General function of the gall bladder from the evolutionary standpoint, by Frank W. Gorham and Andrew Conway Ivy.

v.22:no.3(1938)

Single period Markowitz portfolio selection, performance gauging and duality: a variation on Luenberger's shortage function

Markowitz portfolio theory (1952) has induced research into the efficiency of portfolio management. This paper studies existing nonparametric efficiency measurement approaches for single period portfolio selection from a theoretical perspective and generalises currently used efficiency measures into the full mean-variance space. Therefore, we introduce the efficiency improvement possibility function (a variation on the shortage function), study its axiomatic properties in the context of Markowitz efficient frontier, and establish a link to the indirect mean-variance utility function. This framework allows distinguishing between portfolio efficiency and allocative efficiency. Furthermore, it permits retrieving information about the revealed risk aversion of investors. The efficiency improvement possibility function thus provides a more general framework for gauging the efficiency of portfolio management using nonparametric frontier envelopment methods based on quadratic optimisation.

Embedding theorems of function classes, IV

Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt

Embedding theorems of function classes, II

Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt.

The period function of the generalized Lotka-Volterra centers

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt"

Embedding theorems of function classes, I

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

Delegation and information sharing in oligopoly

Information sharing in oligopoly has been analyzed by assuming that firms behave as a sole economic agent. In this paper I assume that ownership and management are separated. Managers are allowed to falsely report their costs to owners and rivals. Under such circumstances, if owners want to achieve information sharing they must use managerial contracts that implement truthful cost reporting by managers as a dominant strategy. I show that, contrary to the classical result, without the inclusion of message-dependent payments in managerial contracts there will be no information sharing. On the other hand, with the inclusion of such publicly observable payments and credible ex-ante commitment by owners not to modify these payments, there will be perfect information sharing without the need for third parties. Keywords: Information sharing, Delegation, Managerial contracts. JEL classification numbers: D21, D82, L13, L21

Sharing the surplus: a just and efficient proposal for environments with externalities

Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This in turn leads to disputes regarding the compensation levels to the various parties affected. We propose a general, yet simple, method of deciding upon the distribution of the gains (costs) of cooperation in the presence of externalities. This method is shown to be the unique one satisfying several desirable properties. Furthermore, we illustrate the use of this method to resolve the sharing of benefits generated by international climate control agreements.

Information-sharing implications of horizontal mergers

We analyze the effects of uncertainty and private information on horizontal mergers. Firms face uncertain demands or costs and receive private signals. They may decide to merge sharing their private information. If the uncertainty parameters are independent and the signals are perfect, uncertainty generates an informational advantage only to the merging firms, increasing merger incentives and decreasing free-riding effects. Thus, mergers become more profitable and stable. These results generalize to the case of correlated parameters if the correlation is not very severe, and for perfect correlation if the firms receive noisy signals. From the normative point of view, mergers are socially less harmful compared to deterministic markets and may even be welfare enhancing. If the signals are, instead, publicly observed, uncertainty does not necessarily give more incentives to merge, and mergers are not always less socially harmful.

The third order Melnikov function of a quadratic center under quadratic perturbation

We study quadratic perturbations of the integrable system (1+x)dH; where H =(x²+y²)=2: We prove that the first three Melnikov functions associated to the perturbed system give rise at most to three limit cycles.

Investor protection, risk sharing and inequality

This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, financial risk sharing and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk while lending to firms. This implies lower cost of external finance and better risk sharing between financiers and entrepreneurs. Investor protection, by boosting the market for risk sharing plays the twofold role of encouraging agents to undertake risky enterprises and providing them with insurance. By increasing the number of risky projects, it raises income inequality. By extending insurance to more agents, it reduces it. As a result, the relationship between the size of the market for risk sharing and income inequality is hump-shaped. Empirical evidence from a cross-section of sixty-eight countries, and a panel of fifty countries over the period 1976-2000, supports the predictions of the model.

Cooperative production and efficiency

We characterize the sharing rule for which a contribution mechanism achieves efficiency in a cooperative production setting when agents are heterogeneous. The sharing rule bears no resemblance to those considered by the previous literature. We also show for a large class of sharing rules that if Nash equilibrium yields efficient allocations, the production function displays constant returns to scale, a case in which cooperation in production is useless.

Effect on renal function of tenofovir co-administered with either efavirenz or boosted lopinavir or boosted atazanavir: the Swiss HIV Cohort Study

Reduced re'nal function has been reported with tenofovir disoproxil fumarate (TDF). It is not clear whether TDF co-administered with a boosted protease inhibitor (PI) leads to a greater decline in renal function than TDF co-administered with a non-nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitor (NNRTI).Methods: We selected ail antiretroviral therapy-naive patients in the Swiss HIV Cohort Study (SHCS) with calibrated or corrected serum creatinine measurements starting antiretroviral therapy with TDF and either efavirenz (EFV) or the ritonavir-boosted PIs, lopinavir (LPV/r) or atazanavir (ATV/r). As a measure of renal function, we used the Chronic Kidney Disease Epidemiology Collaboration (CKD-EPI) equation to estimate the glomerular filtration rate (eGFR). We calculated the difference in eGFR over time between two therapies using a marginal model for repeated measures. In weighted analyses, observations were weighted by the product of their point of treatment and censoring weights to adjust for differences both in the sort of patients starting each therapy and in the sort of patients remaining on each therapy over time.Results: By March 2011, 940 patients with at least one creatinine measurement on a first therapy with either TDF and EFV (n=484), TDF and LPVlr (n=269) or TDF and ATV/r (n=187) had been followed for a median of 1. 7, 1.2 and 1.3 years, respectively. Table 1 shows the difference in average estimated GFR (eGFR) over time since starting cART for two marginal models. The first model was not adjusted for potential confounders; the second mode! used weights to adjust for confounders. The results suggest a greater decline in renal function during the first 6 months if TDF is used with a PI rather than with an NNRTI, but no further difference between these therapies after the first 6 months. TDF and ATV/r may lead to a greater decline in the first 6 months than TDF and LPVlr.Conclusions: TDF co-administered with a boosted PI leads to a greater de cline in renal function over the first 6 months of therapy than TDF co-administered with an NNRTI; this decline may be worse with ATV/r than with LPV/r.