Theory of mind and relational complexity

Cognitive complexity and control theory and relational complexity theory attribute developmental changes in theory of mind (TOM) to complexity. In 3 studies, 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds performed TOM tasks (false belief, appearance-reality), less complex connections (Level 1 perspective-taking) tasks, and transformations tasks (understanding the effects of location changes and colored filters) with content similar to TOM. There were also predictor tasks at binary-relational and ternary-relational complexity levels, with different content. Consistent with complexity theories: (a) connections and transformations were easier and mastered earlier than TOM; (b) predictor tasks accounted for more than 80% of age-related variance in TOM; and (c) ternary-relational items accounted for TOM variance, before and after controlling for age and binary-relational items. Prediction did not require hierarchically structured predictor tasks.

Theory-of-mind development in oral deaf children with cochlear implants or conventional hearing aids

Background: In the context of the established finding that theory-of-mind (ToM) growth is seriously delayed in late-signing deaf children, and some evidence of equivalent delays in those learning speech with conventional hearing aids, this study's novel contribution was to explore ToM development in deaf children with cochlear implants. Implants can substantially boost auditory acuity and rates of language growth. Despite the implant, there are often problems socialising with hearing peers and some language difficulties, lending special theoretical interest to the present comparative design. Methods: A total of 52 children aged 4 to 12 years took a battery of false belief tests of ToM. There were 26 oral deaf children, half with implants and half with hearing aids, evenly divided between oral-only versus sign-plus-oral schools. Comparison groups of age-matched high-functioning children with autism and younger hearing children were also included. Results: No significant ToM differences emerged between deaf children with implants and those with hearing aids, nor between those in oral-only versus sign-plus-oral schools. Nor did the deaf children perform any better on the ToM tasks than their age peers with autism. Hearing preschoolers scored significantly higher than all other groups. For the deaf and the autistic children, as well as the preschoolers, rate of language development and verbal maturity significantly predicted variability in ToM, over and above chronological age. Conclusions: The finding that deaf children with cochlear implants are as delayed in ToM development as children with autism and their deaf peers with hearing aids or late sign language highlights the likely significance of peer interaction and early fluent communication with peers and family, whether in sign or in speech, in order to optimally facilitate the growth of social cognition and language.

Theory of mind and mental state discourse during book reading and story-telling tasks

This article presents three studies conducted in Canada and Australia that relate theory of mind (ToM) development to mental state discourse. In Study 1, mental state discourse was examined while parents and their 5-7-year-old children jointly read a storybook which had a surprise ending about the identity of the main character. Comments specific to the mental states of the story characters and discourse after the book had ended were positively related to children's ToM, and this was due to parent elaborations. Studies 2 and 3 examined children's mental state discourse during storytelling tasks, and in both, mental state discourse of children during narrative was concurrently related to ToM performance. While research has shown that mental state discourse of parents is related to children's ToM acquisition, the current research indicates that children's spontaneous use of mental state language examined outside of the interactional context is also a strong correlate.

Steps in theory-of-mind development for children with deafness or autism

Prior research demonstrates that understanding theory of mind (ToM) is seriously and similarly delayed in late-signing deaf children and children with autism. Are these children simply delayed in timing relative to typical children, or do they demonstrate different patterns of development? The current research addressed this question by testing 145 children (ranging from 3 to 13 years) with deafness, autism, or typical development using a ToM scale. Results indicate that all groups followed the same sequence of steps, up to a point, but that children with autism showed an importantly different sequence of understandings (in the later steps of the progression) relative to all other groups.

Telling the story of theory of mind: Deaf and hearing children's narratives and mental state understanding

Theory of mind (ToM) was examined in late-signing deaf children in two studies by using standard tests and measures of spontaneous talk about inner states of perception, affect and cognition during storytelling. In Study 1, there were 21 deaf children aged 6 to 11 years and 13 typical-hearing children matched with the deaf by chronological age. In Study 2, there were 17 deaf children aged 6 to 12 years and 17 typical-hearing preschoolers aged 4 to 5 years who were matched with the deaf by ToM test performance. In addition to replicating the consistently reported finding of poor performance on standard false belief tests by late-signing deaf children, significant correlations emerged in both studies between deaf children's ToM test scores and their spontaneous narrative talk about imaginative cognition (e.g. 'pretend'). In Study 2, with a new set of purpose-built pictures that evoked richer and more complex mentalistic narration than the published picture book of Study 1, results of multiple regression analyses showed that children's narrative talk about imaginative cognition was uniquely important, over and above hearing status and talking of other kinds of mental states, in predicting ToM scores. The same was true of children's elaborated narrative talk using utterances that either spelt out thoughts, explained inner states or introduced contrastives. In addition, results of a Guttman scalograrn analysis in Study 2 suggested a consistent sequence in narrative and standard test performance by deaf and hearing children that went from (1) narrative mention of visible (affective or perceptual) mental states only, along with FB failure, to (2) narrative mention of cognitive states along with (1), to (3) elaborated narrative talk about inner states along with (2), and finally to (4) simple and elaborated narrative talk about affective/perceptual and cognitive states along with FIB test success. Possible explanations for this performance ordering, as well as for the observed correlations in both studies between ToM test scores and narrative variables, were considered.

