

Essays on Information Economics

This thesis consists of three essays on information economics. I explore how information is strategically communicated or designed by senders who aim to influence the decisions of a receiver. In the first chapter, I study a cheap talk game between two imperfectly informed experts and a decision maker. The experts receive noisy signals about the state and sequentially communicate the relevant information to the decision maker. I refine the self-serving belief system under uncertainty and Ι characterise the most informative equilibrium that might arise in such environments.In the second chapter, I consider the case where a decision maker seeks advice from a biased expert who cares also about establishing a reputation of being competent. The expert has the incentives to misreport her information but she faces a trade-off between the gain from misrepresentation and the potential reputation loss. I show that the equilibrium is fully-revealing if the expert is not too biased and not too highly reputable. If there is competition between two experts the information transmission is always improved. However, in cases where the experts are more than two the result is ambiguous, and it depends on the players’ prior belief over states.In the last chapter, I consider a model of strategic communication where a privately and imperfectly informed sender can persuade a receiver. The sender may receive favorable or unfavorable private information about her preferred state. I describe two ways that are adopted in real life situations and theoretically improve equilibrium informativeness given sender's private information. First, a policy that suggests symmetry constraints to the experiments' choice. Second, an approval strategy characterised by a low precision threshold where the receiver will accept the sender with a positive probability and a higher one where the sender will be accepted with certainty.

Transmission Of Intra-cellular Genetic Information: A System Proposal.

One of the great challenges of the scientific community on theories of genetic information, genetic communication and genetic coding is to determine a mathematical structure related to DNA sequences. In this paper we propose a model of an intra-cellular transmission system of genetic information similar to a model of a power and bandwidth efficient digital communication system in order to identify a mathematical structure in DNA sequences where such sequences are biologically relevant. The model of a transmission system of genetic information is concerned with the identification, reproduction and mathematical classification of the nucleotide sequence of single stranded DNA by the genetic encoder. Hence, a genetic encoder is devised where labelings and cyclic codes are established. The establishment of the algebraic structure of the corresponding codes alphabets, mappings, labelings, primitive polynomials (p(x)) and code generator polynomials (g(x)) are quite important in characterizing error-correcting codes subclasses of G-linear codes. These latter codes are useful for the identification, reproduction and mathematical classification of DNA sequences. The characterization of this model may contribute to the development of a methodology that can be applied in mutational analysis and polymorphisms, production of new drugs and genetic improvement, among other things, resulting in the reduction of time and laboratory costs.

[evaluation Of Data On Live Birth Certificates From The Information System On Live Births (sinasc) In Campinas, São Paulo, 2009].

To assess the completeness and reliability of the Information System on Live Births (Sinasc) data. A cross-sectional analysis of the reliability and completeness of Sinasc's data was performed using a sample of Live Birth Certificate (LBC) from 2009, related to births from Campinas, Southeast Brazil. For data analysis, hospitals were grouped according to category of service (Unified National Health System, private or both), 600 LBCs were randomly selected and the data were collected in LBC-copies through mothers and newborns' hospital records and by telephone interviews. The completeness of LBCs was evaluated, calculating the percentage of blank fields, and the LBCs agreement comparing the originals with the copies was evaluated by Kappa and intraclass correlation coefficients. The percentage of completeness of LBCs ranged from 99.8%-100%. For the most items, the agreement was excellent. However, the agreement was acceptable for marital status, maternal education and newborn infants' race/color, low for prenatal visits and presence of birth defects, and very low for the number of deceased children. The results showed that the municipality Sinasc is reliable for most of the studied variables. Investments in training of the professionals are suggested in an attempt to improve system capacity to support planning and implementation of health activities for the benefit of maternal and child population.

Geographical Distribution Of The Association Between El Niño South Oscillation And Dengue Fever In The Americas: A Continental Analysis Using Geographical Information System-based Techniques.

El Niño South Oscillation (ENSO) is one climatic phenomenon related to the inter-annual variability of global meteorological patterns influencing sea surface temperature and rainfall variability. It influences human health indirectly through extreme temperature and moisture conditions that may accelerate the spread of some vector-borne viral diseases, like dengue fever (DF). This work examines the spatial distribution of association between ENSO and DF in the countries of the Americas during 1995-2004, which includes the 1997-1998 El Niño, one of the most important climatic events of 20(th) century. Data regarding the South Oscillation index (SOI), indicating El Niño-La Niña activity, were obtained from Australian Bureau of Meteorology. The annual DF incidence (AIy) by country was computed using Pan-American Health Association data. SOI and AIy values were standardised as deviations from the mean and plotted in bars-line graphics. The regression coefficient values between SOI and AIy (rSOI,AI) were calculated and spatially interpolated by an inverse distance weighted algorithm. The results indicate that among the five years registering high number of cases (1998, 2002, 2001, 2003 and 1997), four had El Niño activity. In the southern hemisphere, the annual spatial weighted mean centre of epidemics moved southward, from 6° 31' S in 1995 to 21° 12' S in 1999 and the rSOI,AI values were negative in Cuba, Belize, Guyana and Costa Rica, indicating a synchrony between higher DF incidence rates and a higher El Niño activity. The rSOI,AI map allows visualisation of a graded surface with higher values of ENSO-DF associations for Mexico, Central America, northern Caribbean islands and the extreme north-northwest of South America.

[access To Information About How To Prevent Oral Problems Among School Children In The Public School Network].

The scope of this study is to identify the prevalence of access to information about how to prevent oral problems among schoolchildren in the public school network, as well as the factors associated with such access. This is a cross-sectional and analytical study conducted among 12-year-old schoolchildren in a Brazilian municipality with a large population. The examinations were performed by 24 trained dentists and calibrated with the aid of 24 recorders. Data collection occurred in 36 public schools selected from the 89 public schools of the city. Descriptive, univariate and multiple analyses were conducted. Of the 2510 schoolchildren included in the study, 2211 reported having received information about how to prevent oral problems. Access to such information was greater among those who used private dental services; and lower among those who used the service for treatment, who evaluated the service as regular or bad/awful. The latter use toothbrush only or toothbrush and tongue scrubbing as a means of oral hygiene and who reported not being satisfied with the appearance of their teeth. The conclusion drawn is that the majority of schoolchildren had access to information about how to prevent oral problems, though access was associated with the characteristics of health services, health behavior and outcomes.

Análise dos esforços de alta intensidade de jogadores de futebol profissional

Universidade Estadual de Campinas . Faculdade de Educação Física

O uso de dicas especificas como estrategia de atenção seletiva em portadores da Sindrome de Down

Universidade Estadual de Campinas. Faculdade de Educação Física

Auto-organização no comportamento de crianças no jogo

Universidade Estadual de Campinas . Faculdade de Educação Física

Corpo-sujeito Kadiweu : jogo e esporte

Universidade Estadual de Campinas . Faculdade de Educação Física

Utilização da discriminação grafica de Fisher para indicação dos dermatoglifos como referencial de potencialidade de atletas de basquetebol

Universidade Estadual de Campinas. Faculdade de Educação Física