'The utility of human security': Which humans? What security? A reply to Thomas & Tow

Thomas & Tow's evaluation of the utility of human security is an important contribution to an ongoing debate about what security is and for whom security should be provided. In particular, the authors' engagement with the human security agenda is important given the centrality of this approach to recent attempts to rethink security. This article argues, however, that Thomas & Tow's approach to the human security agenda is problematic for two central reasons. First, their attempt to narrow security to make this approach amenable to state policymakers risks reifying the sources of insecurity for individuals everywhere. Second, the conception of human security they put forward appears largely inconsistent with the normative concerns inherent in the human security agenda.

Nuclear weapons as obstacles to international security

This article argues that nuclear weapons serve no useful purpose in military calculations; moreover, their continued retention invites the dangers of further proliferation and of accidental use. They are thus defined here as obstacles to, rather than as facilitators of, international security. Seven reasons are presented to support this contention, including an assessment of the moral implications and the strategic limitations of nuclear weapons. Despite these limitations, and the recent commitments made by the nuclear weapon states to eliminate their arsenals, nuclear weapons remain central to the strategic doctrines of these states. Several reasons are put forward to explain why this retention continues, including the unchanging nature of strategic mindsets, the presence of vested interests, and now, in the case of the USA at least, a renewed reliance on nuclear weapons, regardless of how appropriate and effective such a strategy might be against emerging terrorist or `rogue state' threats.

The Utility of the Human Security Agenda for Policy-makers

The idea of “human security” is gaining attention among policy-makers and security analysts. Little scholarly attention has been given to the questions of why states accept (or reject) a human security agenda or how such an agenda is incorporated into policy practices. The article suggests that a human security approach is most likely to be applied when both humanitarian and national interests combine. Yet when states or organisations adopt a human security approach, they often misjudge the complex and long-term commitment required of such an approach. There is also the potential for such an agenda to be manipulated to justify questionable courses of action. These issues frame an analysis of six recent case studies.

Turkey's Accession to the European Union in terms of impact on the EU's security and defense policies: potential and drawbacks

This study explores the impact of Turkey's likely entry in the European Union (EU) in terms of the EU's foreign, security and defense policies. It reviews Turkish capabilities, namely its military capabilities, which could provide the EU with valuable defense assets. There are differences related to Turkey's relations with the EU, which have increasingly spilled over into the NATO, hindering the development of cooperation over crisis management operations. The article then delves in the implications of Turkey's strategic geographical location to EU policies. It reviews how far the EU and Turkey may have convergent interests in some of the neighboring regions, especially in the Middle East.

Security issues during Lula's administration: from the reactive to the assertive approach

Brazil's security agenda during Lula's administration was not homogeneous through the two mandates: the first tenure (2002-2006) revealed a reactive approach towards security topics, while the second one (2006-2010) was more assertive. More specifically, the shift occurred in terms of both its geographical scope - once it incorporated global issues in a more systematic way -, and instruments through which the security agenda was exercised, given the multilateral initiative of Unasur's CDS

Terrorism as war by other means: national security and state support for terrorism

The conventional approach in the discipline of International Relations is to treat terrorist organizations as "non-state" actors of international relations. However, this approach is problematic due to the fact that most terrorist organizations are backed or exploited by some states. In this article, I take issue with the non-stateness of terrorist organizations and seek to answer the question of why so many states, at times, support terrorist organizations. I argue that in the face of rising threats to national security in an age of devastating wars, modern nation states tend to provide support to foreign terrorist organizations that work against their present and imminent enemies. I elaborate on my argument studying three cases of state support for terrorism: Iranian support for Hamas, Syrian support for the PKK, and American support for the MEK. The analyses suggest that, for many states, terror is nothing but war by other means.

UN Security Council decision-making: testing the bribery hypothesis

Liberal-Institutionalism and Structural Realism expectations about international organizations are confronted by looking at if and how US-controlled international aid is granted, and particularly if it is related or not to political affinity and to United Nations Security Council (UNSC) non-permanent membership. A preliminary assessment suggests that these relations only hold for the period of the Cold War, and, even then, only when UNSC non-permanent membership is in years in which the Security Council was deemed very important.

The US experience in contracting out security and lessons for other countries

The United States has gone further than any country in the "privatization of security". Other countries may find the economic or financial logic in the use of contractors persuasive. The US experience with contracting out security, particularly in Iraq, was problematic, and can serve as a cautionary tale in order that other countries might learn how to avoid the pitfalls.