Theory of mind and central coherence in adults with high-functioning autism or Asperger syndrome

The study investigated theory of mind and central coherence abilities in adults with high-functioning autism (HFA) or Asperger syndrome (AS) using naturalistic tasks. Twenty adults with HTA/AS correctly answered significantly fewer theory of mind questions than 20 controls on a forced-choice response task. On a narrative task, there were no differences in the proportion of mental state words between the two groups, although the participants with HFA/AS were less inclined to provide explanations for characters' mental states. No between-group differences existed on the central coherence questions of the forced-choice response task, and the participants with HTA/AS included an equivalent proportion of explanations for non-mental state phenomena in their narratives as did controls. These results support the theory of mind deficit account of autism spectrum disorders, and suggest that difficulties in mental state attribution cannot be exclusively attributed to weak central coherence.

Mental playmates: Siblings, executive functioning and theory of mind

This study assessed the theory of mind (ToM) and executive functioning (EF) abilities of 124 typically developing preschool children aged 3 to 5 years in relation to whether or not they had a child-aged sibling (i.e. a child aged 1 to 12 years) at home with whom to play and converse. On a ToM battery that included tests of false belief, appearance-reality (AR) and pretend representation, children who had at least 1 child-aged sibling scored significantly higher than both only children and those whose only siblings were infants or adults. The numbers of child-aged siblings in preschoolers' families positively predicted their scores on both a ToM battery (4 tasks) and an EF battery (2 tasks), and these associations remained significant with language ability partialled out. Results of a hierarchical multiple regression analysis revealed that independent contributions to individual differences in ToM were made by language ability, EF skill and having a child-aged sibling. However, even though some conditions for mediation were met, there was no statistically reliable evidence that EF skills mediated the advantage of presence of child-aged siblings for ToM performance. While consistent with the theory that distinctively childish interaction among siblings accelerates the growth of both TOM and EF capacities, alternative evidence and alternative theoretical interpretations for the findings were also considered.

Linguistic determinism and theory of mind in deaf children

DeVilliers and DeVilliers (2000, 2005) propose that deaf and hearing children acquire a theory of mind (or the understanding that human behaviour is the product of psychological states like true and false beliefs) as a consequence of their linguistic mastery of a rule of syntax. Specifically, they argue that the syntactic rule for sentential complementation with verbs of speech (e.g., “say”) precedes syntactic mastery of complementation for cognition (e.g., “think”) and both of these developmentally precede and promote conceptual mastery of a theory of mind (ToM), as indexed via success on standard false belief tests. The present study examined this proposition in groups of primary-school-aged deaf children and hearing preschoolers who took false belief tests and a modified memory for complements test that included control questions. Guttman scaling techniques indicated no support either for the prediction that syntactic skill precedes ToM understanding or for the earlier emergence of complementation for “say” than for “think”. Methodological issues and implications for deaf children's ToM development are discussed.

Are there theory of mind regions in the brain? A review of the neuroimaging literature

There have been many functional imaging studies of the brain basis of theory of mind (ToM) skills, but the findings are heterogeneous and implicate anatomical regions as far apart as orbitofrontal cortex and the inferior parietal lobe. The functional imaging studies are reviewed to determine whether the diverse findings are due to methodological factors. The studies are considered according to the paradigm employed (e.g., stories vs. cartoons and explicit vs. implicit ToM instructions), the mental state(s) investigated, and the language demands of the tasks. Methodological variability does not seem to account for the variation in findings, although this conclusion may partly reflect the relatively small number of studies. Alternatively, several distinct brain regions may be activated during ToM reasoning, forming an integrated functional "network." The imaging findings suggest that there are several "core" regions in the network-including parts of the prefrontal cortex and superior temporal sulcus-while several more "peripheral" regions may contribute to ToM reasoning in a manner contingent on relatively minor aspects of the ToM task. © 2008 Wiley-Liss, Inc.

Representation, control, or reasoning? Distinct functions for theory of mind within the medial prefrontal cortex

The medial pFC (mPFC) is frequently reported to play a central role in Theory of Mind (ToM). However, the contribution of this large cortical region in ToM is not well understood. Combining a novel behavioral task with fMRI, we sought to demonstrate functional divisions between dorsal and rostral mPFC. All conditions of the task required the representation of mental states (beliefs and desires). The level of demands on cognitive control (high vs. low) and the nature of the demands on reasoning (deductive vs. abductive) were varied orthogonally between conditions. Activation in dorsal mPFC was modulated by the need for control, whereas rostral mPFC was modulated by reasoning demands. These findings fit with previously suggested domain-general functions for different parts of mPFC and suggest that these functions are recruited selectively in the service of ToM.

Theory of mind after mild TBI in preschool children : a longitudinal perspective

Les enfants d’âge préscolaire (≤ 5 ans) sont plus à risque de subir un traumatisme crânio-cérébral (TCC) que les enfants plus agés, et 90% de ces TCC sont de sévérité légère (TCCL). De nombreuses études publiées dans les deux dernières décennies démontrent que le TCCL pédiatrique peut engendrer des difficultés cognitives, comportementales et psychiatriques en phase aigüe qui, chez certains enfants, peuvent perdurer à long terme. Il existe une littérature florissante concernant l'impact du TCCL sur le fonctionnement social et sur la cognition sociale (les processus cognitifs qui sous-tendent la socialisation) chez les enfants d'âge scolaire et les adolescents. Or, seulement deux études ont examiné l'impact d'un TCCL à l'âge préscolaire sur le développement social et aucune étude ne s'est penchée sur les répercussions socio-cognitives d'un TCCL précoce (à l’âge préscolaire). L'objectif de la présente thèse était donc d'étudier les conséquences du TCCL en bas âge sur la cognition sociale. Pour ce faire, nous avons examiné un aspect de la cognition sociale qui est en plein essor à cet âge, soit la théorie de l'esprit (TE), qui réfère à la capacité de se mettre à la place d'autrui et de comprendre sa perspective. Le premier article avait pour but d'étudier deux sous-composantes de la TE, soit la compréhension des fausses croyances et le raisonnement des désirs et des émotions d'autrui, six mois post-TCCL. Les résultats indiquent que les enfants d'âge préscolaire (18 à 60 mois) qui subissent un TCCL ont une TE significativement moins bonne 6 mois post-TCCL comparativement à un groupe contrôle d'enfants n'ayant subi aucune blessure. Le deuxième article visait à éclaircir l'origine de la diminution de la TE suite à un TCCL précoce. Cet objectif découle du débat qui existe actuellement dans la littérature. En effet, plusieurs scientifiques sont d'avis que l'on peut conclure à un effet découlant de la blessure au cerveau seulement lorsque les enfants ayant subi un TCCL sont comparés à des enfants ayant subi une blessure n'impliquant pas la tête (p.ex., une blessure orthopédique). Cet argument est fondé sur des études qui démontrent qu'en général, les enfants qui sont plus susceptibles de subir une blessure, peu importe la nature de celle-ci, ont des caractéristiques cognitives pré-existantes (p.ex. impulsivité, difficultés attentionnelles). Il s'avère donc possible que les difficultés que nous croyons attribuables à la blessure cérébrale étaient présentes avant même que l'enfant ne subisse un TCCL. Dans cette deuxième étude, nous avons donc comparé les performances aux tâches de TE d'enfants ayant subi un TCCL à ceux d'enfants appartenant à deux groupes contrôles, soit des enfants n'ayant subi aucune blessure et à des pairs ayant subi une blessure orthopédique. De façon générale, les enfants ayant subi un TCCL ont obtenu des performances significativement plus faibles à la tâche évaluant le raisonnement des désirs et des émotions d'autrui, 6 mois post-blessure, comparativement aux deux groupes contrôles. Cette étude visait également à examiner l'évolution de la TE suite à un TCCL, soit de 6 mois à 18 mois post-blessure. Les résultats démontrent que les moindres performances sont maintenues 18 mois post-TCCL. Enfin, le troisième but de cette étude était d’investiguer s’il existe un lien en la performance aux tâches de TE et les habiletés sociales, telles qu’évaluées à l’aide d’un questionnaire rempli par le parent. De façon intéressante, la TE est associée aux habiletés sociales seulement chez les enfants ayant subi un TCCL. Dans l'ensemble, ces deux études mettent en évidence des répercussions spécifiques du TCCL précoce sur la TE qui persistent à long terme, et une TE amoindrie seraient associée à de moins bonnes habiletés sociales. Cette thèse démontre qu'un TCCL en bas âge peut faire obstacle au développement sociocognitif, par le biais de répercussions sur la TE. Ces résultats appuient la théorie selon laquelle le jeune cerveau immature présente une vulnérabilité accrue aux blessures cérébrales. Enfin, ces études mettent en lumière la nécessité d'étudier ce groupe d'âge, plutôt que d'extrapoler à partir de résultats obtenus avec des enfants plus âgés, puisque les enjeux développementaux s'avèrent différents, et que ceux-ci ont potentiellement une influence majeure sur les répercussions d'une blessure cérébrale sur le fonctionnement sociocognitif.