Chagas' disease and social security: a case-control study in an urban area, Goiás, Brazil

One hundred and twenty subjects with Chagas' cardiopathy and 120 non-infected subjects were randomly selected from first time claimants of sickness benefits in the National Institute of Social Security (INPS) in Goiás. Cases of Chagas' cardiopathy were defined based on serological test, history of residence in an endemic area and, clinical and/or electrocardiogram (ECG) alterations suggestive of Chagas' cardiomyopathy. Controls were defined as subjects with at least two negative serological tests. Case and controls were compared in the analysis for age, sex, place of birth, migration history, socio-economic level, occupation, physical exertion at work, age at affiliation and years of contribution to the social security scheme, clinical course of their disease and ECG abnormalities. Chagas' disease patients were younger than other subjects and predominantly of rural origin. Non-infected subjects presented a better socio-economic level, were performing more skilled activities and had less changes of job than cases. No important difference was observed in relation to age at affiliation to INPS. About 60% of cases have claimed for benefits within the first four years of contribution while among controls this proportion was 38.5%. Cases were involved, proportionally more than controls, in "heavy" activities. A risk of 2.3 (95%CL 1.5 - 4.6) and 1.8 (95%CL 1.2- 3.5) was obtained comparing respectively "heavy" and "moderate" physical activity against "light". A relative risk of 8.5 (95%CL 4.9 - 14.8) associated with the presence of cardiopathy was estimated comparing the initial sample of seropositive subjects and controls. A high relative risk was observed in relation to right bundle branch block (RR = 37.1 95%CL = 8.8 - 155.6) and left anterior hemiblock (RR = 4.4, 95%CL = 2.1 - 9.1).

Biblioteca para a realização de security token services

A família de especificações WS-* define um modelo de segurança para web services, baseado nos conceitos de claim, security token e Security Token Service (STS). Neste modelo, a informação de segurança dos originadores de mensagens (identidade, privilégios, etc.) é representada através de conjuntos de claims, contidos dentro de security tokens. A emissão e obtenção destes security tokens, por parte dos originadores de mensagens, são realizadas através de protocolos legados ou através de serviços especiais, designados de Security Token Services, usando as operações e os protocolos definidos na especificação WS-Trust. O conceito de Security Token Service não é usado apenas no contexto dos web services. Propostas como o modelo dos Information Cards, aplicável no contexto de aplicações web, também utilizam este conceito. Os Security Token Services desempenham vários papéis, dependendo da informação presente no token emitido. São exemplos o papel de Identity Provider, quando os tokens emitidos contêm informação de identidade, ou o papel de Policy Decision Point, quando os tokens emitidos definem autorizações. Este documento descreve o projecto duma biblioteca software para a realização de Security Token Services, tal como definidos na norma WS-Trust, destinada à plataforma .NET 3.5. Propõem-se uma arquitectura flexível e extensível, de forma a suportar novas versões das normas e as diversas variantes que os Security Token Services possuem, nomeadamente: o tipo dos security token emitidos e das claims neles contidas, a inferência das claims e os métodos de autenticação das entidades requerentes. Apresentam-se aspectos de implementação desta arquitectura, nomeadamente a integração com a plataforma WCF, a sua extensibilidade e o suporte a modelos e sistemas externos à norma. Finalmente, descrevem-se as plataformas de teste implementadas para a validação da biblioteca realizada e os módulos de extensão da biblioteca para: suporte do modelo associado aos Information Cards, do modelo OpenID e para a integração com o Authorization Manager.

Improving Remote Voting Security with Code Voting

One of the major problems that prevents the spread of elections with the possibility of remote voting over electronic networks, also called Internet Voting, is the use of unreliable client platforms, such as the voter's computer and the Internet infrastructure connecting it to the election server. A computer connected to the Internet is exposed to viruses, worms, Trojans, spyware, malware and other threats that can compromise the election's integrity. For instance, it is possible to write a virus that changes the voter's vote to a predetermined vote on election's day. Another possible attack is the creation of a fake election web site where the voter uses a malicious vote program on the web site that manipulates the voter's vote (phishing/pharming attack). Such attacks may not disturb the election protocol, therefore can remain undetected in the eyes of the election auditors. We propose the use of Code Voting to overcome insecurity of the client platform. Code Voting consists in creating a secure communication channel to communicate the voter's vote between the voter and a trusted component attached to the voter's computer. Consequently, no one controlling the voter's computer can change the his/her's vote. The trusted component can then process the vote according to a cryptographic voting protocol to enable cryptographic verification at the server's side.